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  1. The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review.Jamie Harris & Jacy Reese Anthis - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (4):1-95.
    Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on (...)
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  • The hard limit on human nonanthropocentrism.Michael R. Scheessele - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):49-65.
    There may be a limit on our capacity to suppress anthropocentric tendencies toward non-human others. Normally, we do not reach this limit in our dealings with animals, the environment, etc. Thus, continued striving to overcome anthropocentrism when confronted with these non-human others may be justified. Anticipation of super artificial intelligence may force us to face this limit, denying us the ability to free ourselves completely of anthropocentrism. This could be for our own good.
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  • The Moral Standing of Machines: Towards a Relational and Non-Cartesian Moral Hermeneutics.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):61-77.
    Should we give moral standing to machines? In this paper, I explore the implications of a relational approach to moral standing for thinking about machines, in particular autonomous, intelligent robots. I show how my version of this approach, which focuses on moral relations and on the conditions of possibility of moral status ascription, provides a way to take critical distance from what I call the “standard” approach to thinking about moral status and moral standing, which is based on properties. It (...)
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