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  1. A probabilistic framework for analysing the compositionality of conceptual combinations.Peter Bruza, Kirsty Kitto, Brentyn Ramm & Laurianne Sitbon - 2015 - Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67:26-38.
    Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad range of compound phrases utilised in everyday language. This article provides a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive science and philosophy. (...)
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  • Concetti: capacità o rappresentazioni?E. Lalumera - 2008 - Epistemologia 31 (1):75-96.
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  • Quantum and Concept Combination, Entangled Measurements, and Prototype Theory.Diederik Aerts - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):129-137.
    We analyze the meaning of the violation of the marginal probability law for situations of correlation measurements where entanglement is identified. We show that for quantum theory applied to the cognitive realm such a violation does not lead to the type of problems commonly believed to occur in situations of quantum theory applied to the physical realm. We briefly situate our quantum approach for modeling concepts and their combinations with respect to the notions of “extension” and “intension” in theories of (...)
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  • A Loophole of All ‘Loophole-Free’ Bell-Type Theorems.Marek Czachor - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (4):971-985.
    Bell’s theorem cannot be proved if complementary measurements have to be represented by random variables which cannot be added or multiplied. One such case occurs if their domains are not identical. The case more directly related to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky argument occurs if there exists an ‘element of reality’ but nevertheless addition of complementary results is impossible because they are represented by elements from different arithmetics. A naive mixing of arithmetics leads to contradictions at a much more elementary level than the (...)
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