ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is twofold: first, to show that, in Plato'sHippias Major,Hippias is the mouthpiece of a materialist ontology; second, to discuss the critique of this ontology. My argument is based on an interpretation ofHippias Major300b4–301e3. I begin by revealing the shortcomings of P. Woodruff's and I. Ludlam's interpretations. Next, I define the concept of materialism as it was understood in ancient Greece in order to outline the specificity of Hippias' materialism. Finally, I argue that the opposition between (...) the two characters of theHippias Majorrepresents in fact an ontological opposition between two conceptions of what a unity is, i.e., Hippias' elementary corporal unities and Socrates' “formal unity.”. (shrink)

It is a matter of philosophical debate whether Jonathan Israel’s assessment of Spinoza’s notion of ‘state religion’ can be interpreted as an atheistic and Marxist reading of Spinoza. Contrary to the widely accepted view, Spinoza has a peculiar understanding of religion; and thus, his views cannot, simply, be equated with atheism. By relying on this fact, in this article, I am going to shed light on the issue and try to show to what extent Israel’s interpretation goes beyond what Spinoza (...) himself claims and whether or not Spinoza’s views can make him an atheist. Another concern of the text will be elucidating Marx’s critique of Bruno Bauer’s argument for the abolition of religion and laying bare if there is any continuity between Marx and Spinoza on the problem of religion. After Israel’s interpretation is restated, both Spinozistic view of religion, as he puts forward in the Theological-Political Treatise [Tractatus Theologico- Politicus, 1670] and Political Treatise [Tractatus Politicus, 1676] and Marx’s arguments on the same issue in “On the Jewish Question” [in Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher, 1844] will be examined in detail. Depending on these investigations, it will be argued that what Israel defends in his text Radical Enlightenment [2001] does not make Spinoza an atheist; on the contrary, although Spinoza is not an advocate of the commonsensical view of religion, he defends his own understanding of religion—which causes him to be regarded, prejudicedly, as an atheist. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that Israel’s interpretation cannot be a Marxist interpretation either because Marx’s critique of religion is generally misunderstood and mistaken with that of Bruno Bauer. Neither Spinoza’s views on religion nor that of Marx are completely compatible with what Israel defends in Radical Enlightenment; nevertheless, this does not mean that Israel tries to make an atheist or Marxist out of Spinoza through his appropriation of the philosopher. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article poursuit un double objectif: premièrement, de montrer que, dans I’Hippias majeur de Platon, Hippias défend une ontologie matérialiste, et, deuxièmement, de définir la critique de cette ontologie matérialiste. Cette démonstration repose sur l’interprétation du passage qui se trouve en 300b4-301e3. Nous présenterons d’abord les limites des interprétations qu’en font P. Woodruff et I. Ludiam, pour ensuite définir le concept de matérialisme dans le contexte de la pensée ancienne afin de dégager les traits spécifiques du matérialisme que Platon (...) prête aHippias. L’opposition entre Hippias et Socrate est enfait une opposition ontologique entre deux conceptions de l’unité : les unités corporelles élémentaires et l’«unité formelle».ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is twofold: first, to show that, in Plato’s Hippias Major, Hippias is the mouthpiece of a materialist ontology; second, to discuss the critique of this ontology. My argument is based on an interpretation of Hippias Major 300b4-301e3. I begin by revealing the shortcomings of P. Woodruff’s and I. Ludlam’s interpretations. Next, I define the concept of materialism as it was understood in ancient Greece in order to outline the specificity of Hippias’ materialism. Finally, I argue that the opposition between the two characters of the Hippias Major represents in fact an ontological opposition between two conceptions of what a unity is, i. e., Hippias’ elementary corporal unities and Socrates’ “formal unity.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is twofold: first, to show that, in Plato'sHippias Major,Hippias is the mouthpiece of a materialist ontology; second, to discuss the critique of this ontology. My argument is based on an interpretation ofHippias Major300b4–301e3. I begin by revealing the shortcomings of P. Woodruff's and I. Ludlam's interpretations. Next, I define the concept of materialism as it was understood in ancient Greece in order to outline the specificity of Hippias' materialism. Finally, I argue that the opposition between (...) the two characters of theHippias Majorrepresents in fact an ontological opposition between two conceptions of what a unity is, i.e., Hippias' elementary corporal unities and Socrates' “formal unity.”. (shrink)