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  1. Focused true–true counterfactuals. Da Fan - 2023 - Philosophical Forum 54 (3):121-141.
    Any counterfactual with a true antecedent and a true consequent is invariably predicted to be true by the standard Stalnaker–Lewis semantics. But many such true–true counterfactuals appear false to ordinary speakers, which is considered by many authors as evidence that the standard semantics should be revised. However, Walters and Williams prove that allowing true–true counterfactuals to be false would unacceptably invalidate some very plausible logical principles. The objective of this paper is to provide a pragmatic account of seemingly false true–true (...)
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  • Counterfactuals and double prevention: Trouble for the Causal Independence thesis.David Turon - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):198-206.
    Some have argued that no analysis of counterfactual conditionals can succeed without appealing to causal notions. Such authors claim that, in determining what would transpire had some events gone differently, we hold fixed everything that is causally independent from those events. Call this view Causal Independence. Some have argued that we need Causal Independence to accommodate intuitive judgments about certain kinds of counterfactuals in indeterministic worlds. The aim of this paper is to show that, contra these authors, Causal Independence systematically (...)
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