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  1. Aristotle’s Vocabulary of Pain.Wei Cheng - 2019 - Philologus: Zeitschrift für Antike Literatur Und Ihre Rezeption 163 (1):47-71.
    This paper examines Aristotle’s vocabulary of pain, that is the differences and relations of the concepts of pain expressed by synonyms in the same semantic field. It investigates what is particularly Aristotelian in the selection of the pain-words in comparison with earlier authors and specifies the special semantic scope of each word-cluster. The result not only aims to pin down the exact way these terms converge with and diverge from each other, but also serves as a basis for further understanding (...)
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  • Héraklès entre Prodicos et Xénophon.Louis-André Dorion - 2008 - Philosophie Antique 8:85-114.
    La fable d’Héraklès à la croisée des chemins (Mémorables, II, 1, 21-34), que Xénophon attribue expressément à Prodicos (II, 1, 21), a dernièrement fait l’objet de plusieurs articles (Sansone, Gray, Tordesillas) qui s’efforcent de déterminer si et à quel point la version rapportée par Socrate est fidèle à la version originale de Prodicos. Or on peut aisément montrer que la plupart des thèmes exposés dans l’apologue sont également développés par Socrate ailleurs dans les Mémorables, de sorte qu’il est tentant de (...)
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  • Prodicus at the Crossroads. Once Again on the Antilogy.Stefania Giombini - 2017 - Peitho 8 (1):187-200.
    The aim of this paper is to analyze the tale of Heracles at the Crossroads, attributed to Prodicus by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, through the notion of antilogy. The apologue has got an antilogic structure that is immediately outlined in the description of the situation in which the young Heracles finds himself. But the text, seemingly antilogic, does not develop itself according to one of the most important rules of antilogies, i.e., the epistemic parity of two speeches, since it appears (...)
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