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Meaning relativism and subjective idealism

Synthese 197 (9):4047-4064 (2020)

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  1. A dilemma for dispositional answers to Kripkenstein’s challenge.Andrea Guardo - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (1):135-152.
    Kripkenstein’s challenge is usually described as being essentially about the use of a word in new kinds of cases ‒ the old kinds of cases being commonly considered as non-problematic. I show that this way of conceiving the challenge is neither true to Kripke’s intentions nor philosophically defensible: the Kripkean skeptic can question my answering “125” to the question “What is 68 plus 57?” even if that problem is one I have already encountered and answered. I then argue that once (...)
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  • Naturalizing Kripkenstein: How Primitivist, Dispositional and Skeptical Answers to Kripke's Wittgenstein All Fit within an Evolutionary Account of Meaning.Dario Vaccaro - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Milan
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  • The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism.Michał Wieczorkowski - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.
    According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Miller states that minimal factualism presupposes the conformity of meaning ascriptions with rules of discipline and syntax. However, he contends that this maneuver is also (...)
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