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  1. Models and reality.Robert Stalnaker - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):709-726.
    Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this (...)
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  • Measuring measuring rods.John C. Graves & James E. Roper - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (1):39-56.
    In this paper, we show that a restricted form of time travel both accords with special relativity kinematics and avoids several prima facie objections. We argue that such time travel provides a reasonable way to interpret certain phenomena which can readily be described, and the analogues of which have already been observed at the level of elementary particle reactions. We then describe how a time-traveling object could measure itself, and demonstrate how, in the appropriate circumstances, such an experiment could convince (...)
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  • On conventionality and simultaneity - a reply.Brian Ellis - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):177 – 203.
    This paper is a response to the "panel discussion of simultaneity by slow clock transport in the special and general theories of relativity" ("philosophy of science", 36, (march, 1969), Pp. 1-81) which arose out of a paper by brian ellis and peter bowman on "conventionality in distant simultaneity", ("philosophy of science", 34, (june, 1967), Pp. 116-36). It is argued that the basic disagreement between the pittsburgh panel and us is an epistemological one. In particular, Our concept of a good physical (...)
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  • Did the intensity of my preferences double last night?Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (2):282-285.
    About twenty years ago, philosophers debated the verifiability of the statement “Last night everything doubled in size.” It seems that universal nocturnal expansion would double our rulers and tape measures making the size change indiscernible. I think that there is an internal analogue to the question “Did everything double in size last night?” The question “Did my preferences double in intensity last night?“ also raises problems of verification.
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