Expanding his collected essays on architectural theory and criticism, Chris Abel pursues his explorations across disciplinary and regional boundaries in search of a deeper understanding of architecture in the evolution of human culture and identity formation. From his earliest writings predicting the computer-based revolution in customised architectural production, through his novel studies on 'tacit knowing' in design or hybridisation in regional and colonial architecture, to his radical theory of the 'extended self', Abel has been a consistently fresh and provocative thinker, (...) contesting both conventions and intellectual fashions. This revised third edition includes a new introduction and six additional chapters by the author covering a broad range of related topics, up to recent concerns with genetic design methods and virtual selves. Together with the former essays, the book presents a unique global perspective on the changing cultural issues and technologies shaping human identities and the built environment in diverse parts of the world, both East and West (from the book cover). (shrink)

In a recent discussion of disenchantment and re-enchantment Charles Taylor suggests that it is possible to respond to the disenchanted view of the world, in which meaning and value are understood as subjective projections, by articulating a re-enchanted sense of nature or the universe from the perspective of human ‘agency-in-the-world’, in which meaning and value are objective. The question I address in this thesis is, what could it mean to articulate a re-enchantment from within our ‘agency-in-the-world’? In Chapter One I (...) examine the work of John McDowell in order to explore the possibility that he gives sense to the idea of a re-enchantment from within our agency-in-the-world. I conclude that he provides one way of doing so. However I argue that McDowell’s naturalism of second nature can seem limited as it does not address the ‘proto-religious’ dimension to Taylor’s understanding of re-enchantment. In Chapter Two I turn to the work of Roger Scruton to consider whether he provides a re-enchantment from within our agency-in-the-world that does accommodate this proto-religious dimension. I conclude that he does, but raise concerns about how convincing Scruton’s re-enchantment is. I argue that, from a McDowellian point of view, a case can be made that Scruton implicitly accepts as true certain significant elements of the disenchanted view of the world. In Chapter Three I look to the later Heidegger for an alternative re-enchantment from within our agency-in-the-world that attempts to accommodate the proto-religious. I focus on two interpretations of the later Heidegger given by Julian Young and Charles Taylor. In response to a worry put forward by Young, I argue that Charles Taylor’s interpretation can accommodate a proto-religious dimension. In my Conclusion I argue that McDowell’s naturalism of second nature and the understanding of our agency-in-the-world as presented by Taylor’s Heidegger, form interestingly continuous re-enchantments. On this basis I argue that although McDowell himself does not extend his idea of second nature to accommodate the proto-religious, the example of later Heidegger shows that there is nothing inherently limited about the framework of second nature that means it cannot be extended to encompass important proto-religious responses to the world. (shrink)

In recent years, codes of ethics have been introduced in the banking sector and academia, or have been modified in reaction to recent developments and scandals; earlier on, bioethics commissions were set up to reflect on the ‘ethical’ implications of the so-called ‘sixth technology revolution.’ Yet, this frequent reference to morality and ethics by politicians, managers, medical professionals, technologists, scientists, and lobby groups is quite disquieting. Such moralism, it is argued in this article, not only misunderstands and overshadows the nature (...) of human morality and of humans themselves, but it also expresses the intellectual and political failure to comprehend the source of contemporary ‘moral deficiencies,’ which codes by themselves are incapable of ‘solving.’ The obvious separation between the ‘moral’ and the ‘human’ that is implied in these cases is reinforced by a different current of thought in which the Nietzschean opposition between morality and the affirmation of being is exploited, and accordingly, a life without morality is advocated. Yet another contemporary tendency among scientists is the endeavour to prove how humans, as well as some animals, are ‘naturally’ moral, ‘cannot help’ being moral. All these approaches rest on anthropologies in which the human will is neutralized, in both senses of the term. The Jesuit philosopher and theologian Paul Valadier, on the other hand, draws on the Nietzschean legacy to conclude that the affirmation of life is only possible if one is willing to live an authentic moral life, that is, if one is willing to accept the tedious process of becoming human. He thereby opposes the distinction between ‘moral’ and some kind of ‘raw’ human, as well as the belief that certainty can be achieved in the moral domain. His alternative conception of morality as ‘self-creation,’ I argue, has the potential to counter what is commonly called the intellectual and political crises of the ‘West’ by restating the need and ways to create or humanize oneself. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Martin Heidegger’s and Herbert Marcuse’s critiques of technology, and their suggestions on how to neutralise the negative effects of technology, in order to articulate a potential path to an authentic, unalienated life. Martin Heidegger’s view of technology and its negative effects are first explored before presenting Marcuse’s critique of Heidegger. The dissimilarities between Heidegger’s ‘Gestell’ and Marcuse’s ‘Technological Rationality’ are then explored, before then examining the differences between Heidegger’s and Marcuse’s ideas of how one may (...) overcome the alienating impact of technology. Favouring Marcuse’s suggestions, Hans Jonas’ work on technological ethics is then posited as a necessary guide for Marcuse’s vision of a post-alienated existence. I conclude that the continued appropriation and integration of Heideggerian thought into critiques of technology could be valuable for the field, especially when answering questions concerning individual authenticity in the context of rapid technological progress and ecological decline. (shrink)

(2006). John Gray and the Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 155-169.

This essay explores the philosophical significance of the history of mystical anarchism for contemporary ethics and politics. It examines the complex relationship between religion and politics, and elaborates the thesis that many of our contemporary political concepts are secularized theological concepts. After a critical discussion of Carl Schmitt's theory of sovereignty and John Gray's critique of liberal humanism, it examines the anarchist practices of medieval mystics such as Marguerite Porete and the heresy of the Movement of the Free Spirit, and (...) contrasts this mystical anarchist tradition with more recent forms of anarchism, such as Raoul Vaneigem's Situationism.Retrieving the mystical anarchist tradition might help us rethink the relationship between religion and politics and suggest ethically grounded forms of anarchism that avoid violence or abstraction. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a possible a/theological response to what Nietzsche called the ‘death of God’—or Hölderlin’s and Heidegger’s ‘flight of the gods’—through a juxtaposition of the Christian-Pauline concept of kenōsis and the ancient Greek-Platonic notion of chōra, and by taking Nishida Kitarō’s appropriations of these concepts as a clue and starting point. Nishida refers to chōra in 1926 to initiate his philosophy of place and then makes reference to kenōsis in 1945 in his final work that culminates—without necessarily (...) completing—his oeuvre. What he had thereby accomplished is an inversion of Platonism resulting in the collapse of the transcendent/immanent—idea/genesis and by implication the Heaven/Earth—dichotomy. I then unpack the ethical implication of this kenotic chōra Nishida has left us with. It suggests from us a certain response to the desacralization or secularization of the world. I shall build upon this suggestion and unfold its implications by drawing from a variety of sources, starting with Nishida but including others, such as Meister Eckhart, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Gianni Vattimo, Reiner Schürmann, Mark Taylor, Jürgen Moltmann, and other philosophical and theological sources. (shrink)

Growing interest has been shown toward humanism in the 21st century after decades of critique and rejection. Posthumanism and transhumanism have redefined the topic primarily through developments in technology and by focusing on relations of interconnectedness between humans and the environment. A different concern with ‘being human’ can be found in the writings of Zygmunt Bauman and Ernst Bloch. The leitmotif of Bauman’s sociology and of Bloch’s utopian philosophy is their assertion that humans have the distinct capacity to transcend necessity (...) and inevitability. Their works share the concern for a good society that would ameliorate social fragmentation and disintegration. Following this, the article seeks to theorize the meaning of humanism in the contemporary era. Taking up Bauman’s notion of interregnum, the article will argue that the contemporary importance of humanism is social in the sense of redeeming the currently casualized human condition, i.e. diminished life-chances, inequality and alienation. Interregnum marks a historical epoch where the old order has decayed, but the new one is not yet present. In interregnum, or in what Bloch calls Mischzeit, humanism is about a human being-in-the-world which contains the possibility to do better. (shrink)

The history of biochemistry and molecular biology is replete with examples of erroneous theories that persisted for considerable lengths of time before they were rejected. This paper examines patterns of dissolution of three such erroneous hypotheses: The idea that nucleic acids are tetrads of the four nucleobases (‘the tetranucleotide hypothesis’); the notion that proteins are collinear with their encoding genes in all branches of life; and the hypothesis that proteins are synthesized by reverse action of proteolytic enzymes. Analysis of these (...) cases indicates that amassed contradictory empirical findings did not prompt critical experimental testing of the prevailing theories nor did they elicit alternative hypotheses. Rather, the incorrect models collapsed when experiments that were not purposely designed to test their validity exposed new facts. (shrink)

This study applies evolution theory to visual ethics and argues that social comparison theory favored by scholars of eating disorders is actually a Darwinian maladaptation to the media's widespread digital manipulation of women's bodies creating the thin ideal. An evolutionary perspective suggests how the media is enmeshed and why social comparison of the mediated ?mono-body? will continue. This study has three sections: 1) evolution theory and morality; 2) social comparison, biology of the social gaze, and anthropological evidence of Western media's (...) role in the global rise of eating disorders; and 3) rethinking visual ethics to expand Newton's (2001) mass interpersonal relationship. (shrink)

This is a “metacritical” engagement from a Confucian perspective with the legacy of Kantian ethics. The first and longest part of this essay deals with the European West and Kant, especially the categorical imperative. The second part hearkens back to East Asian antiquity, especially Ancient China, as it briefly explores Kongzi’s Golden Rule and Mengzi’s compassion.

Michael F. Duggan ABSTRACT: This article examines the basis for testing historical claims and proffers the observation that the historical method is akin to the scientific method in that it utilizes critical elimination rather than justification. Building on the critical rationalism of Karl Popper – and specifically the deductive component of the scientific method called ….

This article argues that Durkheim’s founding insight – uniquely social phenomena – presents us with both a foundation for the discipline of sociology and the risk that the discipline will become isolated. This, we argue, has happened. Our contention is that the emergent social phenomena need to be understood in relation to, but not reduced to, their biological and psychological substrates. Similarly, there are a number of other characteristics, notably of self-organization, which are distinguishing properties of social phenomena but also (...) of quite different phenomena. The comparison is instructive. We therefore argue for an ecological approach to sociological theory, which has important relationships to the general theories and philosophy of ecology and biology. We explore a number of terminological and conceptual parallels that may inform our understanding of the relation of social theory to these and other disciplines. (shrink)

Michael S. Gazzaniga, a pioneer and world leader in cognitive neuroscience, has made an initial attempt to develop neuroethics into a brain-based philosophy of life that he hopes will replace the irrational religious and political belief-systems that still partly govern modern societies. This article critically examines Gazzaniga’s proposal and shows that his actual moral arguments have little to do with neuroscience. Instead, they are based on unexamined political, cultural and moral conceptions, narratives and values. A more promising way of interpreting (...) the belief-forming system of the brain is to say that we cannot avoid thinking in terms of wider frameworks and narratives that are socially embedded and historically developed; consequently, any moral discussion has to be in terms of these frameworks and narratives. (shrink)

(2006). Gray’s Elegy for Progress. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 227-241.

Viewing animals as a disposable resource is by no means novel, but does milking the cow for all its worth now represent a previously unimaginable level of exploitation? New technology has intensified milk production fourfold over the last 50 years, rendering the cow vulnerable to various and frequent clinical interventions deemed necessary to meet the demands for dairy products. A major question is whether or not the veterinary code of practice fits, or is in ethical tension, with the administration of (...) ‘efficient’ techniques, such as artificial insemination, to enhance reproduction levels among cattle? Vets perform these interventions and their ‘success’ is measured by the maximisation of milk production, requiring perpetually pregnant cows. Our empirical research on 33 farm vets explores how their professional ethical code promising to protect the welfare of the animal ‘above all else’, is increasingly in conflict with, and subordinate to, the financial demands of clients. Since vets cannot stand outside of the productive power–knowledge relations that have intensified the consumption of animal bodily parts and secretions, we argue that a process of adiaphorization’ occurs, whereby humans become morally indifferent to cruel practices deemed necessary to our consumerist ways of life. However, this indifference reflects and reinforces a taken-for-granted anthropocentrism among vets, animal owners and the population generally. We suggest that posthumanist ideas may offer new insights for the study of human–animal relations in organisations that transcend the coercive and negative impact of discourses that deny any alternative to prevailing farm/veterinary practices. Our study has major implications in relation to climate warming and zoonotic diseases, both partly derived from our unethical relationship to animals, that are increasingly threatening our, and their, lives. (shrink)

The rise of a collective conscience of a new epoch, the Anthropocene, has brought to the fore scientists’ predictions of irreversible damage done to the Earth’s ecosystems within barely a decade. The passive attitude worldwide of placing the task of overcoming the evil consequences of human activity on specialized forums has already proved to be insufficient. In this context, Hamilton seeks to continue Becker’s project of laying down the foundations of an “anthropodicy,” seen as a humanistic science meant to bring (...) a participatory dimension to the humanity’s dealing with the degradation of the conditions of civilized life on Earth. (shrink)

This essay argues that through a new and radical relationship with digital technologies that are oriented towards networking and automaticity, humans have become estranged from what philosopher Arnold Gehlen termed the ‘circle of action’ that expressed our ancient adaptation to tool use and constituted the basis for our capacity for reflective consciousness. The objectification of the material and analogue relationship that enabled humans to ‘act’ upon the world and to construct the basis for our collective endeavours, this paper shows, is (...) beginning to redirect the social orientation that tool use enabled, back to a form of individualism I term a ‘post-modern vanity’. Computer-driven automation on a networked and global scale is engendering a new illusion regarding our relationship with technology. Greek philosophy, later religion, and then the Enlightenment all saw our relation to technology as evidence of either our ‘specialness’ or our inherent ‘mastery over nature’. These perspectives resulted in our acquiring a ‘reasoned self-delusion’ wherein for the individual life had meaning and was ontologically tolerable—we thought ourselves to be of a realm beyond raw nature. Automation, however, to an unprecedented degree, objectifies and exteriorizes the processes of technology use, alienating the individual from the ‘circle of action’. This process is throwing us back to another form of what this essay terms a ‘reasoned self-delusion’ where we increasingly believe that we no longer need each other so much. The cult of computer efficiency and the virtual sphere of the network that it has spawned, I argue, is a largely barren sphere of radical individualism, a post-modern vanity, where we exist at a borderland closer to nature and to the animals than we have been for thousands of years. (shrink)

(2006). Gray’s Blues: Pessimism as a Political Project. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 263-284.

(2006). Straw Dogs, Blind Horses and Post‐Humanism: The Greening of Gray? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 243-262.

In the third and subsequent editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress articulate a series of ethical norms that they regard as “derived” from, and hence carrying, the “authority” of the common morality. Although Beauchamp and Childress do not claim that biomedical norms they derive from the common morality automatically become constituents of the common morality, or that every detail of their account carries the authority of the common morality, they regard these derived norms as provisionally (...) binding in a way that does not apply to the norms of mere “particular” moralities. Whereas particular moralities “do not bind other persons or communities,” Beauchamp and Childress have designed the norms of Principles of Biomedical Ethics to be “extensions” of the common morality that universally binds other persons and communities. Beauchamp and Childress seem to hold that (1) the norms they articulate in Principles of Biomedical Ethics are derived in an objective way from the common morality, and also that by virtue of being so derived (2) they carry a moral authority that objectively exceeds the authority of norms constituting particular moralities. My thesis in this essay is that both of these claims are false. (shrink)

The modernist conception of the autonomous ‘subject’ as centred, sovereign, and coherently rational, acting intentionally, knowledgeably, and volitionally, has been challenged from a variety of sources, including poststructuralism, feminism, and posthumanism. A different kind of attack on the modernist subject has recently been staged by neurobiologists who have started to decentre the subject from within—to ‘naturalise’ (and materialise) the subject. This biological naturalism—the new ‘life sciences’—claims to challenge our conceptions of self, the ethical subject, and what we conceive of as (...) ‘life’. But what conceptions we have of the configurations of the self is fundamental to our understandings and conceptions of ethics. This paper traces a debate between German neurobiologists and (post)humanist philosophers on the ontology of such things as ‘free will’, ‘ethical agency’, and the ‘self' as an example of how the dispute between naturalists and nonnaturalist or postnaturalists is instrumental in sharpening our understanding of the self and of ethical agency. The paper argues that naturalism is bound to fail due to its inability to grasp the intersubjectivist nature of ethical agency, a theme which links up with recent geographical writing on ethics. I suggest, building on a recent contribution of Huib Ernste in this journal, that we should consider Helmuth Plessner’s concept of eccentric positionality and ontology of the possible as a postmetaphysical kind of ethical humanism. (shrink)

This article explores the everyday emotional attachments to martial discourses through the embodiment of popular culture representations of war bodies in cosplay. In cosplay – the creatio...

(2006). Pluralism and its Discontents: John Gray's Counter‐Enlightenment. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 211-225.

In 2008, the European Community adopted a Proposal to revise the EC Directive on nonhuman animal experiments, with the aim of improving the welfare of the nonhuman animals used in experiments. An Impact Assessment, which gauges the likely economic and scientific effects of future changes, as well as the effects on nonhuman animal welfare, informs the Proposal. By using a discourse analytical approach, this paper examines the Directive, the Impact Assessment and the Proposal to reflect critically upon assumptions about the (...) morality of nonhuman animal experiments. Because nonhuman animal welfare is so prominent in the Proposal, it appears that the EC position advances beyond human self-interest as the sole motivator for such experiments, to ethical questions about the welfare of nonhuman animals . In examining this contention, this paper concludes that, even given concerns about nonhuman animal welfare, nonhuman animal experimentation in the EC is firmly grounded in a morality that focuses on human benefit goals rather than on the wider moral issues associated with the means of achieving such goals. (shrink)

(2006). Liberalism, Nihilism and Modernity in the Political Thought of John Gray. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 285-304.

(2006). John Gray: A Political Theorist Of and Against Our Times. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 113-115.

(2006). Gray and the Politics of Pluralism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 171-188.

Globalization is hailed by its advocates as a means of spreading cosmopolitan values, ideals of sustainability and better standards of living all around the world. Its critics, however, see globalization as a new form of colonialism imposed by rich countries and transnational corporations on the rest of the world, a process in which the rhetoric of sustainability and equality does not match the realities of exploitation and impoverishment of people and nature. This paper endorses neither view. Globalization is not new, (...) but it continually produces new challenges for conceptions of 'home' and 'belonging'. While some enthusiasts regard the 'liberal' and 'environmental' values of the West as the best remedy for what is wrong with the world, others argue that a resource for resisting the destructive effects of globalization may be found in the sense of identity and importance of place found in the traditional scientific and medical traditions of both India and China. Instead of trying to merge these two views in some grand synthesis, this paper argues that traditional conservative and modern liberal values should continually interact with each other to produce novel ideas in debates about home, place and belonging. (shrink)