In this paper, I construct an ethical-aesthetic account based on the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Iris Murdoch, centered on the claims that motive matters to morality and that, specifically, acting from compassion—understood as a combination of cognitive empathy and concern—is necessary for making moral decisions. I present empirical evidence that we are naturally inaccurate when it comes to cognitive empathy, suggesting that many of our moral decisions are made in ignorance of the interests of others. We can improve our (...) empathic accuracy by becoming more adept at decentering on our own perspective and recentering on those of others. My account holds that aesthetic experience often requires us to decenter and that we can acquire what I have called imaginative flexibility through our engagement with certain kinds of art. Finally, I provide evidence supporting my claims that art has this value. (shrink)

Aleksej Losev''s definition of myth centres onthe concept of detachment. In modern timesdetachment has most often figured in thecontext of philosophical aesthetics, where itis a cognitive category akin to Kant''s``disinterestedness'''' or the Russian formalists''``estrangement.'''' However Losev''s usage alsomakes reference to the ontological sense ofdetachment as contemplativeascent (cf. Meister Eckhardt''sAbgeschiedenheit). Thus, Losev''s concept ofmyth combines both senses of detachment,binding perceptual attitude and being togetherin a double movement of resignation from theworld and union with meaning; this movementliterally makes sense out of reality. (...) Ittherefore bears comparison to the treatment ofdistanciation in contemporary hermeneutics,where detachment is a key condition ofunderstanding. By investigating Losev''sconnections to other Russian thinkers, theauthor makes a case for a distinct Russiantradition of hermeneutic philosophy (V. Ivanov,G. Shpet, A. Bakshy, A. Losev). (shrink)

The Analytic of the Beautiful in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is a text of unparalleled importance in the history of philosophical aesthetics. Its main claims are adopted by some and rejected by others. A significant number of responses, of both kinds, take the Analytic to apply to all experiences of beauty—most notably, to the beauty of both nature and fine art. Our principal claim is that this assumption is mistaken. The analysis in the misleadingly titled Analytic of the Beautiful (...) applies paradigmatically to judgments of natural beauty. The experience of the beauty of most artworks is different and requires a separate analysis. We detail the modifications required in all four moments of the Analytic and thereby explicate the experience of artistic beauty. This reveals that Kant holds an interesting and historically consequential account of the experience of artistic beauty, which is significantly different from the experience of natural beauty. The analysis further reveals that despite these significant differences, the experiences are both species of a single genus. (shrink)

We explain that most of the explanations that traditionally have been used to conceptually and ontologically differentiate aesthetic experience from any other are not compatible with a naturalistic framework, since they are based on transcendental idealistic metaphysics, reductions, and on the assumption that the aesthetic is an a priori special ontology in the object and the mind. However, contemporary works that propose as an alternative to apply directly evidence and theory from the science of emotions to the problem of aesthetics (...) introduce Aesthetic Science into a new set of problematic assumptions. We argue that conceptually equating or ontologically reducing the aesthetic to the theory of rewards cannot provide a clear alternative for any Aesthetic Science to naturalize the aesthetic experience as a heterogeneous class of events that are not already explained by affective science. This practice introduces a serious danger of making the term “aesthetic” and the respective scientific field pretty weak or completely redundant and unnecessary. (shrink)

This article roots Kant’s concept of disinterestedness, as he uses it in the Critique of Judgment, in Aristotle’s notion of philia by establishing a path from ethics to aesthetics and back. In this way, the third Critique turns out to be one of the main sources for a new ideal of humanity: the ideal suitable for late Enlightenment. This article argues that Kant reaches this fruitful use of disinterestedness by giving to Aristotle’s concept of philia an aesthetic turn.

У статті досліджується кантівська концепція вільної гри пізнавальних спроможностей – виображення і розсуду – в ракурсі проблеми трансцендентальної універсальності. Відзначається універсалізуючий потенціал третьої «Критики», одним із визначальних сюжетів якої є проблема вільної гри, щодо Кантової філософської системи в цілому. Викладаються базові параметри авторської тематизації трансцендентального універсалізму як такого, що ґрунтується на принципах відношення і відмінності і є пов’язаним із конституюванням порядку гіпер-універсальності. Оприявнено й проаналізовано параметри універсальності, імпліковані концепцією вільної гри. Показано, яким чином вихідна універсальність трансцендентального виображення виявляється в рамках (...) вільної гри водночас підваженою і гіперболізованою. Досліджено амбівалентну позицію вільної гри у відношені до пізнання; з метою схоплення універсалістичних імплікацій релевантного вільній грі модусу пізнання – «пізнання взагалі» – введено концепт «пізнання als ob». Встановлено певну асиметрію в рамках вільної гри між статусами виображення і розсуду, а саме – пріоритетність останнього. Проаналізовано специфіку властивої вільній грі суб’єктивної універсальності, виявлено її інтерсуб’єктивні та квазі-об’єктивні засновки; застосовано поняття «als ob-об’єктивності», що характеризує певну тенденцію до універсалізації самої універсальності, позначаючи універсальний вимір на межі суб’єктивного й об’єктивного. (shrink)

This dissertation studies the shift that occurs in German aesthetic theory between Kant's Critique of Judgment and Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation , with Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism forming the pivot. This shift is actually part of a much larger movement, and I have chosen aesthetic theory because it mirrors so well the changing focus of the essence of the self which takes place as post-Enlightenment German philosophers delve deeper into the question of what it means to (...) be human. ;Kant remains firmly rooted in the rationalist tradition, and provides for his successors both a foundation and the means to undermine it. He gives an explanation for the individual's response to a great work of art which relies on an account of how the mind functions. Schelling and Schopenhauer are deeply influenced by Kant, but regard the human self as containing some inexplicable mystery, an unconscious mythic unity with all other selves, for Schelling, and an irrational desiring will, for Schopenhauer. Although Kant, too, unwillingly points to the evidence which suggests a non-rational basis for aesthetic response, as well as for an account of the self, he tries to avoid stating this result. By contrast, Schelling and Schopenhauer make this inexplicable aspect a basic premise of their respective works. ;In this work, I rely mainly on the three primary texts, with the intent of making the complex arguments, in particular those of Kant and Schelling, more accessible to the reader. I examine first the cognitive theory of each thinker, and then study each one's aesthetic theory in relation to their respective theory of mind. In this way, I show how a decisive shift in focus has occurred in the period under consideration. In addition, I refer to a cross-section of recent literature to clarify and support my position. ;The conclusion I draw is that philosophic self-understanding attains a completely new vantage point as the result of Schelling and Schopenhauer's work, a perspective which irrevocably changes the lines of debate about the nature of the self. (shrink)

Exploring emotions, in terms of their evolutionary origin; their basic neurobiological substratum, and their functional significance in autonomous agents, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions. Our aim is to provide a naturalized explanation – mostly based on an interactivist model of emergent representation and appraisal theory of emotions – concerning basic aesthetic emotions in the formation of aesthetic judgment. We suggest two processes the Cognitive Variables Subsystem (CVS) which is fundamental for the accomplishment of the function of (...) heuristic learning; and Aesthetic Appraisal Subsystem (AAS) which primarily affects the elicitation of aesthetic emotional meanings. These two subsystems (CVS and AAS) are organizationally connected and affect the action readiness of the autonomous agent. More specifically, we consider the emotional outcome of these two subsystems as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty that emerges in the particular interaction. (shrink)