دیدگاه کریستین وُلف دربارۀ ‌‌ادراک حسی که چارچوبی لایب‌‌‌نیتسی دارد، اساس استتیک او را برمی‌‌‌سازد. او با توجه به ماهیت واضح ولی مغشوشِ ‌‌ادراک حسی در این چارچوب، مفهوم کمال و لذت را تبیین می‌‌‌کند و از همین معبر ره به تعریف زیبایی می‌‌‌برد. به این ترتیب، از نظر او، کمال همانا توافق یا هماهنگی کثرات یا انبوهی از اشیاء یا اجزای آن‌هاست؛ لذت، حاصل شهود کمال در اشیاء است؛ و زیبایی هم عبارت است از کمال شیْ‏ء از آن حیث (...) که برای ایجاد لذت در ما مناسب است. با این اوصاف، در این مقاله قصد داریم ماهیت ‌‌ادراک حسی نزد او و رابطۀ ادراک حسی، کمال و لذت را با زیبایی در استتیک او بکاویم تا مشخص شود چگونه علم استتیک به‌‌‌طور عام از دل مباحث معرفت‌‌‌شناختی و به‌‌‌طور خاص از بطن ‌‌ادراک حسی بیرون می‌‌‌آید. در نهایت‌‌، با در نظر داشتن این مهم که خود او مستقیماً داعیۀ نظریۀ مستقلی در حوزۀ استتیک نداشته، نقد و نظری بر لوازم مربوط به استتیک او خواهیم داشت تا حدود و ثغور نظریۀ عقل‌‌‌گرایانۀ مفرط او در برخورد با مسائلی چون دایرۀ شمول زیبایی، مراتب زیبایی و اختلاف‌‌‌نظرهای ذوقی مشخص شود. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Communicative Implications of Kant’s Aesthetic TheoryThomas HoveIn recent discussions of aesthetic theory, critics who raise social, cultural, and political concerns have issued important challenges to the Kantian legacy. Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) continues to be widely regarded as one of the founding documents of modern aesthetic theory. But the arguments he laid out in that notoriously enigmatic work remain controversial on a variety of fronts. (...) One of those arguments concerns his distinction between pleasures that are beautiful and those that are agreeable. According to Kant’s definition, what makes experiences of the beautiful special is that they have a potentially communicable universal validity. By contrast, pleasures that are merely agreeable are incommunicable and remain confined to private sensation. Philosophers have found this distinction problematic for a variety of reasons. Their detailed commentaries have examined the intricate logical and conceptual difficulties that Kant’s theory raises (see Allison 2001; Guyer 1982, 1997, 2002; Kalar 2000; Wenzel 2005). On another front, sociologists and cultural critics—whom I will broadly refer to as “social critics”—typically raise concerns about the theory’s hidden social implications (Bourdieu 1984; Eagleton 1990; Smith 1988; Shumway 2005). Specifically, they question Kant’s proposal that judgments about the beautiful ought to have universal validity. Taking an external standpoint, they tend to regard aesthetic judgments either as the peculiar habits of [End Page 103] specific social classes, or as badges of hierarchical distinction, or as weapons in symbolic struggles for cultural dominance.To suggest why Kant’s theory is worth revisiting in the wake of such critiques, the following analysis defends his theoretical effort to distinguish the experience of the beautiful from that of the agreeable. This feature of his aesthetic theory highlights an alternative to the cognitive and practical concerns that social critics emphasize. In particular, I indicate how Kant’s aesthetic theory offers directions for the effort to explain how aesthetic experience promotes communicative sociability. By emphasizing this theme, I hope to supplement the rival emphasis that social critics place on the Kantian legacy’s elitist undercurrents. Social critiques characteristically overlook the affective type of sociability to which aesthetic experience gives rise. This oversight occurs because those critiques tend to privilege the theoretical and practical dimensions of communication. In the process, they disregard the special types of validity claims that are unique to aesthetic discourse. Following the lead of his academic precursors Meier and Baumgarten, Kant tried to define a possible third mental “faculty” that differs from cognitive and practical reason (see Henrich 1992, 31–36). But the difficulty of defining this third faculty, much less determining its existence, continues to vex both philosophers and communication theorists.Kant’s Account of Aesthetic Experience and Its CriticsIn the opening sections of the Critique of Judgment, Kant attempts to establish the independence of aesthetic judgment from theoretical and practical cognition. Those faculties are concerned with cognitive and moral concepts. By contrast, the aesthetic properties that concern taste judgments have a unique ontological and epistemological status. Kant’s argument about that status is itself enormously complex, involving as it does an intricate network of idiosyncratically defined concepts (for example, the understanding, the imagination, intuition, representations, objects, etc.). But to avoid getting lost in those intricacies, we can bracket them by simply referring to aesthetic “experience.” Also, we can concentrate on the two properties that distinguish aesthetic experience from other kinds of experience. First, aesthetic properties relate to the feelings of pleasure that are aroused by certain encounters with objects. Second, aesthetic properties are “merely subjective” (Kant 2000, 75). They do not have an objective status because we cannot associate the feelings they arouse with determinate concepts and objects. [End Page 104] As Miles Rind puts it, “in making a cognitive judgment one requires everyone to conceptualize an object in a certain way, while in making a judgment of taste one requires others to share one’s liking for an object” (Rind 2000, 83). In sum, Kant differentiates aesthetic judgment from both theoretical and practical cognition because it is radically subjective and because its unique grounding lies in feelings of pleasure and displeasure.Social critics tend to downplay the idea that there... (shrink)

Dentro de la hermenéutica filosófica, no es fácil encontrar un trabajo que se acerque con tanto respeto al pensamiento del poeta, dramaturgo y filósofo Friedrich Schiller como el de Laura Anna Macor. Si su trabajo destaca dentro de lo que Valerio Rocco ha denominado una auténtica revolución historiográfica, es porque es uno de los pocos acercamientos a la obra schilleriana que hace un deliberado esfuerzo por tomarse su relevancia filosófica en serio, con independencia de la adherencia de Schiller a la (...) filosofía transcendental kantiana. Frente a obras como la de Frederick Beiser que, por otra parte, merece un gran reconocimiento por su riguroso estudio y defensa de la filosofía schilleriana, Macor bucea en la producción médica, poética y dramática del joven Schiller para dar allí con contenidos de carácter legítimamente filosófico, con la intención de demostrar no sólo la íntima coherencia de su pensamiento, sino también su calidad filosófica antes, después y más allá de Kant. Lo interesante de este planteamiento es que, al contrario que la mayoría de los intérpretes, Macor no se acerca condescendientemente al carácter híbrido del pensamiento de Schiller, sino asumiendo que el mismo es, de hecho, una fuente de riqueza multidisciplinar que no jerarquiza los saberes. Una riqueza que, además, es una clara señal de la relevancia actual del planteamiento schilleriano. (shrink)

This essay argues that nano-images would be best understood with an aesthetical approach rather than with an epistemological critique. For this aim, I propose a ‘techno-aesthetical’ approach: an enquiry into the way instruments and machines transform the logic of the sensible itself and not just the way by which it represents something else. Unlike critical epistemology, which remains self-evidently grounded on a representationalist philosophy, the approach developed here presents the advantage of providing a clear-cut distinction between image-as-representation and other modes (...) of existence of images, such as the one of ‘ imaginaction ’ that I draw from a comparison between far-field and near-field microscopies. Once this regime of imaginaction is distinguished from representation, I focus on nanotechnological percepts and argue that they follow a transmodal logic. I then draw the implications of this enquiry in terms of a new sensible condition that changes the way we think of non-living objects. Finally, I conclude that if techno-aesthetics dares to posit and articulate sensibility beyond the privileged sphere of subject/object relationships, it simultaneously engages us to consider the political character of our responsibilities towards the design of nano-engineered sensorial spaces. (shrink)

This article examines the turn to the aesthetic dimension in early 20th century critical theory, particularly in the work of Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno. It focuses on the concept of play, which garnered particular attention as a possible form of aesthetic resistance to the reification of reason in modern society. The article traces the concept of play from the work of Lukács, who engaged with Schiller’s notion of the play-drive but ultimately viewed it to be an inadequate form of aesthetic (...) resistance, to the work of Benjamin, who optimistically embraced the revolutionary possibility of play. In contrast, the article argues that Adorno’s work tacitly advances a critical concept of dark play that offers a third perspective between Lukács’s pessimism and Benjamin’s optimism, thus avoiding both the retreat into an apolitical aesthetic dimension and the uncritical embrace of play’s revolutionary potential. (shrink)

Christian Wolff’s view regarding sensory perception – which is formed on a Leibnizian framework – forms the base of his aesthetics. He explains the concept of perfection and pleasure according to the clear but disordered essence of sensory perception that is present in this framework and through this very path guides towards the definition of beauty. Thus, according to him, perfection is the consistency or accordance of diversity or the abundance of things or their parts; pleasure is the result of (...) the intuition of the perfection present in things; and beauty is the perfection of a thing from the aspect of it being suitable in creating pleasure in us. Therefore, in this article we intend to explore the essence of sensory perception according to him and the relation between it, perfection and pleasure with beauty in his aesthetics so that it becomes clear how aesthetics emerges from the heart of epistemological discussions in general and from the depths of sensory perception in particular. Finally, while keeping in mind the important fact that he did not directly claim to have an independent theory in the field of aesthetics, we will critique and give our views in regards to the requisites connected to his aesthetics so that the limits of his extreme rationalist views in dealing with issues such as the extent that beauty covers, the levels of beauty and the difference of views in relation to taste and liking become clear. (shrink)