The principal objective of this article is to develop an overtly theological interpretive lens for assessing the ethics of human germ line genetic modification (GGM). In constructing this lens, I draw upon four selected doctrinal or thematic strands: Incarnation, resurrection, procreative mandate, and sin. In turn, I derive four corresponding moral claims: there is no Christian essentialist understanding of the body, the body cannot be perfected, offspring remain a good of marriage, and sin is a universal human disability. In conclusion, (...) I contend that for Christians there are three possible broad options for assessing the ethics of GGM: refusal, endorsement, and ambivalence. In each, I assess the principal strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the respective theological themes, moral claims, and options. In addition, for the sake of this inquiry I assume that the technologies at issue are safe, efficacious, and do not entail the destruction of embryos or fetuses. (shrink)

Professional engineers are under increasing pressure to practice in an environmentally sensitive way. To prepare engineers for this new reality, changes in engineering education are needed. For example, engineering hydrology has traditionally been taught with an emphasis on the interpretation of numerical data bout rainfall and runoff in watersheds. However, to do environmentally sensitive hydrology work, it is necessary to also understand the life forms that share the watershed. In 1997, a project was undertaken in the Department of Civil Engineering (...) at the University of Toronto to enhance an introductory hydrology course by adding information about how hydrological phenomena affect fish. Through carefully structured assignments and exam questions, an assessment was made of the effectiveness of the enhancements in increasing students’ awareness of the life context of hydrology. The project has resulted in a commitment to increased environmental information in the hydrology curriculum, and the implementation of an assessment process for all students, to monitor changes in their environmental knowledge and attitudes. It has also raised questions about ultimate objectives in engineering education. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of sovereign agency in Nygren’s agapic theology. I argue that Nygren’s theology is structured by a voluntarist-inspired idealization of sovereignty that in effect precludes a viable agapic theory of alterity. ‘Otherness’ plays no essential role in Nygren’s subject-centred ethic. George Grant’s profound meditations on ‘otherness’ in Technology and Justice and other late works will provide the critical perspective for my reading of Nygren and agapist theology in general.

Based on a survey of some popularintroductory anthologies and texts, I arguefrom my experience as a philosopher oftechnology that environmental philosophy mightbe conceived by some researchers in the fieldin terms of an overly narrow theoreticalfoundation. Many of the key figures in thefield take as a basic assumption that theenvironmental crisis is fundamentally bestexplained in terms of some failing in themetaphysical outlooks of most people. However,philosophers of technology typically present atleast two additional types of generalexplanation of the crisis. Environmentalethicists might benefit (...) from consideration ofthese alternative ways of explaining the rootcauses of the ecological crisis. (shrink)

In this article, the authors explore how technology has helped erode society’s conceptions of justice. Law, via juridification, has replaced the concept of justice with one of efficiency. The authors argue that this has been largely a result of the destruction of society’s common story or vision and the introduction of the computer and the Internet as tools enabling technique to replace that story. They offer a perspective on how justice operated in traditional societies, using the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Finally, (...) the authors ask what might be done to recover the best features of what has been lost and create a new common story to help guide society’s conception of justice. (shrink)

George Grant’s bleak assessment of the prospects of technological civilization owed a lot to his reading of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul. However, Grant understood technological development within the context of liberal theory and capitalist practice. Grant explained why liberalism is the doctrine most appropriate to the development of productive forces, or the most complete exploitation of natural and human resources. Unlike most North American conservatives, Grant was not a friend of capitalism but of civil servants who restrain capitalist accumulation (...) in the name of the common good or national community. Grant was what Gad Horowitz called a Red Tory and offered a unique perspective of how American technique has closed us off from love and contemplation, leaving us with the one-dimensional problem-solving mentality of the social engineer. (shrink)

This article argues that sustainability is essentially a contested concept that not only cannot be sufficiently defined in a one-forall blueprint, but requires a new mode of self-actualization of human potential in dialogical, cooperative learning processes. Inherent aporias and their ethical implications are illustrated by an analysis of the mainstream interpretation of the sustainability concept in the context of the relationship between the logic of accumulation and improvement and insatiable human desires as off-springs of a deeper ontological transformation of modernity. (...) A philosophical account of technology and modern sciencewill be introduced in order to investigate overconsumption driven by mimetic desires and the transformative and dialectic dynamics of desire. A contemplative learning model is suggested as a useful basis for a reasonable interpretation of the sustainability concept. (shrink)

Nietzche and Grant both challenge us to make a clear choice about what we believe the world and human beings to be, while describing clearly the consequences of such a choice. This thesis attempts to clarify the choice with which they confront us, by examining what they say about three key topics: modernity, history and morality. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what it is that differentiates them and why. The thesis draws two conclusions, one about the fundamental (...) difference between Grant and Nietzsche and the other about the possible bases for a choice between their world views. The fundamental difference between Grant and Nietzsche is that for Nietzsche the world is chaos, and being is becoming, while for Grant there is order and purpose in the world, and being is seen as unchanging goodness. It is these particular views of being that shape and influence what each says about modernity, history and morality. The thesis argues that the basis for choosing between the world views of Nietzsche and of Grant must be faith or belief, rather than knowledge, for whatever reasons or justification one can give for choosing between being as becoming and being as unchanging goodness presuppose a context of being that is assumed or taken as already given. Source: Masterss International, Volume: 37-01, page: 0078. Adviser: Robert Pinto. Thesis --University of Windsor, 1997. (shrink)

Of primary importance in formulating a response to the increasing prevalence and power of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in society are questions of ontology. Questions such as: What “are” these systems? How are they to be regarded? How does an algorithm come to be regarded as an agent? We discuss three factors which hinder discussion and obscure attempts to form a clear ontology of AI: (1) the various and evolving definitions of AI, (2) the tendency for pre-existing technologies to be (...) assimilated and regarded as “normal,” and (3) the tendency of human beings to anthropomorphize. This list is not intended as exhaustive, nor is it seen to preclude entirely a clear ontology, however, these challenges are a necessary set of topics for consideration. Each of these factors is seen to present a 'moving target' for discussion, which poses a challenge for both technical specialists and non-practitioners of AI systems development (e.g., philosophers and theologians) to speak meaningfully given that the corpus of AI structures and capabilities evolves at a rapid pace. Finally, we present avenues for moving forward, including opportunities for collaborative synthesis for scholars in philosophy and science. (shrink)