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  1. Epistemology, two types of functionalism, and first-person authority.Alvin I. Goldman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):395-398.
    My target article did not attribute a pervasive ontological significance to phenomenology, so it escapes Bogdan's “epistemological illusion.” Pust correctly pinpoints an ambiguity between content-inclusive and content-exclusive forms of folk functionalism. Contrary to Fodor, however, only the former is plausible, and hence my third argument against functionalism remains a threat. Van Brakel's charity approach to first-person authority cannot deal with authority vis-a-vis sensations, and it has some extremely odd consequences.
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  • Speaking of beliefs: Reporting or constituting mental entities?Werner Greve & Axel Buchner - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):391-392.
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  • Do children understand the mind by means of a simulation or a theory? Evidence from their understanding of inference.Ted Ruffman - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):388-414.
    Three experiments investigating children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge and beliefs were used to determine whether children use a theory in understanding the mind. A child watched while a sweet was placed in a box whereas a doll was merely given a message about which sweet had been transferred. Children were asked to judge whether the doll knew the colour of the sweet in the box and what colour the do6 would think the sweet was. The main (...)
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  • Interpreting self-ascriptions.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):393-395.
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  • Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion.Joel Pust - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):392-393.
    Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.
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  • The epistemological illusion.Radu J. Bogdan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):390-391.
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  • How to understand beliefs.Alison Gopnik - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):398-400.
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  • Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'.Cynthia Macdonald - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (5):467-488.
    It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (‘commonsense’) view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3– and 4–year–old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one’s own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the experimental (...)
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