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In 1909 A. Koyré (1892–1964) came to Göttingen as an exile and there became a student of Edmund Husserl and other philosophers (A. Reinach, M. Scheler): already before leaving his country Russia Koyré read Husserl'sLogical Investigations, a text which interested greatly Russian philosophers and was translated into Russian in the same year. As many other contemporary philosophers, in Göttingen they were discussing on the fundaments of mathematic, Cantor's set theory and Russell's antinomies. On this problems Koyré wrote a long paper (...) |
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The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one. |
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The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p ’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that property. |
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Tato stať je zamýšlena jako úvod do spojité problematiky explikace pravdivosti a sémantic-kých paradoxů, které onu explikaci pronásledují. Tyto paradoxy jsou viděny jako prostředek ukázání, že nedostatečně promyšlená explikace našeho pojmu pravdivosti (významu pravdi-vostního predikátu) je explikací nevyhovující. Poté jsou předvedeny rysy obou klasických přístupů, Russellovy teorie typů a Tarského hierarchie metajazyků. Nakonec jsou podány zá-kladní ideje hlavních názorových škol, které přišly poté. |
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V první části textu ukazuji, že paradox holiče není analogický Russellově paradoxu, ba že to vůbec není paradox. Poté se stručně věnuji otázce jeho pravděpodobného historického původu i původu jeho známých verzí. V závěru diskutuji zdroj jeho údajné paradoxnosti. |
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Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘ ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The (...) |
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The Barber paradox is often introduced as a popular version of Russell’s paradox, though some experts have denied their similarity, evencalling the Barber paradox a pseudoparadox. In the first part of thepaper, I demonstrate mainly that in the standard (Quinean) defini-tion of a paradox the Barber paradox is a clear-cut example of a non-paradox. Despite some outward similarities, it differs radically fromRussell’s paradox. I also expose many other differences. In the secondpart of the paper, I examine a probable source of (...) |
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The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these theories meets the correspondence (...) |
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