Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics, his metatheory, and his transcendental phenomenology have a sophisticated and systematic interrelation that remains relevant for questions of ontology today. It is well established that Husserl anticipated many aspects of model theory. I focus on this aspect of Husserl’s philosophy in order to argue that Thomasson’s recent pleonastic reconstruction of Husserl’s approach to essences is incompatible with Husserl’s philosophy as a whole. According to the pleonastic approach, Husserl can appeal to essences in the absence of a (...) positive metaphysical account of their nature. I show, using central results from recent model theory, that the pleonastic approach undermines Husserl’s approach to formalization and categoricity, an effect that will ripple out from Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics into Husserl’s metatheory and transcendental phenomenology. The result is that Husserl cannot appeal to formal essences without metaphysical commitments. However, the very observations Thomasson makes about the nature of eidetic intuition in Husserl lead to a general strategy for responding to the problem. The article thus illustrates that the pleonastic and the model-theoretic routes for making Husserl relevant to present-day ontology are competing approaches, but I conclude that Husserl scholars seeking to set Husserl’s present-day relevance into sharp relief could do worse than to emphasize the model-theoretic nature of Husserl’s enterprise. (shrink)

This paper explicates Husserl’s usage of what he calls “radical Besinnung” in Formale und transzendentale Logik. Husserl introduces radical Besinnung as his method in the introduction to FTL. Radical Besinnung aims at criticizing the practice of formal sciences by means of transcendental phenomenological clarification of its aims and presuppositions. By showing how Husserl applies this method to the history of formal sciences down to mathematicians’ work in his time, the paper explains in detail the relationship between historical critical Besinnung and (...) transcendental phenomenology. Ultimately the paper suggests that radical Besinnung should be viewed as a general methodological framework within which transcendental phenomenological descriptions are used to criticize historically given goal-directed practices. (shrink)

By extending Husserl’s own historico-critical study to include the conceptual mathematics of more contemporary times – specifically category theory and its emphatic development since the second half of the 20th century – this paper claims that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be completely revisited. It will be contended that Husserl’s phenomenological work was very much influenced by the discoveries and limitations of the formal mathematics being developed at Göttingen during his tenure there and that, subsequently, the rôle he (...) envisaged for his material a priori science is heavily dependent upon his conception of the definite manifold. Motivating these contentions is the idea of a mathematics which would go beyond the constraints of formal ontology and subsequently achieve coherence with the full sense of transcendental phenomenology. While this final point will be by no means proven within the confines of this paper it is hoped that the very fact of opening up for the possibility of such an idea will act as a supporting argument to the overriding thesis that the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology must be problematised. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as (...) Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics. (shrink)

This paper argues that the shared intersubjective accessibility of mathematical objects has its roots in a stratum of experience prior to language or any other form of concrete social interaction. On the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, I demonstrate that intersubjectivity is an essential stratum of the objects of mathematical experience, i.e., an integral part of the peculiar sense of a mathematical object is its common accessibility to any consciousness whatsoever. For Husserl, any experience of an objective nature has as its (...) correlate a “we,” which he terms the “community of monads”. Thus, even before mathematical objects gain expression, formalization, and axiomatization through natural and scientific language, from a phenomenological viewpoint their objectivity has its roots in raw pre-linguistic though intersubjective experience. Accordingly, I demonstrate the different senses in which the experience of mathematical objects is permeated by intersubjectivity, suggesting a picture of mathematical intersubjectivity as pre-linguistic common experience based on Husserl’s idea of a “community of monads”. (shrink)

The paper examines Husserl’s interactions with logicians in the 1930s in order to assess Husserl’s awareness of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. While there is no mention about the results in Husserl’s known exchanges with Hilbert, Weyl, or Zermelo, the most likely source about them for Husserl is Felix Kaufmann (1895–1949). Husserl’s interactions with Kaufmann show that Husserl may have learned about the results from him, but not necessarily so. Ultimately Husserl’s reading marks on Friedrich Waismann’s Einführung in das mathematische Denken: die (...) Begriffsbildung der modernen Mathematik, 1936, show that he knew about them before his death in 1938. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to clarify Husserl’s critical remarks about Kant’s view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an ‘extraordinary apriority’ to it. He thinks the reason for Kant’s uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant’s view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a ‘“world” of ideal Objects’. Whereas for Kant, general (...) logic is about laws of reasoning. Husserl thinks that formal logic should describe formal structures. Husserl claims that if Kant had had a more comprehensive concept of logic, he would have thought of raising critical questions about how logic is possible. This kind of criticism cannot itself use forms of judgments or syllogisms of logic, nor even the ‘inferential’ [schliessende] method more generally, but should be descriptive in nature. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the method for such criticism. The paper argues that this results in reflection, and possibly revision, of the logical principles with respect to the normative goals governing the investigation in question. (shrink)

Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) is the definitive statement of Husserl’s early logic. But what does it say that logic is? I argue that Husserl in the Prolegomena thinks logic is its own discipline, namely the “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), but has two conflicting ideas of what that is. One idea—expressed by the book’s general argument, and which I call Husserl’s Austrian Semanticism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the positive science explaining what science is (which turns out just to (...) be the study of meaning) plus the dependent art that, applying the science, teaches us how to scientifically know. The other idea—expressed by the book’s opening chapter, and which I call Husserl’s German Idealism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the purely reflective self-knowing of science, independent of science’s positive expansion. These two ideas are incompatible. Thus, the Prolegomena is ambivalent on what logic is. But since the ambivalence only deepens the significance of Husserl’s early logic, the ambivalence should be embraced. (shrink)