The section we have examined is a persuasive and sustained demolition of the realist strategy of deriving an invariable concomitance between the existenthood of the world and the system of validation (a system accepted by both parties as being the regulator of epistemic activity). This leaves the Advaitin with an absence of invariable concomitance. This is where the Advaitin wants to be. On his view, the absence of this concomitant dependence of the system of validation on an ‘existent’ world points (...) to the possibility that the cognized world is not that independent world which Nyāya takes to be the determinate reality. If that world is not philosophically proven to be so independent, then there is at least aprima facie case for the Advaitic soteriological claim that it is Brahman alone which is ultimately real, even though the commonly cognized world allows of coherent epistemic activity. It is fair to say that such a view is established by the failure of the opponent to prove invariable concomitance between inquiry, validation and an independent world. It is the inability of the opposing view to prove a metaphysical claim which itself points to the nature of the Advaitic position; the position, that is, which suspends the need to make an ontic commitment to the extrinsic world as a determinate reality. Whether the critique of the Nyāya concept ofsattā takes us to the refutation of the Nyāya concept of a determinate world (and whether the Advaitic rejection ofsattā is of a piece with the concept of an ‘indeterminate’ world) is another issue, dealt with in detail by Śrī Har $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} $$ a elsewhere in his book, but beyond the purview of this paper. (shrink)

The problem which seems to remain with the Advaitin's non-realist account is that in giving up both the robust realist use of existenthood and the strong idealist use of cognitive verification, he seems to have weakened the connection between what must be the case and what is experienced. In explaining the nature of cognition, the realist says that existenthood (objects ontologically independent of cognition)must be the case; the idealist says that existenthoodmust not be the case. But in saying that existenthood (...) and non-existenthood are both outside the purview of the explanation of cognition, and then further, in saying that there is only a weak connection — of coherent assumption or best justification through confirmation — between objects and cognition, in other words, refusing to say whatmust be the case, is the non-realist not making his ontology acutely contingent on the current features of cognition? Is his ontology not, in this sense, provisional upon current cognition? As any reader even glancingly acquainted with Advaita would see straightaway, that understanding of ontology as aprovisional state (samv $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{r} $$ tti-sattā) is precisely what the Advaitin has striven to establish. We must leave the examination of the purpose of this effort for another occasion. (shrink)

Jonardon Ganeri’s The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance is a trailblazing study in cross-cultural philosophy of mind. Its liberal conception of naturalism makes room for a rich analytic taxonomy of conceptions of personal identity that go well beyond the standard models of Cartesianism, Physicalism, and Reductionism. But this naturalistically respectable model of the self must contend with the fact that the findings of the cognitive sciences are also compatible with ontological antirealism about the self. And while the book (...) opens new avenues for systematic reflection that thoroughly engages the historical material, its solutions to the problem of personal identity and the problem of self-knowledge often shortcut descriptive accounts that take agency and self-awareness to be constituted by their proprietary phenomenology. (shrink)