The relationship between law and coercion has been, and still is, a central topic in legal philosophy. Despite this, discussion about it is immersed in confusion. Some philosophers have noticed this, but hardly any work has been done to attempt to solve or even identify the confusions. This paper aims to fill this gap. Here I propose distinctions and qualifications that help us clarify the relationship between law and coercion and avoid confusion. Building on the clarificatory work, I then argue (...) that despite there being several distinct philosophical discussions about the relationship between law and coercion, one of them should be prioritised. (shrink)

The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle, according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself (...) to AAP, one must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights are not necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best, way to protect morally weighty interests. I also argue that economic participation rights raise important worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise must be constrained by a number of moral duties. (shrink)

This is a collection of four papers about the All-Affected Principle (AAP): the view that every person whose morally weighty interests are affected by a democratic decision has the right to participate in that decision. -/- The first paper (“Narrow Possibilism about Democratic Enfranchisement”) examines how we should distribute democratic participation rights: a plausible version of AAP must avoid treating unlike cases alike, which would be procedurally unfair. The solution is to distribute participation rights proportionately to the risk that a (...) person’s interests will be affected. AAP thus implies an account of political equality that requires adherence to the ‘one person—one vote’ model only if interests are indeed equally affected. -/- The second paper (“Economic Participation Rights and the AAP”) argues that AAP supporters have paid insufficient attention to economic participation rights. The exercise of such rights raises unique worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise is constrained by a number of duties. -/- The third paper (“What AAP Is, and How (Not) to Fight It”) explores how AAP fares in light of possible objections from desirability and feasibility. Unlike crude versions of AAP, a plausibly restricted version of AAP cannot be dismissed as easily as many AAP sceptics may have thought. My reflections here are useful for AAP supporters and sceptics alike: this paper helps clarify what kind of objection can cast serious doubt on AAP. -/- The fourth paper (“Criminal Disenfranchisement, Political Wrongdoing, and Affected Interests”) asks: is AAP compatible with criminal disenfranchisement? AAP, when endorsed in combination with a plausible theory of punishment, is compatible with disenfranchising a narrow set of criminal wrongdoers only: those guilty of ‘political wrongdoing’, which is wrong primarily because it undermines democratic procedures and institutions for private gain. The upshot is that current blanket policies of criminal disenfranchisement are incompatible with AAP. (shrink)

Prominent analytical jurisprudents assert that a theory of law consists of necessary, universal truths about the nature of law. This often-repeated claim, which has not been systematically established, is critically examined in this essay. I begin with the distinction between natural kinds and social artifacts, drawing on the philosophy of society to show that necessity claims about law require a fundamental reworking of basic understandings of ontology and epistemology, which legal philosophers have not undertaken. I show law is a poor (...) fit for a priori and a posteriori knowledge. I distinguish between universal application and universal truth, showing the former is sound while the latter is not. I expose the implications that follow from the initial selection of the central case of law, demonstrating that this choice must be justified, and I reveal two ways analytical jurisprudents shield their theories of law from refutation. This analysis raises significant doubts about the claim by analytical jurisprudents that they are identifying necessary, universal truths about the nature of law. (shrink)

For an academic, there is no greater reward than having one's scholarship taken seriously. The five distinguished scholars who have contributed to this symposium on The Force of Law have done just that, with varying degrees of agreement and disagreement, praise and criticism. But even critical commentary, and perhaps especially critical commentary, is evidence of serious engagement. More importantly, the commentaries contained here have advanced our understanding of law in valuable ways. I respond to each in this reply, but with (...) full acknowledgment that my responses cannot do justice to the full breadth of their contributions and challenges. My hope is not that I will persuade readers that I am correct and my critics mistaken, but rather that the reader who absorbs both the challenges and my response will come away with a greater understanding of the issues that The Force of Law seeks to place on the agenda of contemporary jurisprudence. (shrink)

Extraterritorial border controls prevent migrants from arriving at the territory of the state and effectively undermine rights to apply for asylum and protections against non-refoulement. As a result, a wealth of scholarship argues that external border controls are illegitimate exercises of state power. This paper challenges two versions of this argument, first, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to morally impermissible forms of coercion and, second, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to (...) illegitimate claims to authority.Against coercion-based accounts of legitimacy, this paper defends the view that while carrier-sanctions are coercive, the coerciveness of a policy is not relevant to its legitimacy. What is relevant is instead whether the authority claimed by the state is legitimate. Against authority-based accounts, this paper argues that states are unable to claim authority in the relevant sense over migrants that are present in the territories of other states.The paper concludes by suggesting that the charge that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate should shift towards the state that allows carriers to enforce these policies on their territories. No state has the legitimate authority to permit other states to pressure carriers to prevent migrants in need of protection from travelling. The state that introduces carrier-sanction legislation, on the other hand, is not exercising illegitimate authority though they may act contrary to demands of justice. (shrink)

This paper argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between law and coercion. It firstly refutes Kenneth Himma’s claim that the authorisation of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law. It then claims that the best way to understand the law is as coercion-apt. The “coercion-aptness” of law is clarified, in part, by appealing to an essential distinction between law and morality: Whereas it can be reasonable for the law to appeal to coercive means in order (...) to motivate compliance, it seems decidedly unreasonable for morality to do so. (shrink)

One of the most conspicuous features of law, as it works in the world of our experience, is that legal norms are characteristically backed by coercive enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, many legal philosophers specializing in conceptual jurisprudence believe that coercion is not a conceptually necessary feature of law. In this essay, I argue that the authorization of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law. I ground the argument in the Hartian claim that the sense of ‘law’ requiring explication (...) picks out municipal legal systems in the modern state; widely accepted Razian claims about how our legal practices construct the content of our legal concepts; claims showing the centrality of coercive enforcement mechanisms in every paradigm instance of law we have ever known; and logical difficulties arising in connection with explaining legal normativity in a system without such mechanisms. (shrink)

If one were to publish a book some hundred years ago, with the central claim that there was a necessary connection between law and coercion, one would have largely pushed on an open door. And to sa...

Whether legal systems are necessarily coercive raises normative concerns. Coercion carries a presumption of illegitimacy and a special justificatory burden. If legal systems are necessarily coercive, coerciveness necessarily taints our legal institutions. Traditionally, legal systems have been regarded as contingently coercive. This view is mainly supported by the society of angels thought experiment. For the past few years, however, this traditional view has been under attack. Critics have challenged the reliability of the thought experiment and have urged us to centre (...) the discussion on typical legal systems: legal systems made by humans to address human needs. Once we do so – they claim – we would inevitably reject the traditional view. This paper argues that the critics are wrong. After discussing key features of the society of angels thought experiment and responding to objections, it is argued that even typical legal systems are contingently coercive. Coerciveness is a feature that our legal systems can and should strive to get rid of. (shrink)

ABSTRACT“A legal system exists,” Joseph Raz claims, “if and only if it is in force.” By this he means to suggest that the efficacy of law—that is, its capacity to control the population to which it applies—is necessary for its identity as such. Despite widespread recognition that efficacy is a condition of the existence of law, however, little time has been spent analyzing the notion. This article begins an attempt to make up the deficit. I make the case for efficacy (...) as necessary for law and go on to develop and defend an account of the concept that is broadly Kelsenian in spirit. In doing so I address questions concerning the relationship between obedience and enforcement in an account of the existence of a legal system as well as relating the discussion to that concerning the ontological status of international law. (shrink)