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  1. Algorithmic Management and the Social Order of Digital Markets.Georg Rilinger - forthcoming - Theory and Society:1-30.
    Platform companies use techniques of algorithmic management to control their users. Though digital marketplaces vary in their use of these techniques, few studies have asked why. This question is theoretically consequential. Economic sociology has traditionally focused on the embedded activities of market actors to explain competitive and valuation dynamics in markets. But restrictive platforms can leave little autonomy to market actors. Whether or not the analytical focus on their interactions makes sense thus depends on how restrictive the platform is, turning (...)
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  • Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems.Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H. Gerding & Nicholas R. Jennings - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (2):648-672.
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  • A technical survey on statistical modelling and design methods for crowdsourcing quality control.Yuan Jin, Mark Carman, Ye Zhu & Yong Xiang - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 287 (C):103351.
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  • Shall We Vote on Values, But Bet on Beliefs?Robin Hanson - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):151-178.
    Policy disputes arise at all scales of governance: in clubs, non-profits, firms, nations, and alliances of nations. Both the means and ends of policy are disputed. While many, perhaps most, policy disputes arise from conflicting ends, important disputes also arise from differing beliefs on how to achieve shared ends. In fact, according to many experts in economics and development, governments often choose policies that are “inefficient” in the sense that most everyone could expect to gain from other feasible policies. Many (...)
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  • On market Maker functions.Robin Hanson - unknown
    Since market scoring rules have become popular as a form of market maker, it seems worth reviewing just what such mechanisms are intended to do. The main function performed by most market makers is to serve as an intermediary between people who prefer to trade at different times. Traders who have the same favorite times to trade can show up together to an ordinary continuous double auction, and then make and accept offers to trade. But when traders have different favorite (...)
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  • Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker.Yiling Chen, Rahul Sami & Daniel M. Reeves - unknown
    We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to report their true beliefs about the likelihood of an event outcome provided that they ignore the impact of their reports on the profit they might garner from future trades. In this paper, we analyze non-myopic strategies and examine what information structures lead to truthful betting by traders. (...)
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  • An Experimental Test of Combinatorial Information Markets.Robin Hanson - unknown
    While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of variables, including any conditional or joint probability. In laboratory experiments, we compare the accuracy of simple markets, two kinds of combinatorial markets, a call market and a market maker, isolated individuals who report to a scoring rule, and two ways to combine those individual reports into (...)
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  • Enhancing our truth orientation.Robin Hanson - 2009 - In Julian Savulescu & Nick Bostrom (eds.), Human Enhancement. Oxford University Press. pp. 357--372.
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  • Foul Play in Information Markets.Robin Hanson - unknown
    People have long noticed that speculative markets, though created for other purposes, also do a great job of aggregating relevant information. In fact, it is hard to find information not embodied by such market prices. This is, in part, because anyone who finds such neglected information can profit by trading on it, thereby reducing the neglect.1 So far, speculative markets have done well in every known head-to-head field comparison with other forecasting institutions. Orange juice futures improved on National Weather Service (...)
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