During the last decades, shared decision making (SDM) has become a very popular model for the physician-patient relationship. SDM can refer to a process (making a decision in a shared way) and a product (making a shared decision). In the literature, by far most attention is devoted to the process. In this paper, I investigate the product, wondering what is involved by a medical decision being shared. I argue that the degree to which a decision to implement a medical alternative (...) is shared should be determined by taking into account six considerations: (i) how the physician and the patient rank that alternative, (ii) the individual preference scores the physician and the patient (would) assign to that alternative, (iii) the similarity of the preference scores, (iv) the similarity of the rankings, (v) the total concession size, and (vi) the similarity of the concession sizes. I explain why shared medical decisions are valuable, and sketch implications of the analysis for the physician-patient relationship. (shrink)

Principles of need are constantly referred to in health care priority setting. The common denominator for any principle of need is that it will ascribe some kind of special normative weight to people being worse off. However, this common ground does not answer the question how a plausible principle of need should relate to the aggregation of benefits across individuals. Principles of need are sometimes stated as being incompatible with aggregation and sometimes characterized as accepting aggregation in much the same (...) way as utilitarians do. In this paper we argue that if one wants to take principles of need seriously both of these positions have unreasonable implications. We then characterize and defend a principle of need consisting of sufficientarian elements as well as prioritarian which avoids these unreasonable implications. (shrink)

Background Healthcare systems are increasingly struggling with resource constraints, given demographic changes, technological development, and citizen expectations. The aim of this article is to normatively analyze different suggestions regarding how publicly financed plastic surgery should be delineated in order to identify a well-considered, normative rationale. The scope of the article is to discuss general principles and not define specific conditions or domains of plastic surgery that should be treated within the publicly financed system. Methods This analysis uses a reflective equilibrium (...) approach, according to which considered normative judgements in one area should be logically and argumentatively coherent with considered normative judgements and background theories at large within a system. Results and conclusions In exploring functional versus non-function conditions, we argue that it is difficult to find a principled reason for an absolute priority of functional conditions over non-functional conditions. Nevertheless, functional conditions are relatively easier to establish objectively, and surgical intervention has a clear causal effect on treating a functional condition. Considering non-functional conditions that require plastic surgery [i.e., those related to appearance or symptomatic conditions ], we argue that the patient needs to experience some degree of suffering, which must be ‘validated’ in some form by the healthcare system. This validation is required for both functional and non-functional conditions. Functional conditions are validated by distinguishing between statistically normal and abnormal functioning. Similarly, for non-functional conditions, statistical normality represents a potential method for distinguishing between what should and should not be publicly funded. However, we acknowledge that such a concept requires further development. (shrink)

Instrumentalists about need believe that all needs are instrumental, i.e., ontologically dependent upon ends, goals or purposes. Absolutists view some needs as non-instrumental. The aims of this article are: clearly to characterize the instrumentalism/absolutism debate that is of concern (mainly §1); to establish that both positions have recent and current adherents (mainly §1); to bring what is, in comparison with prior literature, a relatively high level of precision to the debate, employing some hitherto neglected, but important, insights (passim); to show, (...) on grounds not previously to the fore in the literature, that insofar as instrumentalism’s advocates have provided arguments for the position, these are unsound (§2); to argue against instrumentalism using a new dilemma concerning whether ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are interpreted in a mentalistic manner (§3); to elucidate the implications of the needs/need-satisfiers and preconditions/means distinctions for the debate (§4). (shrink)

In contrast to standardized guidelines, personalized medicine and person centered care are two notions that have recently developed and are aspiring for more individualized health care for each single patient. While having a similar drive toward individualized care, their sources are markedly different. While personalized medicine stems from a biomedical framework, person centered care originates from a caring perspective, and a wish for a more holistic view of patients. It is unclear to what extent these two concepts can be combined (...) or if they conflict at fundamental or pragmatic levels. This paper reviews existing literature in both medicine and related philosophy to analyze closer the meaning of the two notions, and to explore the extent to which they overlap or oppose each other, in theory or in practice, in particular regarding ethical assumptions and their respective practical implications. (shrink)

In health care priority setting different criteria are used to reflect the relevant values that should guide decision-making. During recent years there has been a development of value frameworks implying the use of multiple criteria, a development that has not been accompanied by a structured conceptual and normative analysis of how different criteria relate to each other and to underlying normative considerations. Examples of such criteria are unmet need and severity. In this article these crucial criteria are conceptually clarified and (...) analyzed in relation to each other. We argue that disease-severity and condition-severity should be distinguished and we find the latter concept better reflects underlying normative values. We further argue that unmet need does not fulfil an independent and relevant role in relation to condition-severity except for in some limited situations when having to distinguish between conditions of equal severity. (shrink)