Simone Weil (1909-1943) is a French philosopher who is also a prominent figure in the tradition of Christian mysticism. In her early philosophical writings and lectures, she describes her understanding of the aim of philosophy as “the Search for the Good”. Very much influenced by Plato, Descartes and Kant, Weil states that God as the absolute Good is beyond known truths and can only be reached through Love. This treatment of love as a destructive power whereby the Self effaces itself (...) in order to get closer to God, echoes a somewhat mystical scheme. Weil believes that the only way to reach such knowledge and therefore God, which in her view is the sole purpose of life and should also be the purpose of philosophy. This dissertation focuses on the grounds that bring her to such conclusions as well as providing an analysis of whether Weil’s philosophical approach as an alternative to metaphysical and ethical problems in philosophy is able to stand firm on its own. (shrink)

My claim in this article is that the thesis that Buddhism has no God, insofar as it is taken to apply to Buddhism universally, is false. I defend this claim by interpreting a central text in East-Asian Buddhism – The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna – through the lenses of perfect being theology (PBT), a research programme in philosophy of religion that attempts to provide a description of God through a two-step process: (1) defining God in terms of maximal greatness; (...) (2) inferring the properties or attributes that God must have in virtue of satisfying the definition. My argument comprises two steps. First, I argue that, since PBT is a method for providing a description of God starting from a definition of God, any text that contains a PBT ipso facto contains a notion of God. Second, I argue through textual evidence that The Awakening articulates a PBT, concluding that it contains a notion of God. Since the method of PBT leaves open what descriptions are to be inferred, my argument allows me to conclude that a text contains a notion of God without previously committing to any particular conception of the divine, which makes it particularly versatile and powerful. (shrink)

The authors undertake a thought experiment the purpose of which is to explore possibilities for understanding moral principles in analogy with cosmic order. The experiment is based on three proposals, which are described in detail: an ontological, a neurological, and a moral proposal. The ontological proposal accepts from the phenomena of quantum physics that there is a nonempirical domain of physical reality that consists not of material things but of what is philosophically conceptualized as a realm of nonmaterial forms. This (...) realm of forms is the realm of potentiality in physical reality that quantum physics posits as an indivisible Wholeness—the One. It is the ultimate reality because everything empirical is the actualization of its forms. The neurological proposal is the hypothesis that the brain is sensitive to the potentiality waves in the cosmic field, as ordinary measuring instruments in physics are sensitive to potentiality waves at the quantum level, so that the cosmic field can communicate with the human brain. The third proposal assumes that the communication with the cosmic field can translate into moral ideas and actions. Even though the three proposals underlying the thought experiment are highly speculative, they lead to definite implications that make sense in their own right and can be applied in a useful way. From the order of reality some simple rules of conduct follow that are identical with traditional moral rules but have the character of rules of well-ness, leading to new aspects of Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia and Kant's concept of the highest good. In analogy with the structure of physical reality, where all empirical phenomena are actualizations of nonempirical forms, it is suggested that the structure of morality, too, is that of a tacit, nonempirical form that actualizes in explicit principles and moral acts through our consciousness. The tacit form is thought to exist in the realm of cosmic potentiality, together with all the other forms that the empirical world actualizes. It can appear spontaneously in our consciousness when needed, offering its guidance to our judgment and free will. Because it does not appear in the form of commandments accompanied by threats, the actions of the tacit moral form define a higher level of morality, similar to that offered by some aspects of the Christian teaching, where one acts not out of fear but on the desire to do things right. (shrink)

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject (...) and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen. This is examined step by step from the perspective of Descartes’ Meditations. On the one hand, we focus on prima facie similarities in meditative and reflective methodologies used by the Zen and Cartesian approaches. On the other, we highlight some unequivocal differences in the metaphysical role of the subject: an indubitable foundation for the epistemological access to objective reality, and an introspective apprehension of the egoless void or absolute reality. (shrink)

In the paper a comparative analysis of Chan Buddhist meditation and the early Buddhist meditation has been conducted. In the first part the meditational instructions present in Zuochan yi and the corresponding texts of Chinese Buddhism have been demonstrated. Subsequently, based on those texts, the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation is created. The second part consists of the analysis of Aṭṭhaka‑vagga with the corresponding motifs from the other Pali Canon Suttas. The last part consists of a comparative analysis of (...) the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation and meditation as shown in Aṭṭhaka‑vagga. The whole of the analysis aims at demonstrating the topos common for the early Buddhist tradition and Chan Buddhism. (shrink)

In recent decades, scholars of Buddhist philosophy have frequently treated the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, or “Teaching of the Three Natures,” attributed to Vasubandhu, as an authentic and authoritative representation of that celebrated thinker’s mature work within the Yogācāra tradition. However, serious questions may be posed concerning the status and authority of the TSN within Yogācāra, its true authorship, and the relation of its contents to trends in early Yogācāra thought. In the present article, we review the actual state of our knowledge of (...) the TSN’s possible origins, considering, too, the implications this may have for contemporary treatments thereof. (shrink)

This paper examines vegetarianism in the eighth “no meat-eating” chapter of the Laṅkāvatāra with specific attention to how the sūtra confronts the previous dietary code and combats Buddhist resistance to the new doctrine. This study corroborates previous observations that vegetarianism in Indian Buddhism was a response to outsiders’ censure, rather than an expression of a specific Buddhist doctrine. It goes on to explore how the Laṅkāvatāra introduces a new dietary norm, one that was incompatible with the preexisting monastic code that (...) allowed monks to partake of meat pure in three aspects. The Laṅkāvatāra replaced the three conditions for meat to be pure with the three modes of killing, thereby rendering the old regulation into a rule that makes any form of meat-eating impossible. In an effort to suppress intra-Buddhist resistance to vegetarianism, the sūtra prophesized the future appearance of anti-vegetarian Buddhists and identified them as heretics. Eliminating the past and future possibility of meat-eating, the Laṅkāvatāra defines Buddhism as a meat-free tradition. (shrink)

This paper presents an integration of transpersonal structural theory. It is claimed that a “dichotomy debate” is currently taking place within transpersonal psychology, which involves what Wilber has called the “pre/trans fallacy” and the “ascender/descender debate” . The pre/trans fallacy states that early, prepersonal life experiences are confused for transpersonal experiences of higher consciousness. Yet Grof and Washburn contend that early, prenatal, life experiences are legitimate sources of transpersonal experience, and can be thought of as the presence of deeper consciousness. (...) Consequently, it is suggested that confusing prepersonal life experiences for prenatal life experiences—as well as preferring higher stages over deeper stages of transpersonal consciousness—commits the “trans/trans fallacy.” Finally, it is claimed that Avatar Adi Da’s spiritual revelation provides the missing link whereby transpersonal structural theory can be integrated: the “conjoining” of the prenatal and prepersonal selves. (shrink)

This paper claims that the ultimate issue confronting transpersonal theory is that of nondualism. The revelation of this spiritual reality has a long history in the spiritual traditions, which has been perhaps most prolifically advocated by Ken Wilber , and fully explicated by David Loy . Nonetheless, these scholarly accounts of nondual reality, and the spiritual traditions upon which they are based, either do not include or else misrepresent the revelation of a contemporary spiritual master crucial to the understanding of (...) nondualism. Avatar Adi Da not only offers a greater differentiation of nondual reality than can be found in contemporary scholarly texts, but also a dimension of nondualism not found in any previous spiritual revelation. (shrink)