Bertrand Russell's 1903 masterpiece "The Principles of Mathematics" places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as "psychological occurrences". These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell's re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood against the background of his struggle with (...) the problem of the unity of the proposition in earlier work. Once this is recognized, and the solution to the problem offered by the 1919 theory is appreciated, new light is also shed on Russell's naturalism. I go on to compare Russell's psychological "picture theory" with the vehemently anti-psychological picture theory of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and suggest that, once the background of the dispute is brought into clearer focus, Russell's position can be seen to have many advantages over its more celebrated rival. (shrink)

RESUMEN Los casos de "ver-como", presentados por Wittgenstein en la Segunda Parte de Philosophical Investigations, muestran que el concepto de "ver" se encuentra cercano al de "interpretar" y resiste su separación. El presente artículo propone un argumento para aclarar la noción de "interpretación" presente en estos casos, a partir de su comparación con los usos presentes en el Tractatus y en la Primera Parte de Philosophical Investigations. Se sostiene que dicha noción cumple el rol de determinar el sentido de lo (...) visualmente experimentado. Además, "ver" e "interpretar" mantienen un tipo de relación interna y "ver-como" puede considerarse como una "representación elástica". ABSTRACT The "seeing-as" cases, presented by Wittgenstein in the Second Part of Philosophical Investigations, show that the concept of 'seeing' is close to that of 'interpretation' and resists its separation. This article proposes an argument to clarify the notion of 'interpretation' present in these cases, from its comparison with the uses present in the Tractatus and in the First Part of Philosophical Investigations. It is argued that this notion fulfills the role of determining the sense of the visually experienced. In addition, 'to see' and 'to interpret' maintain a type of internal relationship and 'seeing-as' can be considered an "elastic representation". (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que as interpretações "tradicional" e "resoluta" não livraram o "Tractatus" da aparente autoderrota paradoxal. Argumento que essas leituras apresentam apenas uma nova roupagem ao paradoxo. A leitura "tradicional" de Hacker acaba atribuindo uma conspiração metafísica ao "Tractatus", o que é incompatível com os objetivos do livro. A leitura "resoluta" de Diamond e Conant atribui a Wittgenstein uma conspiração autoral, o que contradiz suas opiniões sobre autoria e método. Com base nas dificuldades encontradas em (...) ambos os lados do debate atual, concluo este artigo propondo vários requisitos que a correta interpretação do "Tractatus" deve preencher. (shrink)

The main question addressed by this article is this: How should one understand the role of the sentences of the Tractatus, given Wittgenstein’s statement that they are nonsensical? I begin with a presentation of three general principles of interpretation in order to avoid answering the question in an inappropriate way. I then move on to a short presentation and commentary on a selection of readings – namely, the ineffabilist, resolute and elucidatory ones – and elaborate the answers given by advocates (...) of these to the question explored here. I agree on many points with resolute and elucidatory readings: the Tractatus presents an austere conception of nonsense, and is not a book that seeks to present ontological or semantic theories. I point out, however, that these readings cannot fully explain the nature of Tractarian elucidations. Then I discuss those parts of the Tractatus which refer to the sentences of the book itself. The main proposal of my own approach is this: Tractarian elucidations should be construed as rules of translation, in that they show how to substitute certain expressions for others. They enable us to construct a notation in which everything that is expressible in ordinary language can be said perspicuously. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a central aspect of the “picture theory” in the Tractatus – the “identity requirement” – namely the idea that a proposition represents elements in reality as combined in the same way as its elements are combined. After introducing the Tractatus' views on the nature of the proposition, I engage with a “nominalist” interpretation, according to which the Tractatus holds that relations are not named in propositions. I claim that the nominalist account can only be maintained by (...) rejecting the “identity requirement.” I then consider an opposite – “realist” – interpretation, according to which Tractarian names include names of properties and relations. I argue that, although it can accommodate the “identity requirement,” the realist interpretation falls short of providing a correct interpretation of the Tractatus' conception of a name. I conclude by presenting an alternative account (to both nominalism and realism) of the Tractatus' conception of a name. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza las primeras consideraciones de Ludwig Wittgenstein respecto de la percepción de figuras ambiguas, lo que posteriormente fue englobado por la más amplia noción de “percepción de aspectos”. El objetivo consiste en poner de manifiesto algunas las consideraciones del Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus respecto al carácter intrínsecamente representacional de la percepción en el caso del Cubo de Necker, para establecer de qué manera y en qué medida sus primeras observaciones críticas de la percepción de propiedades que admiten grados en (...) Some Remarks on Logical Form, en 1929, puede impactar análogamente sobre su propia descripción de esta clase particular de experiencias bajo consideración. (shrink)

The article argues for a contextualised reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. It analyses in detail the role that use and application play in the text and how that supports a conception of transcendentality of logic that allows for contextualisation. The article identifies a tension in the text, between the requirement that sense be determinate and the contextual nature of application, and suggests that it is this tension that is a major driver of Wittgenstein’s later ideas.

It is argued that Russell before 1905 saw no value in Frege's sense/reference distinction. This is clearest in the Mont Blanc correspondence. It is argued that Russell and Frege failed to engage because Frege lacked a grasp on the internal/external relations distinction. For Russell sense is either an external relation, objectionably separating out thought and reference, or an internal relation, so what is thought is altered such that we do not know what we are talking about. The novelty of the (...) present paper lies in the arrangement of the parts and the claim that Russellian propositions are not made up of the things themselves but of transparent representatives thereof. (shrink)

This paper investigates the issue whether metaphors have a metaphorical or secondary meaning and how this question is related to the borderline between philosophy and linguistics. On examples by V. Woolf and H. W. Auden, it will be shown that metaphor accomplishes something more than its literal meaning expresses and this “more” cannot be captured by any secondary meaning. What is essential in the metaphor is not a secondary meaning but an internal relation between a metaphorical proposition and a description (...) of its effects. In order to understand metaphors, we have to share an ability to construe metaphorical meanings at once. The aim of this ability is to uncover an internal relation, which lies behind a particular metaphor. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the Tractatus classifies names into constant names and variable names. A variable name, via the application of the existential quantifier against the background of picturing, picks out and denotes an unspecified object from the range of objects of the form shown by the relevant variable. A constant name labels an object picked out from a scope of the existential quantifier. I also refute two types of attempts to argue that the Tractarian relation between a (...) name and its meaning is not realist, and to explain why it is more reasonable to hold that it is. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’essaie de montrer que l’idée du langage comme calcul structure la philosophie de Wittgenstein dans le Big Typescript. Pour ce faire, je commence par mettre en relief les différences entre la conception du langage comme calcul dans le Tractatus, et sa reformulation dans le Big Typescript ; j’explique ensuite comment l’idée de l’autonomie de la grammaire est à la base de la conception de la « grammaire » ou du langage comme calcul. J’espère pouvoir montrer ainsi l’unité (...) de la philosophie de Wittgenstein aux alentours de 1932-1933. Il doit en ressortir que sa philosophie à l’époque du Big Typescript présente un intérêt en elle-même, quoiqu’il ne s’agisse pas encore de la philosophie des Recherches philosophiques.I aim at showing that the idea of language as a calculus is the central view that shapes Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the Big Typescript. In order to do so, I first contrast the conception of language as a calculus in the Tractatus with its reformulation in the BigTypescript ; then I explain how the idea of the autonomy of grammar grounds the conception of “grammar” or language as calculus. With this on hand, I give an overview of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy around 1932-1933. It should become clear that his philosophy at the time is worth arguing for, even though it is not yet the philosophy of the PhilosophicalInvestigations. (shrink)

It is generally considered the case that an authorial preface is an author’s opportunity to give the reader a hand in interpreting the work he or she is about to read. It is strange then that the Preface to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1922) has often been overlooked. Max Black’s (1964) influential A Companion toWittgenstein’sTractatus, for example, passes over the Preface in silence. And even in the latest published edition of the so-called Prototractatus (1996), the Preface is the only part that appears (...) in hand-written facsimile but is not reproduced in typescript form. Perhaps an argument for not so-reproducing the Preface of the Pro- totractatus in typescript is also an argument for the importance of the Preface: not one letter of this early hand-written text of the Preface is different from the final published edition (I will return to this later). Only of late has the Preface to the Tractatus been seen as having any kind of focal importance.This recent interest in the Preface has largely been spawned by Cora Diamond’s and James Conant’s “New” view of Wittgenstein. This New view (designated as such subsequent to the publication in 2000 of the volume entitled The New Wittgenstein) uses the Preface as a central interpretive tool that, according to this view, shows that the Tractatus takes “a strong anti-metaphysical stand” which is “most explicit in Wittgenstein’s statements in the book’s Preface and concluding remarks.1”The third and fourth paragraphs of the Preface are seen as especially revealing of Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphysical purpose. (shrink)

After the works of Jaako Hintikka, David Stern and, more recently, Denis Perrin, the idea that there is a wittgensteinian reflection upon the time and that it is at the origin of the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language is nothing surprising, but we cannot consider it established yet. It seems to me that an important element in this debate is in chapter VII of the Philosophical Remarks : indeed, we find there the very first sustained discussion on (...) the possibility of a phenomenological language —a discussion obviously centred on the question of time. Without aiming to propose an “alternative” reading of Wittgenstein’ reflections on time and the phenomenological language, I would like to bring to light the importance of this chapter for this problem and also try to show that the interpretation key must be looked for in a reductio ad absurdum whose base is the impossibility to measure time. (shrink)

En este trabajo trato de dar respuesta a la cuestión acerca de si los conceptos formales del Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein son o no categorías ontológicas. Mi respuesta es que no. Así, después de ofrecer una definición de ‘ontología’ y diferentes lecturas sobre las proposiciones iniciales del Tractatus, presento la noción de concepto formal o lógico, así como diferentes interpretaciones en relación con el papel de esos conceptos en el Tractatus. Después, y teniendo en consideración lo dicho en las secciones (...) precedentes, presento mi propia lectura de las proposiciones iniciales en términos de expresiones conceptuales o gramaticales, la distinción tanto en extensión como en intensión de las nociones de concepto formal o lógico y categoría ontológica y la disolución de la ontología, que no de la lógica. Finalmente ofrezco unas conclusiones finales que recogen aspectos centrales de la discusión precedente. (shrink)