La nuestra parece ser una época aquejada por el escepticismo. ¿Pero qué forma de escepticismo es propiamente la que nos afecta, y cómo recibimos esta herencia del pensamiento antiguo? En este trabajo exploro la cuestión atendiendo al origen histórico del escepticismo filosófico, su actualización durante el Renacimiento y su influencia en el presente. En la primera parte presento las dos variantes del escepticismo clásico, pirronismo y academicismo. En la segunda señalo cómo el primero dejó su impronta en el Renacimiento fomentando (...) la crítica intelectual y la tolerancia social. En la tercera parte presento cómo, con Descartes, la discusión sobre el escepticismo partió de asunciones infalibilistas, confinándose en los límites de lo que Williams llamó «la investigación pura». En la cuarta parte esbozo el marco de la normatividad epistémica, señalando diversas patologías contemporáneas propias de lo que se ha denominado “la posverdad” (auge de las fake news, producción sistemática de incertidumbre, conspiracionismo…). Cuestiono ahí ese apelativo y presento estas patologías como efecto de lo que llamo “desnutrición epistémica”. En la quinta apunto en qué sentido estos males parecen ser resultado de aquella herencia escéptica. En la sexta parte descarto algunos diagnósticos fallidos de esta relación, y en la séptima afino finalmente el tiro, subrayando que es a la interpretación infalibilista del escepticismo, así como a su desvinculación de toda motivación práctica, y no al escepticismo per se, a lo que cabría, si acaso, atribuir estos perniciosos efectos. (shrink)

This article deals with the question about the conditions for someone to call something ‘fake news’. It examines cases in which something is called fake news and analyses these cases from an ordinary language point of view as speech acts. Doing so, the analysis explains fake news as the expression of a dissent. The analysis avoids problems of recent attempts to provide a definition of fake news and argues against the view that fake news belong to a so-called post-truth era. (...) The conclusion of the article is that it is not possible to call something fake news without having unyielding convictions about the truth. (shrink)

According to some philosophers and social scientists, mainstream economic theories currently play an unprecedented role in shaping human societies. This phenomenon can be linked to the dissemination of methodological individualism, where common goods are interpreted as reducible to aggregates of individuals' well-being. Nonetheless, some emergent difficulties of economics in coping with global institutional issues have encouraged some authors to revise that paradigm. In the last three decades, there has been a parallel growing philosophical interest in investigating social sciences' epistemological and (...) ontological foundations. Unfortunately, these two research trends have often not communicated systematically enough to understand the specific ontology of collective aims. It is still unclear whether some irreducible social goods exist and how the answer to this question can set up a consistent understanding of cooperative actions. This dissertation addresses this issue, drawing on philosophical investigations about collective intentionality. It claims that a coherent ontological taxonomy of irreducible and reducible social goods is theoretically viable and can reframe prevailing approaches to collective action dilemmas influenced by the traditional economic categorisation of goods. The research begins by analysing how the influential theory of public goods has paved the way for some social and moral impasses. Furthermore, some theoretical proposals suggesting the existence of relational goods and common-pool resources are scrutinised. Hence, a refutation of the ontological reduction of all social goods to individual ones is developed, arguing that a specific form of cooperation, grounded in we-intentions and we-reasoning, shows the plausibility of the existence of some kinds of irreducible collective goods. Expanding on that view, a refinement of this categorisation of social goods is put forward by underlying the function of some relational entities, such as trust and shared sensemaking processes, in making cooperation robust in uncertain environments. Finally, by applying the taxonomy to collective action gridlocks regarding climate change, digital information, and public education, the consistency of this hypothesis is tested, showing that a pluralistic ontological account of social goods might improve the moral understanding of current social dilemmas. (shrink)

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social co...

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response, which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify the grounds on which the state is justified in acting (...) against them. This article argues that the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria. Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such ‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that they can serve as a useful guide for public policy. (shrink)

Many scientists have expressed concerns about potential catastrophic risks associated with new technologies. But expressing concern is one thing, identifying serious candidates another. Such risks are likely to be novel, rare, and difficult to study; data will be scarce, making speculation necessary. Scientists who raise such concerns may face disapproval not only as doomsayers, but also for their unconventional views. Yet the costs of false negatives in these cases -- of wrongly dismissing warnings about catastrophic risks -- are by definition (...) very high. For these reasons, aspects of the methodology and culture of science, such as its attitude to epistemic risk and to unconventional views, are relevant to the challenges of managing extreme technological risks. In this piece I discuss these issues with reference to a real-world example that shares many of the same features, that of so-called 'cold fusion'. (shrink)