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  1. Constitutivism and Generics.Samuel Gavin - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1015-1036.
    Constitutivism is a family of theories of normativity, especially in metaethics, that rely on the concept of constitutive norms: norms that are grounded in constitutive features of the kind of thing to which they apply. In this paper, I present two conditions that any constitutivism must meet in its account of constitutive norms, if it is to remain true to its motivations: the constitutivity and broad normativity conditions. I argue that all extant accounts of constitutive norms fail to meet these (...)
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  • Meaning and Understanding.Jason Bridges - 2017 - In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 375-389.
    Explores the central role in Wittgenstein's later work of his opposition to a 'mechanistic' conception of understanding. Offers a diagnosis of Kripke's skeptical paradox on this basis.
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  • The Unboundedness of the Plain; or the Ubiquity of Lilliput? How to Do Things with Thompson Clarke?Kelly Dean Jolley & Keren Gorodeisky - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (3-4):225-262.
    In this essay, we focus primarily on Moore’s “Proof of an External World” and Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism.” We are not exactly commenting on Clarke’s “The Legacy of Skepticism,” interpreting it, although what we do involves us in (some of) that. Instead of directly commenting on it, we do things with Legacy; we read Moore’s Proof and Kant’s Refutation with Clarke in mind. And by way of doing this, we bring onto the stage a post-Legacy Moore, and a post-Legacy Kant. (...)
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  • II—Meaning, Justification, and‘Primitive Normativity’.Adrian Haddock - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
    I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’: first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to (...)
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