In this paper I will reconsider the doxographical text about Aristotle in Clement of Alexandria's Protrepticus 5.66.4: οδν δ ομαι χαλεπν νταθα γενμενος κα τν κ το Περιπτου μνησθναι· κα γε τς αρσεως πατρ, τν λων ο νοσας τν πατρα, τν καλομενον ‘πατον’ ψυχν εναι το πντος οεται· τουτστι το κσμου τν ψυχν θεν πολαμβνων ατς ατ περιπερεται. γρ τοι μχρι τς σελνης ατς διορζων τν πρνοιαν, πειτα τν κσμον θεν γομενος περιτρπεται, τν μοιρον θεο θεν δογματζων.

En el presente trabajo analizaremos los procedimientos metodológicos implementados por Aristóteles en el fragmento 16 de Sobre la filosofía, en los que postula cierta entidad que caracteriza como divina y eterna. Para dar cuenta de esa entidad, Aristóteles se vale de un argumento factible de dividirse en tres momentos: en el primero, presenta el razonamiento por el cual se debe aceptar su eternidad; en el segundo, establece la identificación entre lo divino y lo óptimo y se focaliza en las posibles (...) causas por las cuales algo cambia, y, finalmente, sobre la base de este último resultado, en el tercer momento, se centra en demostrar que lo divino es inmutable. Para hacer esto, se vale de lo que suele llamar “silogismos a partir de hipótesis”. Nuestro objetivo es examinar el uso dialéctico de este tipo de silogismos, que en la primera parte del fragmento son equiparables con lo que en la terminología de la lógica actual conocemos como modus ponens y, hacia el final del fragmento, adquieren la forma de una reducción a lo imposible. (shrink)

The dominant interpretation ofMetaphysicsΘ.8 commits Aristotle to the claim that the heavenly bodies’ eternal movements are not the exercises of capacities. Against this, I argue that these movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities. I clarify what it is for a heavenly body to possess a nature and argue that a body’s nature cannot be a final cause unless the natural body possesses capacities that are exercised for the sake of its naturequaform. This discussion yields a better understanding of (...) what capacities are, what explanatory work capacities do, and what it is to possess a nature. (shrink)

Il est relativement peu de textes qui, dans le De Cœlo, témoignent de l’existence de réalités incorporelles transcendantes à l’ordre astral. La conclusion, sur laquelle se referme la démonstration de l’unicité du ciel en I 9, est-elle de ceux‑là? Les « êtres de là-bas » y désignent-ils les réalités sidérales les plus hautes ou certaines instances hypercosmiques? C’est à l’identification de ces êtres qu’il s’agit ici de procéder. En montrant que convergent ensemble les indices textuels du passage et son homogénéité (...) démonstrative, il pourra alors apparaître que ces êtres, dont Aristote vante l’immutabilité et la perfection, transcendent l’ordre céleste, sans qu’on puisse toutefois déterminer la relation exacte qui les unit au ciel, obérant ainsi la possibilité de lire, à travers eux, une référence implicite à la doctrine du Premier Moteur Immobile. (shrink)

A new examination of Aristotle's Poetics has confirmed my conviction that a number of old and new puzzles can be solved by the same analytical method which in recent years has been successfully applied to a good many of his writings, giving us a better insight into the growth and successive elaboration of his thought. The importance of the Poetics seems to me to justify any attempt to discover the original train of thought and to distinguish it from later additions (...) . Readers will be aware of the enormous number of books and papers dealing with the problems of this work and will forgive me for referring to a selection only. (shrink)

Twenty-five years ago Paul Wilpert called for a thorough re-examination of our knowledge of the content of Aristotle's lost workDe Philosophia. Expressing his reservations about the validity of our current reconstruction of the work, he wrote: ‘On the basis of attested fragments, we form for ourselves a picture of the content of a lost writing, and this picture in turn serves to interpret new fragments as echoes of that writing. So our joy over the swift growth of our collection of (...) fragments is clouded by the thought that we are not thereby really nearing the original character of the work, but we are entangling ourselves ever more tightly in a picture we ourselves have created.’ As a corrective Wilpert called for a critical retracing of our steps since 1830 to establish a more secure reconstruction of this important lost work.Since then there have been numerous, searching analyses of the ideas and fragments ofDe Philosophia, but at least one venerable old theory has escaped critical reappraisal: namely, the theory that inDe PhilosophiaAristotle discussed his doctrine of a fifth element, i.e. his belief that the heavenly bodies are composed of an element distinct from the four earthly elements, earth, water, air, and fire. This theory has become so widely accepted that it has virtually become a fact. When support is needed, most modern authors simply cite one or both of the two modern authorities on the early Aristotle, namely W. Jaeger and E. Bignone. The more meticulous restate the traditional evidence with complete confidence that this evidence proves their case. If Wilpert's hope for a firmly grounded reconstruction of theDe Philosophiais ever to be achieved, one of the importantdesideratatoday is a critical re-examination of the evidence for the fifth element in this work. (shrink)

Scholars have long considered de Philosophia and de Caelo to be in contradiction regarding the nature of the heavenly bodies, particularly with respect to the activity proper to the element composing them. According to the accounts we have of de Philosophia, Aristotle seems to have put forth that stars move because they have minds, and, according to Cicero’s account of the lost text, they choose their actions out of free will. In de Caelo, however, Aristotle seems only to consider that (...) stars engage in the activity of circular motion because it is in their nature to do so, as it is in the nature of, e.g. fire to move upwards or Earth to move downwards. In this paper, I argue against the longstanding view that there is an incompatibility between these two “early” cosmological texts of Aristotle. I aim to show that these two texts endorse complementary, not contradictory, views of the heavenly bodies. I argue that in de Philosophia, Aristotle attributes to stars the intellective counterpart of the spatial motion which is developed in greater depth in de Caelo, while in de Caelo, we see hints of Aristotle’s view in de Philosophia that the stars are also minds and are able to rationally cognize their particular good – a point which is shown in de Caelo 292a18–293a14, where Aristotle attributes both life and praxis to the heavenly bodies. The overarching view which I present of these two texts is that while de Caelo approaches the heavenly bodies qua bodies and de Philosophia approaches them qua minds, they are still examining one and the same substance and that Aristotle has not changed his mind regarding the basic nature of such a substance in the (supposed) interim between writing de Philosophia and de Caelo. Rather, we find echoes of de Caelo in de Philosophia, and echoes of de Philosophia in de Caelo, which speaks to the fact that Aristotle maintains one view of the heavenly bodies which he presents over the course of these two texts. (shrink)