Most philosophers acknowledge ways of overcoming blame, even blame directed at a culpable offender, that are not forgiving. Sometimes continuing to blame a friend for their offensive comment just isn't worth it, so we let go instead. However, despite being a common and widely recognised experience, no one has offered a positive account of letting go. Instead, it tends to be characterised negatively and superficially, usually in order to delineate the boundaries of forgiveness. This paper gives a more complete and (...) systematic account of this important practice. We argue that the basic distinction between forgiving and letting go of blame follows from distinctions that many philosophers already accept. We then develop a positive account in terms of the reasons one has to let go rather than forgive and show that letting go is as valuable a part of our shared moral lives as forgiveness. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I analyze and critique Charles Griswold’s work Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. Griswold’s theory of forgiveness is structured around the notion that human frailty, imperfection, and susceptibility to unfortunate circumstances are cornerstones of the human experience. While Griswold’s paradigm of forgiveness is compelling on the whole, I argue that this “human frailty thesis” creates unintentional and problematic consequences that undermine major goals of his paradigm. In particular, the human frailty thesis undermines Griswold’s requirement that forgiveness hold an (...) offender accountable for wrongdoing. After identifying and discussing the consequences of the human frailty thesis, I will propose revisions to Griswold’s paradigm that redeem it from the problems I have identified. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9327-4 Authors Hailey Huget, 430 7th St, Brooklyn, NY 11215, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893. (shrink)

Los recientes estudios historiográficos sobre la idea de “perdón” han aportado datos valiosos sobre este término de la filosofía académica. Su uso mundano expresa una mentalidad y unas prácticas socialmente regladas muy específicas. Los resultados de esta investigación permiten afirmar que dicha noción existía en el seno de la sociedad greco-romana, de manera que el “perdón al enemigo” no es una innovación total de la cultura judeo-cristiana, sino más bien una consecuencia de la previa romanización. El presente artículo trata de (...) mostrar cómo la escuela estoica es el principal exponente de esta difusión cultural del “perdón al enemigo” desde sus inicios. (shrink)