The body and bodily experience make little appearance in analytic moral philosophy. This is true even of analytic sexual ethics—the one area of ethical inquiry we might have expected to give a starring role to bodily experience. I take a small step toward remedying that by identifying one way in which the bodily experience of sex is ethically significant: some of the physical actions of sex have a default expressive significance, conveying trust, affection, care, sensitivity, enjoyment, and pleasure. When people (...) having sex don't in fact have these feelings, the sex can be misleading, even if they've antecedently communicated that they don't have these feelings. This account of how sex can mislead is inspired by a perhaps surprising source, Catholic sexual morality. Analytic sexual ethicists could benefit from emulating Catholic sexual morality's attentiveness to the bodily nature of sex and its ethical significance. (shrink)

This article reflects one scholar's attempt to locate herself within emerging ethical methodologies given a specific concern with cross-cultural women's moral praxis. The field of comparative ethics's debt to past debates over methodology is considered through a typology of three waves of methodological invention. The article goes on to describe a specific research focus on U.S. Catholic and Iranian Shii women that initiated a search for a distinct method. This method of comparative ethics, which focuses on the production of ethical (...) knowledge through the interaction of discursive logics of various moral agents, is described. The conclusion turns to how methodological invention can itself become a constructive project through the way it (1) locates the scholar in relation to her subject of study and (2) allows for isolation of tactics within specific moral discourses. (shrink)

Over the past one hundred years, Catholic sexual ethics has become more hospitable to sexual bonding as a good that is distinct from procreation. However, our increasing knowledge of women’s sexual pain disorders highlights ongoing problems with official Catholic sexual ethics. This essay argues that the Catholic Church still reproduces gendered social scripts that unwittingly encourage heterosexual women to ignore their sexual pain and continue to engage desperately in intercourse, out of an exacerbated concern to satisfy male partners. These are (...) tactics that only prolong and deepen women’s sexual suffering. Further, insights about the various options for women’s healing from sexual pain concretely suggest more liberative sexual scripts: the importance of women’s non‐obligatory, embodied desire and the need to reject intercourse as the compulsory norm for all sexual activity. Ultimately, women’s experiences of having sexual pain and healing from it lead to revisions in Catholic sexual ethics at a fundamental level. (shrink)

The category of experience has constituted an important point for reflection in moral philosophy and theology, particularly among feminist and liberationist circles. The appeal to experience as an authoritative source has been met with criticism by those who understand the term to connote either radical interiority, on the one hand, or an uncritical foundation for truth claims, on the other. This essay argues that the respective works of classical pragmatist, John Dewey, and Catholic feminist theologian, Margaret Farley, provide a compelling (...) alternative to these characterizations of experience, which can help scholars in ethics and theology to better articulate the relationship of individual and social experience, as well as the ways by which people use experience to give legitimacy to moral practices. (shrink)