A great number of investigations suggest that cognition involves both linguistic and cartographic representations. These researches have motivated a pluralist conception of cognition; also, they have been used to clarify how maps differ from linguistic representations. However, the computational processes underlying the interphase between both kinds of representations deserve further attention. In this paper, I argue that, despite their differences, cartographic representations coexist and interact with linguistic representations in interesting ways.

The primary aim of the article is to take a fresh look at the debate between amodal and grounded (modality-specific) theories of conceptual representations by formulating what I call the challenge from (global) supramodality. The challenge proceeds from the observation that, in recent years, many neuroscience data suggest that extensive portions of what are traditionally considered modality-specific cortices are in fact supramodal in nature; that is, they can process external information independently from the perceptual modality. According to a strong or (...) global interpretation of these data, the entire brain has a task-specific and sensory-independent organization. Within this extreme view, the traditional distinction between modality-specific and amodal representations loses much of its sense. The article aims to explore the implications of (global) supramodality for the debate on the conceptual format. I shall argue that none of the (few) attempts to deal with this issue is ultimately successful, so the challenge remains unsolved. (shrink)