The question of how to frame agential preferences in economics finds one caught between Scylla and Charybdis. If preferences are framed in as minimal and deflationary a manner as revealed preference theory recommends, the theory falls prey to objections about its predictiveness and explanatory power. Alternatively, if too many cognitive and causal intricacies are incorporated into the preference concept, revealed preference models will violate pragmatic norms of model construction, surrendering model simplicity and generality. This paper charts a middle course, arguing (...) that the path to salvation lies through an understanding of revealed preference models as program explanations. (shrink)

This paper focuses on tacit versus explicit uses of plural performance metrics as a primary methodological characteristic. This characteristic usefully distinguishes two schools of normative analysis and their approaches to normative interpretations of bounded rationality. Both schools of thought make normative claims about bounded rationality by comparing the performance of decision procedures using more than one performance metric. The consistency school makes tacit reference to performance metrics outside its primary axiomatic framework, but lexicographically promotes internal axiomatic consistency as the primary, (...) and in most cases sufficient, normative outcome with which to undertake welfare comparisons. The consistency school's axiomatization program, in both neoclassical and behavioral forms, pre-commits to welfare interpretations that follow a hierarchy of rationalities based on the stringency of restrictions that different axiomatizations impose on choice data. In contrast, the ecological rational.. (shrink)