Animal models are used in experiments in the behavioural neurosciences that aim to contribute to the prevention and treatment of cognitive and affective disorders in human beings, such as anxiety and depression. Ironically, those animals that are likely to be the best models for psychopathology are also likely to be considered the ones that are most morally problematic to use, if it seems probable that (and if indeed they are initially selected as models because) they have experiences that are similar (...) to human experiences that we have strong reasons to avoid causing, and indeed aim to alleviate (such as pain, anxiety or sadness). In this paper, against the background of contemporary discussions in animal ethics and the philosophy of animal minds, we discuss the views that it is morally permissible to use animals in these kinds of experiments, and that it is better to use less cognitively complex animals (such as zebrafish) than more complex animals (such as dogs). First, we criticise some justifications for the claim that human beings and more complex animals have higher moral status. We argue that contemporary approaches that attribute equal moral status to all beings that are capable of conscious strivings (e.g. avoiding pain and anxiety; aiming to eat and play) are based on more plausible assumptions. Second, we argue that it is problematic to assume that less cognitively complex animals have a lesser sensory and emotional experience than more complex beings across the board. In specific cases, there might be good reasons to assume that more complex beings would be harmed more by a specific physical or environmental intervention, but it might also be that they sometimes are harmed less because of a better ability to cope. Determining whether a specific experiment is justified is therefore a complex issue. Our aim in this chapter is to stimulate further reflection on these common assumptions behind the use of animal models for psychopathologies. In order to be able to draw more definite conclusions, more research will have to be done on the influence of cognitive complexity on the experience of (human and non-human) animals. (shrink)

In the western healthcare, shared decision making has become the orthodox approach to making healthcare choices as a way of promoting patient autonomy. Despite the fact that the autonomy paradigm is poorly suited to paediatric decision making, such an approach is enshrined in English common law. When reaching moral decisions, for instance when it is unclear whether treatment or non-treatment will serve a child’s best interests, shared decision making is particularly questionable because agreement does not ensure moral validity. With reference (...) to current common law and focusing on intensive care practice, this paper investigates what claims shared decision making may have to legitimacy in a paediatric intensive care setting. Drawing on key texts, I suggest these identify advantages to parents and clinicians but not to the child who is the subject of the decision. Without evidence that shared decision making increases the quality of the decision that is being made, it appears that a focus on the shared nature of a decision does not cohere with the principle that the best interests of the child should remain paramount. In the face of significant pressures toward the displacement of the child’s interests in a shared decision, advantages of a shared decision to decisional quality require elucidation. Although a number of arguments of this nature may have potential, should no such advantages be demonstrable we have cause to revise our commitment to either shared decision making or the paramountcy of the child in these circumstances. (shrink)

The moral terrain of science, the full range of ethical considerations that are part of the scientific endeavor, has not been mapped. Without such a map, we cannot examine the responsibilities of scientists to see if the institutions of science are adequately constructed. This paper attempts such a map by describing four dimensions of the terrain: (1) the bases to which scientists are responsible (scientific reasoning, the scientific community, and the broader society); (2) the nature of the responsibility (general or (...) role); (3) the level of responsibility (minimum demand or ideal); and (4) who bears the responsibility (the individual or the community). Such a map will be used to elucidate the recent debate over the publication of studies concerning H5N1 flu virus. (shrink)

Committee composition is a recurrent theme within the literature on Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs). The ability of IACUCs to ensure the ethical treatment of nonhuman research subjects depends upon who makes up these committees. Non-scientists and those not affiliated with the research institution have been deemed indispensable for the democratic, objective review of protocols and, thus, for ethical treatment. IACUCs’ critics and partners alike have persistently offered suggestions for how to further optimize committee composition towards these ends. (...) This paper contributes to the ongoing conversation by advocating for the addition of holistic species experts to IACUCs, arguing that holistic species experts are as indispensable for the political and epistemic viability of protocol reviews as non-scientists and non-affiliates. Holistic species experts are defined here as members of the larger community who have extensive firsthand experience with animals living and dying under relatively ideal conditions. If we accept that non-scientists and non-affiliates are crucial for IACUCs' ethical treatment of animals, then we have every reason to embrace holistic species experts. The values, welfare expertise, and productive epistemic dissonance that these experts bring to the table would prove invaluable. (shrink)

We have arrived at an inflection point, a moment in history when the sentience, conscious- ness, intelligence, agency, and even the moral agency of many nonhuman animals can no longer be questioned without ignoring centuries of accumulated scientific knowledge. Nowhere is this more true than in our understanding of nonhuman primates (NHPs). A neu- roethics committed to probing the ethical implications of brain research must be able to respond to and anticipate the challenges ahead as brain projects globally prepare to (...) increase the use of NHPs in research. This requires adopting a less anthropocentric focus that includes nonhuman animals within its scope. But the Neuroethics Roadmap represents a missed opportunity to critically examine the future direction of research with NHPs in an ethically-responsive neuroscience. (shrink)

In the Australian state of Victoria, legislation allowing voluntary assisted dying (VAD) passed through parliament in November 2017. There was then an eighteen-month period before the start date for patient access to VAD, referred to as the “implementation period.” The implementation period was intended to allow time for the relevant government department and affected organizations to develop processes before the Act came into effect in June 2019. This qualitative interview study investigates the perspectives of a multidisciplinary sample of twelve clinicians (...) from a single metropolitan hospital during this implementation period. Maximum variation sampling was utilized to ensure breadth across discipline (medical, nursing, allied health), speciality, and stated level of support for the VAD legislation. Four key themes were identified from the interview data: preparing for the unknown, ethical diversity within the organization, building a respectful culture, and concerns about the inability of the legislated approach to capture clinical nuances. Overall, these clinicians’ workplace experiences during the implementation period were shaped by the ethical diversity within their organization and a sense of uncertainty about how the VAD legislation would integrate with the practical realities of their clinical setting. The concept of “ethical diversity” could be a useful one for supporting staff in an organization during a VAD implementation period. (shrink)