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  1. Recognition of proofs in conditional reasoning.John Best - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):326 – 348.
    Relatively little is known about those who consistently produce the valid response to Modus Tollens (MT) problems. In two studies, people who responded correctly to MT problems indicated how “convinced” they were by proofs of conditional reasoning conclusions. The first experiment showed that MT competent reasoners found accurate proofs of MT reasoning more convincing than similar “proofs” of invalid reasoning. Similarly, there was a tendency for MT competent reasoners to find an initial counterfactual supposition more convincing than did people who (...)
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  • Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions.Omid Ghasemi, Simon J. Handley & Stephanie Howarth - 2023 - Cognition 235 (C):105417.
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  • Illusory intuitions: Challenging the claim of non-exclusivity.Simon J. Handley, Omid Ghasemi & Michal Bialek - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e125.
    A person who arrives at correct solutions via false premises is right and wrong simultaneously. Similarly, a person who generates “logical intuitions” through superficial heuristics can likewise be right and wrong at the same time. However, heuristics aren't guaranteed to deliver the logical solution, so the claim that system 1 can routinely produce the alleged system 2 response is unfounded.
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  • When nomenclature matters: Is the “new paradigm” really a new paradigm for the psychology of reasoning?Markus Knauff & Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3):341-370.
    For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new (...)
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