The meaning of niche and competitive ability have long been surrounded by controversy. The reason for this stems from the obscure relationship that exists between these terms. This extends from the views of Darwin through Eltonian tradition to current views in which the meaning of competitive ability is implicitly infused into the paradigm of niche. Distinct operational definitions for niche and competitive ability are therefore established with special reference to plants. It is proposed that potential niche refer explicitly to a (...) theoretical hyperspace of places where a species would leave descendents if all biotic interactions were precluded, and that competitive ability refer to the relative capacity to leave descendents in a particular place in the face of restrictions imposed by competitive interaction. This leads to a qualitative comprehensive theory for coexistence which may be extended to any type of biotic interaction. Niche and competitive ability are both determined by the biological attributes of a species and may be independently adjusted in a population by natural selection in contexts of competition. Species coexistence in nature may therefore be a consequence of alternative evolutionary mechanisms which may operate to various degrees in concert: (1) natural selection leading to niche differentiation; (2) an ongoing process of reciprocal selection (coevolution) which maintains an approximate balance in relative competitive abilities for contested resources. (shrink)

This is an essay about ethics and environmental responsibility. The thesis is that biologic species qua species--not only as collections of individuals or as elements of ecosystems--deserve moral regard. The argument establishes moral considerability on powers and freedoms of relative self-determination and autonomy. It is argued that species are living beings in their own right with their own projects and interests which deserve special regard. The essay draws from the arguments of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Boethius, Avicenna, Maimonides, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, (...) and others, concerning the moral value of natural beings, but situates itself in the contemporary dialogue of environmental ethics. Lengthy consideration is given to species concepts defended by evolution theorists, biological systematists, and ecologists. ;The argument claims that natural beings, including species, have moral value because they have projects and interests which make a legitimate, but not universal, claim on the moral agent. Beings make moral claims when they are integral and integrating, individual, and concreative--conditions comparable to those with which we describe the moral status of a person. We may call such beings rational by analogy to the integration and singularity of intellect, and confer upon them analogous moral consideration. They are due regard in proportion to their projects in the same sense that moral subjects are due regard for having the projects of moral subjects. (shrink)

The concept of an ecological niche (econiche) has been used in a variety of ways, some of which are incompatible with a relational or functional interpretation of the term. This essay seeks to standardize usage by limiting the concept to functional relations between organisms and their surroundings, and to revise the concept to include epistemic relations. For most organisms, epistemics are a vital aspect of their functional relationships to their surroundings and, hence, a major determinant of their econiche. Rejecting the (...) traditional dualism of organism and environment, an econiche is defined as the reciprocal (dual) of a functionally specified class of organisms (FSTU). From this perspective, an econiche necessarily implies a certain type of organism, and a class of functionally similar organisms implies a special econiche.The econiche concept is also discussed in relation to other ecological terms that reflect the distributional patterns of organisms, such as habitat, and the concept of an empty niche is criticized. (shrink)