Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Political deliberation and the challenge of bounded rationality.Andrew F. Smith - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (3):269-291.
    Many proponents of deliberative democracy expect reasonable citizens to engage in rational argumentation. However, this expectation runs up against findings by behavioral economists and social psychologists revealing the extent to which normal cognitive functions are influenced by bounded rationality. Individuals regularly utilize an array of biases in the process of making decisions, which inhibits our argumentative capacities by adversely affecting our ability and willingness to be self-critical and to give due consideration to others’ interests. Although these biases cannot be overcome, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Ota Weinberger’s conception of democracy: reconstructing an unexplored political theory.Marián Sekerák - forthcoming - Studies in East European Thought:1-17.
    Ota Weinberger was a Czech-Austrian jurist, whose core academic work on issues of democracy was mostly published in the 1990s. In his writings, he focused primarily on legal philosophy from a positivist perspective. However, there are also significant overlaps with the field of political theory as Weinberger examined the conditions for the functioning of contemporary democracies. In this paper, some of the main features of his conception of the so-called “structured democracy” are clarified. The conception opposed several other democratic theories, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The place of self-interest and the role of power in deliberative democracy.Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin & José Luis Martí - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1):64-100.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Democratic Experiments: An Affect-Based Interpretation and Defense.Michael Fuerstein - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):793-816.
    I offer an interpretation and defense of John Dewey’s notion of “democratic experiments,” which involve testing moral beliefs through the experience of acting on them on a social scale. Such testing is crucial, I argue, because our social norms and institutions fundamentally shape the relationships through which we develop emotional responses that represent the morally significant concerns of others. Improving those responses therefore depends on deliberate alterations of our social environment. I consider deliberative and activist alternatives and argue that an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark