Recently, Irad Kimhi has argued that negation and falsehood can be made intelligible by understanding assertions/judgements as acts of two-way logical capacities. These are capacities that are, at the same time, for (1) positive and negative assertions/judgements and (2) positive and negative facts. Kimhi’s account of negation and falsehood, however, faces severe problems. I argue that these problems can be resolved, and that a new understanding of cases of negation and falsehood can be achieved, by regarding two-way logical capacities for (...) assertion/judgement and facts as established and undergirded by what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls “samples”. The standard metre sample, for instance, establishes and undergirds the capacity for asserting that something, x, is one metre long (meaning: x is like the standard metre in length). At the same time, it establishes and undergirds the capacity for the fact that x is one metre long (when x is like the standard metre in length). As I explain, invoking samples means we cannot say, as Kimhi wants to, what assertion/judgement, negation, and facts, in general, are but can only show what they are, one case at a time. This, however, is a boon not a disadvantage. (shrink)