In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research, but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most interpretations of QM (...) argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about ''what there is'', and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to ''get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat''. Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements - that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the idea that 'Actuality = Reality'. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to consider quantum superpositions from the perspective of the logos categorical approach presented in [26]. We will argue that our approach allows us not only to better visualize the structural features of quantum superpositions providing an anschaulich content to all terms, but also to restore —through the intensive valuation of graphs and the notion of immanent power— an objective representation of what QM is really talking about. In particular, we will discuss how superpositions relate to (...) some of the main features of the theory of quanta, namely, contextuality, paraconsistency, probability and measurement. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker theorem, which focuses on the (...) constraints to discuss about actual properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, that the choice of a context restores a classical description of reality, and that the choice of a context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM. (shrink)

Recently Cator and Landsman made a comparison between Bell’s Theorem and Conway and Kochen’s Strong Free Will Theorem. Their overall conclusion was that the latter is stronger in that it uses fewer assumptions, but also that it has two shortcomings. Firstly, no experimental test of the Conway–Kochen Theorem has been performed thus far, and, secondly, because the Conway–Kochen Theorem is strongly connected to the Kochen–Specker Theorem it may be susceptible to the finite precision loophole of Meyer, Kent and Clifton. In (...) this paper I show that the finite precision loophole does not apply to the Conway–Kochen Theorem. (shrink)

It is shown how all the major conceptual difficulties of standard (textbook) quantum mechanics, including the two measurement problems and the (supposed) nonlocality that conflicts with special relativity, are resolved in the consistent or decoherent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics by using a modified form of quantum logic to discuss quantum properties (subspaces of the quantum Hilbert space), and treating quantum time development as a stochastic process. The histories approach in turn gives rise to some conceptual difficulties, in particular the (...) correct choice of a framework (probabilistic sample space) or family of histories, and these are discussed. The central issue is that the principle of unicity, the idea that there is a unique single true description of the world, is incompatible with our current understanding of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to (...) restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions. (shrink)