There are two overarching questions that guide this paper: What are some potential issues with the criterion for judgemental rationality as developed by Bhaskar? How can critical realism itself be justified without foundationalist assumptions or an infinite regress of justification? The paper considers how Bhaskar’s criterion for theory choice – developed in the natural sciences – can also be applied in the social sciences, how a criterion developed within epistemic relativity can be applied to overcome judgemental relativity, and explores justification (...) of critical realism and of research inspired by this philosophy of science. It will be argued that a fractal form of justification can be an important approach to justify critical realist philosophy and its meta-philosophy (or ‘the philosophy of philosophy’). I also seek to demonstrate that such fractal justification, and insights from other fractally coherent philosophies, can be helpful to provide answers to several of the issues with Bhaskar’s criterion for judgemental rationality that are presented. (shrink)

In international politics, bridging the gap between the real and knowledge poses a persistent challenge as translating the real into concepts and narratives can nurture the epistemic fallacy. Critical realism addresses this by separating ontology from epistemology at the meta-theoretical level, yet in practical research, critical realism tends to impose assumptions about the ontological complexity of the real at the transcendental level. This paper examines the practical difficulty of overcoming the epistemic fallacy in International Relations inquiries, asserting that critical realism (...) does not effectively guide practical inquiries in separating ontology from epistemology at a methodological level. Despite the meta-theoretical separation, research inquiries can remain theory-laden and epistemically dependent. The solution lies in problematizing ontological presentation, and sustaining critique at the discursive level on International Relations theories, methodologies, and implications. This approach maintains a critical focus on ontological aspects at the practical level to deal with the challenge of the epistemic fallacy. (shrink)

The field of mathematics education has been fashioned by a diversity of theoretical and philosophical perspectives. The purpose of this study is to add to this field an analysis of the philosophical position of critical realism. To achieve this objective, the study addresses the following questions: what does critical realism have to offer mathematics education? How may critical realism underlabour for this discipline? In addressing these questions, the study provides an overview of the basic theories and the possible weak points (...) of and arguments against critical realism and realism in general. It then draws upon the notion of a dialectical phenomenology to provide a sequence of Achilles' heel critiques of some of the perspectives that constitute broadly the theoretical landscape of mathematics education research. This critique proceeds with an analysis of didactically oriented empiricism, hermeneutics, pragmatism, postmodernism, traditionally recognized forms of constructivism, traditionally recognized theories of activity, and ethnomathematics. The last section summarizes the implications of philosophical underlabouring for a more beneficial science of mathematics education. (shrink)

This article offers an omissive critique of integral theory. To this objective, the article draws upon dialectical logic to investigate the affinities between integral theory and critical realism. Section 1 identifies new possibilities regarding the role of metatheory in practice by unpacking the metatheoretical coordinates of critical realism and integral theory. After providing a brief history of the origins of critical realism and integral theory, I review the ontological, epistemological, and methodological metatheorems of dialectical critical realism, and I put them (...) to work to provide an omissive critique of integral theory. Then I introduce the notion of strictly non-dialectic because it functions to explain formally how integral theory relates to critical realism. Section 2 isolates the inadequacies at every moment in the passage from the MELD dialectic. Section 3 concludes the article with a discussion of the implications of foregrounding a critical realist ontology for integral theory. (shrink)

Australia is restricted by the academic, social and administrative mechanisms of financialization. Exaggerated critiques about the adequacy of learner-centered approaches to education have been used to support a retrogressive shift from curriculum informed by contemporary educational theories, towards curriculum informed by management theories based on the dehumanizing educational theory of behaviourism. I therefore suggest a return to pre-1987 learning-centered educational theories, which include face-to-face relations, compassion and civility. This call is not new, but it has been largely ignored by powerful (...) agents in society: politicians, and regulatory-body representatives. It is therefore necessary to embark on an alternative approach to agential change. In this case, I appeal not to the powerful agents, but to all of us involved in VET. Since VET subsists on our activities, that is, since we daily reproduce it with our activities, it should be possible for us to withdraw those activities that reproduce the marketized approach to VET. (shrink)

It has been proposed that the policies and practices of food sovereignty, unlike those of today's hegemonic food/agricultural system, provide the means for satisfying and safeguarding the right to food security for everyone everywhere. My principal objective in this article, which gains its significance in the light of an explanatory critique of the current system, is to explore how scientific research — using what kinds of methodologies, and building on experiences of what and of whom? — can constructively inform these (...) practices and policies, and contribute towards appraising this proposal. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis is a response to Dominic Holland’s critique of Roy Bhaskar’s posthumous Enlightened Common Sense, which I edited. Holland claims that his critique is immanent, but I argue that it is not, on two interrelated counts: it fails to achieve hermeneutic adequacy; and criticizes Bhaskar’s arguments and positions using mainly transcendent, not immanent, criteria.

This article builds upon previous discussion of social and technical determinisms as implicit positions in the biofuel debate. To ensure these debates are balanced, it has been suggested that they should be designed to contain a variety of deterministic positions. Whilst it is agreed that determinism does not feature strongly in contemporary academic literatures, it is found that they have generally been superseded by an absence of any substantive conceptualisation of how the social shaping of technology may be related to, (...) or occur alongside, an objective or autonomous reality. The problem of determinism emerges at an ontological level and must be resolved in situ. A critical realist approach to technology is presented which may provide a more appropriate framework for debate. In dialogue with previous discussion, the distribution of responsibility is revisited with reference to the role of scientists and engineers. (shrink)