Social metaphysics is a source of important philosophical and moral insight. Furthermore, much social metaphysics appears to be substantive. However, some have recently argued that standard views of metaphysics cannot accommodate substantive social metaphysics. In this paper I offer a new diagnosis of this problem and defend a new solution, showing that this problem is an illuminating lens through which to examine the nature and boundaries of metaphysics. This case instantiates a broad, common pattern generated by attempts to align distinctions (...) between realism and anti-realism, mind-independence and mind-dependence, and legitimate and non-legitimate inquiry. I show that the best response is to abandon the association between substantive metaphysics and mind-independence, and I sketch a new definition of substantivity, given in terms of explanatory power, that makes room for substantive social metaphysics while also offering an attractive basis for general metaphysics. (shrink)

We argue that concepts from the social sciences can be as natural as those from physics and chemistry, thereby answering in the positive the question of whether social metaphysics is or can be substantive. The argument takes as a starting point Douven & Gärdenfors’ (Mind & Language, 35, 313–334 2020) optimality account of natural concepts, according to which natural concepts are represented by the cells of an optimally partitioned similarity space. While the account applies straightforwardly to perceptual concepts, it does (...) not apply as straightforwardly to more abstract concepts, such as many scientific concepts. We propose an extension of Douven and Gärdenfors’ optimality account that pertains to scientific concepts as well. The proposal reuses ideas from Lewis’ Best Systems Account of laws of nature, but rather than invoking natural concepts (as Lewis does) defines natural scientific concepts as those that figure in the or a best systematization of the totality of facts. On this proposal, there is nothing especially different between concepts from the natural sciences and those from the social sciences. (shrink)

Yes. I defend this claim against the charge of race reductionism and the charge that ‘white interests’ cannot figure meaningfully into structural explanations of racial inequality. We then distinguish two explanatory roles for white supremacy. The racial role approach attempts to trace the causal effects of white supremacy's normative white/non-white hierarchy on life chances. The racial materialism approach treats racial inequality as an emergent feature of social orders which depend on conventional racial divisions in labor performance. Each approach emphasizes a (...) different level of explanation for the same basic fact: white interests both drive and are served by racial inequality. (shrink)

According to a current trend in social ontology, by articulating claims of social construction in terms of metaphysical grounding, we can shed light on the metaphysics of social construction and understand deep truths about social identities like race and gender. Focusing on two recent accounts, I argue that this move from social construction to grounding has limitations. While there are intelligible grounding claims that can explain certain ideas in social ontology, such grounding claims add nothing to what we have learnt (...) from constructionists about race and gender. Although some applications of this grounding approach attempt to remedy this and offer detailed analyses of how social kinds are grounded, they yield results that are inconsistent with some very plausible views about social construction. Thus, if we want to illuminate the metaphysics of social construction, we must explore other alternatives. (shrink)