Heidegger conceives Dasein’s death as a peculiar type of negation, i.e., a negation that is not simple disappearance, and so is, in some sense, survived by Dasein. This paper argues that Heidegger’s technical terminology for this type of negation is the “deficient mode.” The ontological structure of the deficient mode is characterized by Heidegger as a mode of the “nur noch,” which is a way of just being. And to just be, in the sense that deficient modes just are, is (...) grounded in the unique identity conditions characteristic of a being that can exist in deficient modes—its identity is an unnecessary necessity, and so its loss is a possible impossibility. Hence, the connection with Dasein’s death, which Heidegger defines as “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.” Death is Dasein in a deficient mode. This interpretation of Heideggerian death is then used to address the debated issue concerning Heidegger’s distinction between death and demise. (shrink)

The paper is the final, fifth part of a series of studies introducing the new conceptions of “Hilbert mathematics” and “ontomathematics”. The specific subject of the present investigation is the proper philosophical sense of both, including philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of physics not less than the traditional “first philosophy” (as far as ontomathematics is a conservative generalization of ontology as well as of Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” though in a sense) and history of philosophy (deepening Heidegger’s destruction of it from (...) the pre-Socratics to the Pythagoreans). Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s derivative “fundamental ontology” as well as his later doctrine after the “turn” are the starting point of the research as established and well known approaches relative to the newly introduced conception of ontomathematics, even more so that Husserl himself started criticizing his “Philosophy of arithmetic” as too naturalistic and psychological turning to “Logical investigations” and the foundations of phenomenology. Heidegger’s “Aletheia” is also interpreted ontomathematically: as a relation of locality and nonlocality, respectively as a motion from nonlocality to locality if both are physically considered. Aristotle’s ontological revision of Plato’s doctrine is “destructed” further from the pre-Socratics' “Logos” or Heideger’s “Language” (after the “turn”) to the Pythagoreans “Numbers” or “Arithmetics” as an inherent and fundamental philosophical doctrine. Then, a leap to contemporary physics elucidates the essence of ontomathematics overcoming the Cartesian abyss inherited from Plato’s opposition of “ideas” versus “things”, and now unifying physics and mathematics, particularly allowing for the “creation from nothing” instead of the quasi-scientific myth of the “Big Bang”. Furthermore, ontomathematics needs another interpretation of arithmetic, propositional logic and set theory in the foundations of mathematics, where the latter two ones are both identified with Boolean algebra, and the former is considered to be a “half of Boolean algebra” in the exact meaning to be equated to it after doubling by a dual anti-isometric counterpart of Peano arithmetic. That unified algebraic realization of the foundations of mathematics is related to Hilbert mathematics in both “narrow and wide senses” where the latter is isomorphic to the qubit Hilbert space, thus underlying all the physical world by the newly introduced substance of quantum information being physically dimensionless and generalizing classical information measured in bits. The substance of information, whether classical or quantum, visualizes the way of the unification of physics and mathematics by merging their foundations in Hilbert arithmetic and Hilbert mathematics: thus how ontomathetics is a “first philosophy”. The relation of ontomathematics to the Socratic “human problematics”, furthermore being fundamental for Western philosophy in Modernity, is discussed. Ontomathematics implies its “substitution” by abstract information (or by “subjectless choice” relevant to it), thus “obliterating the human outline on the ocean beach sand” (by Michel Foucault’s metaphor). A reflection back from the viewpoint of mathematic to Western philosophy as the philosophy of locality ends the study. (shrink)

Neste artigo o autor aplica a interpretaçãosocial-institucional da constituição ontológicana análise do conceito de pressuposição, queaparece na afirmação de que todo encontro comentes pressupõe uma compreensão de ser. A teseé examinada no contexto da gênese ontológicado comportamento científico, apresentada porHeidegger em Ser e Tempo. A pressuposição dacompreensão de ser que torna possível os atosbásicos instituidores do comportamento científicotem o sentido da projeção de si mesmo comocapaz de.desempenhar um papel socialrecognitivoespecífico: o de reagir aos objetoscom asserções e com práticas inferenciais ejustificacionais.

Neste artigo apresento os traços gerais da doutrina heideggeriana da temporalidade, em Ser e Tempo. Além de destacar os aspectos ontológicos que caracterizam tal abordagem, acentuo uma característica central da assim chamada cronologia fenomenológica, a saber: a identificação de modos do tempo e o a determinação de uma relação de dependência explicativa entre eles. A finitude da temporalidade e a gênese dos modos do tempo a partir da temporalidade originária do Dasein são analisadas com maior ênfase. O artigo é encerrado (...) com uma breve consideração de quatro tópicos que certamente devem ser abordados com maior detalhe em uma posterior análise da cronologia fenomenológica de Heidegger.Fenomenologia. Heidegger. Temporalidade. Heidegger: Time's Origin and Finitude AbstractIn this paper I present the general lines of Heidegger's doctrine of temporality in Being and Time. Besides the ontological aspects that distinguish such approach, I also stress a main feature of the so-called phenomenological chronology, that is: the identification of modes of time, and the determination of an explanatory dependency relation between them. The finitude of temporality and the genesis of the modes of time from Dasein's originary temporality are both analyzed with more emphasis. The paper ends with a short review of four issues that a further analysis of Heidegger's phenomenological chronology surely must address in detail.Phenomenology. Heidegger. Temporality. (shrink)

What I intend to demonstrate in this paper is that Heidegger pretends to immunize his philosophy from any possibility of refutation. The thesis that I argue is that precisely because the ontological cannot be corroborated by the empirical realm and, on the other hand, does not provide a foundation for what he considers the a priori, the German philosopher shields his philosophy from any kind of reply: the ontological cannot be corroborated by beings and, at the same time, it can (...) only be reached by a “leap”. The question is: on what is the a priori founded? how to establish the validity or legitimacy of a horizon? There seems to be no answer. (shrink)