The practical aspect of ancient philosophy has been recently made a focus of renewed metaphilosophical investigation. After a brief presentation of three accounts of this kind developed by Martha Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot, and Michel Foucault, the model of the therapeutic argument developed by Nussbaum is called into question from the perspectives offered by her French colleagues, who emphasize spiritual exercise (Hadot) or the care of the self (Foucault). The ways in which the account of Nussbaum can be defended are then (...) discussed, including both a ‘negative’ defense, i.e. the indication of the weaknesses of Hadot and Foucault’s proposals, and a ‘positive’ one focused on the points in which Nussbaum can convincingly address doubts about her metaphilosophical account. In response to these analyses, some further remarks made by Hadot and Foucault are discussed in order to demonstrate that their accounts are not as distant from Nussbaum after all. Finally, a recent metaphilosophical study by John Sellars together with a therapeutic (medical) model developed by the author of the present article are suggested as providing a framework for potential reconciliation between all three accounts discussed and a resource for further metaphilosophical studies. (shrink)

Tacitus' claim that history should inspire good deeds and deter bad ones should be taken seriously: his exempla are supposed to help his readers think through their own moral difficulties. This approach to history is found in historians with clear connections to Stoicism, and in Stoic philosophers like Seneca. It is no coincidence that Tacitus is particularly interested in the behavior of Stoics like Thrasea Paetus, Barea Soranus, and Seneca himself. They, and even non-Stoic characters like Epicharis and Petronius, exemplify (...) the behavior necessary if Roman freedom was to survive the monarchy. (shrink)

An overview of the ancient philosophers and their philosophical system (divided into the fields of logic, physics, and ethics) comprising the living, organic, enduring, and evolving body of interrelated ideas identifiable as the Stoic perspective.

Anleitungen zur Selbstperfektionierung wurden geschrieben, um für eine radikale Lebensreform zu werben. Die Kommunikation unter den Reformbefürwortern erfolgte über Schreiben, Lesen und Diskutieren, um Praktiken, Kenntnisse und den Zusammenhalt zu fördern. Da es nur wenigen gelang, sich zeitlebens einem entsagungsvollen Lebensstil zu unterziehen, erwachten immer wieder Bewegungen, die aufs Neue Ängste und Hoffnungen der Menschen artikulierten und zeitgemäße Rezepte für ein glücklicheres Leben lieferten. Ältere Schriften wurden von späteren Generationen verarbeitet und neu interpretiert. Waren die Anleitungen überzeugend, förderten sie über (...) längere Zeit soziokulturelle Prozesse innerhalb der Gesellschaft. Zunächst radikal scheinende Forderungen wurden schließlich allgemein anerkannt. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to focus on some rhetorical strategies of argumentation which play crucial role in the therapeutic discourse of Roman Stoicism, namely in Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Reference is made to Chaim Perelman’s view of ancient rhetoric as an art of inventing arguments. Moreover, it is pointed out that in rhetorical education as well as in therapeutic discourse the concept of “exercise” and constant practice play a crucial role.

There is an increasing interest in publications about the sources of meaning in life; books about the art of living are immensely popular. This article discusses whether one of the ancient predecessors of current 'art of living' theories, the Stoa and more particularly Seneca, can be of interest to educators today. Seneca's explicit writings on education are relatively few, but in his letters to his friend Lucilius we find several ideas as to how educators can assist students to become wise (...) and virtuous adults. The main characteristic of the virtuous sage is his ability to maintain tranquillity of mind. While we disagree with the radicalism of Seneca's view on the extirpation of emotions, we have discovered insights that we believe can be a valuable source for educators and students in their reflections on the meaning of education for the business of life. (shrink)

Teun Tieleman surveys the history of the philosophical notion of the ‘art of life’, starting from its originator Socrates and his ancient successors down to its role among present-day philosophers. Apart from Socrates, special attention is given to the Stoics, Nietzsche and Foucault. The way in which the notion was defined and functioned throughout the history of philosophy reveals an exceptionally fruitful interplay between continuity and originality.

The concept of πρoπαειαι or "pre-emotions" is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term πρoπαεια at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca, nor from Cicero, who also mentions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The πρoπαεια concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the passions proper, is thus confirmed for the Hellenistic period. (...) It is not to be expected that Philo's handling of this or any concept will necessarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The πρoπαεια saves the virtuous person's insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept in Origen and Didymus. QGen 1.55 and 3.56 indicate that the occurrence of the πρoπαειαι is dependent upon uncertainty, and further, that for Philo, as for Seneca in Ira 2.3.4, a thought not acted upon can count as a πρoπαεια. In QGen 4.15-17 and 1.79, Philo indicates that hope and perhaps laughter may be related to joy as πρoπαεια to παoς; these assertions are not paralleled in extant Stoic texts. Further, in QGen 2.57, he names "biting and contraction" as the ευπαεια corresponding to grief, supplying a helpful parallel for Cic. Tusc. 3.83 and Plut. Virt. Mor. 449a. The topic may well have been discussed by Posidonius, as suggested by Cooper and others, but Posidonius' attested innovations are rather different in character from the points which have caught the attention of Philo. Taking together the indirect evidence of Philo, Seneca, and Cicero, we may reasonably infer that the πρoπαεια concept belonged already to an earlier period of Stoicism. (shrink)

This text seeks to situate Being and Time in the line of the ancient philosophical tradition of care for self (epiméleia heautou). After a brief description of the main features of this tradition as portrayed by Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot, the author presents the elements of Being in Time in favour and those against such a link. Her hypothesis appears to encounter a major objection in the explicit refusal of Heidegger to speak of Selbstsorge. But an attentive examination of (...) the meaning of this reserve (the rejection of selfhood as a transparent and introspective relationship of the soul to itself) makes it in reality possible to show Heidegger to be one of the most consequent philosophers in the tradition of care for the soul. Indeed, by highlighting the constitutive link between selfhood and care, Heidegger shows the very condition of possibility of the tradition of care for the soul: that the self is not given as a thing, but may contribute to its own transformation through a specific form of care. (shrink)

It is undeniable that the form of Seneca'sEpistulae Moraleswe currently read is a work of literature, literature being here defined as a piece of work the author intended to publish. What Seneca claims inEp. 21.3–5 is clear evidence of this:exemplum Epicuri referam. cum Idomeneo scriberet et illum a uita speciosa ad fidelem stabilemque gloriam reuocaret, regiae tunc potentiae ministrum et magna tractantem, ‘si gloria’ inquit ‘tangeris, notiorem te epistulae meae facient quam omnia ista quae colis et propter quae coleris’. […] (...) quod Epicurus amico suo potuit promittere, hoc tibi promitto, Lucili: habebo apud posteros gratiam, possum mecum duratura nomina educere. (shrink)

En me fondant sur le témoignage de Photius sur l’Anthologion de Jean Stobée (Bibl., cod. 167) et en considérant d’abord l’architecture de l’ouvrage et les aspects techniques de la composition, je me propose d’évaluer la possibilité d’une nouvelle lecture, selon laquelle le florilège de Stobée n’aurait pas été destiné à une instruction scolaire générale ni adressé à un destinataire unique, son propre fils Septimius, mais, tout en relevant indéniablement de la littérature didactique, aurait eu en quelque sorte un caractère propédeutique, (...) en présentant à l’utilisateur l’inventaire général du monde ordonnée logiquement, et en utilisant une tradition gnomologico-doxographique antérieure avec un dessein culturel nouveau. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that retrieving insights from the ancient Stoic philosophers for Christian ethics is much more difficult than is often assumed and, further, that the “ethics of retrieval” is itself something worth prolonged reflection. The central problem is that in their ancient sense both Christianity and Stoicism are practically dense patterns of reasoning and mutually incompatible forms of life. Coming to see this clearly requires the realization that the encounter between Stoicism and Christianity is a conflict of lived traditions. (...) Precisely because we cannot simply extract Stoic insights from the lives in which they belong, the task of determining how Stoicism is useful for Christianity is exceptionally challenging. Indeed, doing justice to the Stoics has more to do with facing an alternative to Christianity than it does with appropriating insights for our own use. These points are developed in conversation with Elizabeth Agnew Cochran's recent article on the Stoic influence upon Jonathan Edwards. (shrink)

Do you see now why it feels so good to be a critical mind? Why critique, this most ambiguous pharmakon, has become such a potent euphoric drug? You are always right! When naïve believers are clinging forcefully to their objects... you can turn all of those attachments into so many fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing that it is nothing but their own projection, that you, yes you alone, can see. But as soon as naïve believers are thus (...) inflated by some belief in their own importance, in their own projective capacity, you strike them by a second uppercut and humiliate them again, this time by showing that, whatever they think, their behavior is entirely determined by the action of powerful causalities coming from objective reality they don't see, but that you, yes you, the never sleeping critic, alone can see. Isn't this fabulous? Isn't it really worth going to graduate school to study critique? (shrink)

The meaning of the term logagogy is elucidated, and logagogic practices are outlined in the history of medicine. It is shown how the traditional medicine of India, Ayurveda, shows signs of logagogic practices(sattvavajaya), and that not only Ayurveda but also the famous Greek physician Galenus emphasize a philosophical approach to medicine. As Galenus’s logagogic practices have their roots in the tradition of practical philosophy in Greek antiquity, the most important Greek schools of thought that are relevant to logagogic approaches are (...) sketched. It is shown that the Stoics created a rationalistic system emphasizing the importance of the logos for human beings, and that Epicurus made advances in psychoeducation and cognitive reframing that are important for logagogic practices. These logagogic approaches of antiquity have been taken up by modern counseling in philosophical practices. The article closes with an outline of a clinical logagogy. (shrink)