This article presents a normative‐theoretical account of democratic legitimacy that meets the challenge of moral and cultural pluralism in a way that takes the avoidance of oppression and violence to be a fundamental imperative. The discourse‐theoretical perspective of jürgen Habermas reveals that reasoned agreement among citizens is the only alternative to political oppression. Pace Habermas, however, the legitimacy of even basic constitutional principles does not require us to agree with one another for the same reasons. While we can affirm such (...) principles for a wide range of different reasons, the process of achieving reasoned agreements on contentious issues draws us together as citizens in loyalty to a particular, historical set of political institutions. The reasoned commitment to our constitution that we come to share in this ongoing process acts as an identity‐forming bond that allows us to live in peace with deep moral and cultural differences. (shrink)

Neither Habermas nor his communitarian and poststructuralist critics sufficiently explore the non-linguistic, playful, and performative dimensions of contemporary public spheres. I argue that the approaches of Castoriadis and Touraine can inform a theoretical understanding of the history and current resonance of this public sphere of performance. Their concepts of the social imaginary, the autonomous society, and subjectivation highlight the role of fantasy, images, individualism, and other non-rational factors in late modern public life.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of critique in Habermasian thought. Given that the concept of critique is a central theoretical category in the work of the Frankfurt School, it comes as a surprise that little in the way of a systematic account which sheds light on the multifaceted meanings of the concept of critique in Habermas's oeuvre can be found in the literature. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the various meanings (...) that Habermas attributes to the concept of critique in 10 key thematic areas of his writings: (1) the public sphere, (2) knowledge, (3) language, (4) morality, (5) ethics, (6) evolution, (7) legitimation, (8) democracy, (9) religion, and (10) modernity. On the basis of a detailed analysis of Habermas's multifaceted concerns with the nature and function of critique, the study seeks to demonstrate that the concept of critique can be considered not only as a constitutive element but also as a normative cornerstone of Habermasian thought. The paper draws to a close by reflecting on some of the limitations of Habermas's conception of critique, arguing that in order to be truly critical in the Habermasian sense we need to turn the subject of critique into an object of critique. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to provide an in-depth review of Andrew Feenberg’s Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason. To this end, the anal...

In Habermas’s discourse theory of law, the guarantee of citizens’ private and public autonomy is a prerequisite of legitimate law. This includes social entitlements. They provide the living conditions necessary for equal opportunities in the use of private and public freedoms. A proceduralist paradigm of the welfare state ensures private and public autonomy in shaping social rights. This makes welfare state regulations a legitimizing institution. This legal theoretical approach is outlined and defended against objections. The focus falls on examining the (...) critique of the justification and quality of social entitlements. Also considered are possible measures to strengthen the basis of legitimation in shaping social rights. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Habermas' proceduralist model of law can be put to feminist ends in at least two significant ways. First, in presenting an alternative to the liberal and welfare models of laws, the proceduralist model offers feminism a way out of the equality/difference dilemma. Both these attempts to secure women's equality by emphasising women's sameness to men or their difference from men have placed the onus on women to either find a way of integrating themselves into (...) existing institutions or to confront the so-called question of women's difference. The proceduralist model renders this dilemma irrelevant. Instead, it proceeds from the fact of sexual difference; a fact that produces competing and conflicting needs and interests that require interpretation by both men and women. This, I argue, marks a change in the very way we conceptualise the so-called problem of women's difference, insofar as the question is no longer framed in these terms. Second, I argue that this deliberative process over the interpretation of conflicting interests affects a fundamental shift in the nature of legal institutions themselves, insofar as law is no longer a vehicle for promoting male interests. (shrink)

An analysis of the epistemological structure of democratic deliberation as a procedure in which legal norms are constructed reveals that deliberation combines procedural and substantive aspects in a unique and inextricable manner. The co-original recognition of the private and public autonomy of all citizens provides the substantive critical standard against which the justice of norms is measured. At the same time, such recognition requires that the particular needs and values of all people concerned be taken into account. Given the privileged (...) epistemic access people have to their own particular perspective, this requirement implies the ineliminability of actual deliberative procedures. The open-ended nature of these constructive procedures is partly due to the fact that the rules of the procedure are counterfactual and themselves subject to interpretation. More importantly, it also reflects the historical nature of our human world and the freedom of moral persons to shape and reshape their preferences. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s political philosophy incorporates the view that legitimacy is immanent to law, even though it makes morality a central component of democratic legitimacy. Taking this as a startin...

In this article, I argue that political philosophers like Rawls and Habermas that characterize their methods as non-metaphysical or postmetaphysical depend on constitutions in order to provide a positive and public reference point for democratic participants. Michelman shows how this dependency is problematic, by contending that disagreement about the meaning of constitutional rights and the indeterminacy of their application undermines the rationality of consensus. I argue that his concerns raise serious problems for Rawls’ theory. Habermas, on the other hand, has (...) some tools to deal with Michelman’s critique — namely, his distinction between discourses of justification and application, and his idea of constitutional patriotism — but he must concede that much of the substance of constitutional democracy is basically up for grabs. I conclude by suggesting why these consequences are less threatening than they may seem. (shrink)

Honneth pretende detectar elementos de eticidade na realidade social, a englobar relações de amizade, relações íntimas, mercado de produção e de consumo, esfera pública e Estado democrático de direito. O seu projeto de filosofia do direito se alicerça em um conceito de liberdade que se configura socialmente e não a partir de uma perspectiva individualista e isolada. O presente texto desafia o diagnóstico positivo de Honneth em relação a tal configuração da liberdade social. O texto considera que Honneth não foi (...) bem sucedido em sua empreitada, haja vista as realizações falhas da liberdade social serem mais salientes do que as suas realizações adequadas. Isso posto, o estudo aponta para o projeto de Habermas, com base em papel bastante expressivo do direito, inclusive como compensação pelas falhas de eticidade, como sendo mais apropriado para a teoria crítica nos tempos atuais. (shrink)