The metaphysical nature of homologies has been variously characterized as natural kind, individualist, and pluralist-pragmatic. In this essay, I aim to build on the work of proponents of a natural kinds ontology for homologies using Richard Boyd’s influential HPC account of natural kinds. I aim to advance this position by showing the unique fit of extending the HPC account to homologies, deflecting individualist critiques, as well as the pluralist-pragmatic alternative, showing that homologies have a determinate metaphysical character as kinds. As (...) an important extension of this position, I attempt to explain away how the mistaken metaphysics of the individualist, and derivatively the pluralist-pragmatic approach that contextually embraces it, can facilitate certain elements of biological practice. (shrink)

The germ track is the cellular path by which genes are transmitted to future generations whereas somatic cells die with their body and do not leave direct descendants. Transposable elements (TEs) evolve to be silent in somatic cells but active in the germ track. Thus, the performance of most bodily functions by a sequestered soma reduces organismal costs of TEs. Flexible forms of gene regulation are permissible in the soma because of the self‐imposed silence of TEs, but strict licensing of (...) transcription and translation is maintained in the germ track to control proliferation of TEs. Delayed zygotic genome activation (ZGA) and maternally inherited germ granules are adaptations that enhance germ‐track security. Mammalian embryos exhibit very early ZGA associated with extensive mobilization of retroelements. This window of vulnerability to retrotransposition in early embryos is an indirect consequence of evolutionary conflicts within the mammalian genome over postzygotic maternal provisioning. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that functional and dispositional properties are not identical to their physical base, but that there is some kind of asymmetrical ontological dependence between them. In this regard, a popular idea is that the former are realized by the latter, which, under the non-identity assumption, is generally understood to be a non-causal, constitutive relation. In this paper we examine two of the most widely accepted approaches to realization, the so-called ‘flat view’ and the ‘dimensioned view’, and we (...) analyze their explanatory relevance in the light of a number of examples from the life sciences, paying special attention to developmental phenomena. Our conclusion is that the emphasis placed by modern-day biology on such properties as variability, evolvability, and a whole collection of phenomena like modularity, robustness, and developmental constraint or developmental bias requires the adoption of a much more dynamic perspective than traditional realization frameworks are able to capture. (shrink)