Our preferences determine how we act and think, but exactly what the mechanics are and how they work is a central cause of concern in many disciplines. This book uses techniques from modern logics of information flow and action to develop a unified new theory of what preference is and how it changes. The theory emphasizes reasons for preference, as well as its entanglement with our beliefs. Moreover, the book provides dynamic logical systems which describe the explicit triggers driving preference (...) change, including new information, suggestions, and commands. In sum, the book creates new bridges between many fields, from philosophy and computer science to economics, linguistics, and psychology. For the experienced scholar access to a large body of recent literature is provided and the novice gets a thorough introduction to the action and techniques of dynamic logic. (shrink)

A possible world semantics for preference is developed. The remainder operator () is used to give precision to the notion that two states of the world are as similar as possible, given a specified difference between them. A general structure is introduced for preference relations between states of affairs, and three types of such preference relations are defined. It is argued that one of them, actual preference, corresponds closely to the concept of preference in informal discourse. Its logical properties are (...) studied and shown to be plausible. (shrink)

A general format is introduced for deriving preferences over states of affairs from preferences over a set of contextually complete alternatives. Formal results are given both for this general format and for a specific instance of it that is a plausible explication of ceteris paribus preference.

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.

With characteristic incisiveness Georg Henrik von Wright identifies pro­ haireticIogic (i. e. the logic of preference) as the core of a general theory of value concepts. Essentially, this nucleus involves the logical study of acts from the point of view of their preferability. 1 (italics added) Though the term prohairesis is found in Plato, as well as in Aristotle's treatment of the relations of preference, it is von Wright who introduces this word into contemporary analytical philoso­ phy, and succinctly specifies (...) the philosophical dimensions it encompasses. The above emphasis upon the philosophical study of the formalization of preferences is a matter of utmost importance for understanding the type of in­ quiry this investigation attempts to initiate. Over the past one hundred years the literature on general theories of subjective utility has become massive, where one considers the work done in psychometrics, econometrics, statistical theories, probability theories, etc., etc. Histories in these areas are strong in tracing various evolutions in the development of the concept of preference in decision-making. However, what has not been investigated with sustained at­ tention are the fundamentally philosophical inquiries into the formalization of preference-relations. (shrink)

In the paper I investigate aspects of adverbial modification as an operation applying an adverb or adverbial phrase to a predicate and thereby creating a new predicate. The logic of adverbial modification, on this view, belongs to the logic of predicate modifiers. The theory I present is intended to cover not only adverbial modification but also attributive modification, but problems concerning the latter will not be given any special attention.