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Is truth flat or bumpy

In David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F P Ramsey. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--20 (1980)

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  1. Vagueness And The Sorites Paradox.Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):419-461.
    A sorites argument is a symptom of the vagueness of the predicate with which it is constructed. A vague predicate admits of at least one dimension of variation (and typically more than one) in its intended range along which we are at a loss when to say the predicate ceases to apply, though we start out confident that it does. It is this feature of them that the sorites arguments exploit. Exactly how is part of the subject of this paper. (...)
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  • Not Half True.Poppy Mankowitz - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):84-112.
    The word ‘true’ shows some evidence of gradability. For instance, there are cases where truth-bearers are described as ‘slightly true’, ‘completely true’ or ‘very true’. Expressions that accept these types of modifiers are analysed in terms of properties that can be possessed to a greater or lesser degree. If ‘true’ is genuinely gradable, then it would follow that there are degrees of truth. It might also follow that ‘true’ is context-sensitive, like other gradable expressions. Such conclusions are difficult to reconcile (...)
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  • Truth and Gradability.Jared Henderson - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):755-779.
    I argue for two claims: that the ordinary English truth predicate is a gradable adjective and that truth is a property that comes in degrees. The first is a semantic claim, motivated by the linguistic evidence and the similarity of the truth predicate’s behavior to other gradable terms. The second is a claim in natural language metaphysics, motivated by interpreting the best semantic analysis of gradable terms as applied to the truth predicate. In addition to providing arguments for these two (...)
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  • Lógica fuzzy, verdad y cognición.Alejandro Ramírez F. - 2014 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 70:133-147.
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  • Vaghezza: confini, cumuli e paradossi.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2012 - Roma: Laterza.
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  • A note on prototype theory and fuzzy sets.Lofti Zadeh - 1982 - Cognition 12 (1):291--7.
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  • Lógica fuzzy, verdad y cognición.Alejandro Ramírez - 2014 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 70:133-147.
    S.Haack has defended the idea that in fuzzy logic it cannot be affirmed that the true values of a statement are themselves blurry. This article analyzes Haack position in the light of some current approaches of classic philosophy of logic, and from the cognitive point of view of philosophy of logic, especially from the theory of concepts. Under the said approaches, the thesis on non-gradation of truth appears significantly weakened.
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  • Approximate truth for minimalists.Peter Smith - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (2):119-128.
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