The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there (...) is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta. Second, Sean Carroll has asked how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR. Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR. (shrink)

In this article, I show that David Hume’s argument of Section 10 of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does not encourage dogmatism. Instead, it suggests a program for how to categorically deny the existence of miracles without bringing about the stagnation of science. In recognizing the entailments of Hume’s notion of proof while realizing his commitments regarding the laws of nature, we must acknowledge that miracles are possible. Yet this is consistent with Hume’s claim that we are never justified in (...) believing the testimony affirming them. This conclusion is strengthened when we realize that only a doxastic notion of lawlikeness is at work in Hume’s argument rather than a robust, efficacious notion of metaphysical laws. When properly understood, we see that the course he advocates does not impede the advances of science, as has sometimes been suggested. Instead, Hume’s deliberate use of specific examples of two very different sorts propounds a procedure for dealing with purported miracles that is much richer than merely denying them, and tells us when revisions to our conception of the laws of nature are necessary and when they are not. (shrink)

I EXAMINE VARIOUS SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR WEIGHING TESTIMONY TO PAST EVENTS AND IDENTIFY ONE WHICH SEEMS TO BE BOTH TRUE AND ROUGHLY IN THE SPIRIT OF DAVID HUME’S ESSAY. I ARGUE THAT HUME FAILS TO PROVIDE GOOD REASONS FOR SAYING THAT THIS PRINCIPLE, WHEN APPLIED TO REPORTS OF MIRACLES PURPORTING TO SUPPORT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, WILL ALWAYS LEAD US TO REJECT THE OCCURRENCE OF THE MIRACLE.