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  1. (1 other version)Hermeneutics versus stupidities of all sorts.Wulf Rehder - 1983 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (1):81-102.
    Das provokative und vielgelobte Buch Rorty's, des inzwischen international bekannten Ordinarius aus Princeton, stellt das gesamte Unternehmen der abendländischen Philosophie in Frage. Zentrales Thema von Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature sind Krise und Niedergang der analytischen Philosophy, wie wir sie seit Descartes, Locke und Kant kennen. Während Descartes und Locke die Seele als Auge modellierten, das die äußere Welt als inneres Bild wahrnimmt und vermittelt, verfeinerte Kant diese okulare Metapher durch Einführung des transzendentalen Subjekts. Gleichzeitig gab Kant der professionalen (...)
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  • Rorty's critique of foundationalism.Timm Triplett - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):115 - 129.
    Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory (...)
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  • Can there be progress in philosophy?Kai Nielsen - 1987 - Metaphilosophy 18 (1):1–30.
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  • Rorty on Knowledge and Reality.M. J. Davis - 2005 - Dissertation,
    The thesis identifies two strands in Rorty’s philosophy. One is an orientation towards practice in opposition to the traditional philosophical emphasis on theoretical knowledge. The other is Rorty’s anti-representationalist conception of knowledge. Rorty argues that these strands are mutually supporting, while the author argues they are incompatible. The nominal aim of Rorty’s anti-representationalism is to overcome many traditional dualisms of theoretical philosophy, such as subject and object, mind and world, and theory and practice. The thesis argues that anti-representationalism does not (...)
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  • (1 other version)Ende oder Wende der analytischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie?Dirk Koppelberg - 1981 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12 (2):364-400.
    My concern in what follows is to give a comparative report on some important lectures held at the Hegel-Kongreß 1981 in Stuttgart. In discussing the views of Quine, Hacking, Davidson, Putnam and Habermas I want to confront them with some details of Rorty's recent critique of our philosophical tradition. At last I try to give a tentative answer whether there is an end or a turning-point for current analytical philosophy.
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  • Book review. [REVIEW]Rickard J. Donovan - 1981 - Man and World 14 (3):349-353.
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  • The withering away of the tradition.Kai Nielsen - 1988 - Philosophia 18 (2-3):211-226.
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