In Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis,2 I analyzed philosophically and normatively the nature of terrorism in a way that does not beg the moral question against it. I also analyzed the conditions...

Virginia Held argues that terrorism can be justified in some instances. But unlike standard, consequentialist justifications, hers is deontological. This paper critically examines her argument. It explores how the values of fairness, responsibility, and desert can serve to justify acts of terrorism. In doing so, two interpretations of her account are considered: a responsibility-insensitive and a responsibility-sensitive interpretation. On the first, her argument collapses into a consequentialist justification. On the second, it relies on an implausible conception of responsibility. Either way, (...) her argument fails as a distinctly deontological defense of terrorism. (shrink)

My concern today is with the last of these questions. But, it is virtually impossible to say anything intelligent about this matter unless some effort is made to delineate the phenomenon under scrutiny. So I will begin by addressing the first question, and this requires that something be said about the semantics and pragmatics of the terms, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’.

In the liberal democracies of North America and the European Union, terrorism is almost universally condemned. Moreover, few wish to question the“moral clarity” that denies any “moral equivalence” between terrorists and thosewho fight them (Held 2004, 59–60). However, the seeming consensus on the moral reprehensibility of terrorism is undermined by substantial disagreementabout just what terrorism is. The primary purpose of this paper is to propose an account of terrorism capable of facilitating a more productive moral debate. I conclude by opening—though (...) certainly not closing—the question of when, if ever, terrorism might be morally permissible. (shrink)

In Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis,2 I analyzed philosophically and normatively the nature of terrorism in a way that does not beg the moral question against it. I also analyzed the conditions...

I discuss the justification of political violence even within democracies. I define ?violence? and indicate how its evaluative force sometimes has conceptually distorting effects. Though acts of violence are at least prima facie wrong, circumstances can arise where, even in democracies, some of them are morally justified. To establish this, three paradigm cases of non?revolutionary political violence are examined. The question is then discussed whether revolutionary violence is ever justified as a means of establishing or promoting human freedom and happiness. (...) I state the conditions which must be satisfied for such violence to be justified and argue that sometimes these conditions have been satisfied. Finally I argue that discussions of violence are frequently confused by ideological mystification and attempt to go some way towards revealing the sources of that mystification. (shrink)

Pacifism and realism both presuppose an unbridgeable gap between war and morality. The pacifist, abhorring the suffering caused by violence, concludes that war is the consummate evil and rejects it under any circumstances. The realist, beginning from a similar assessment regarding the evil of war, concludes that those who bring war on a peaceful nation deserve all the maledictions its people can pour out. These views reflect the negative duty not intentionally to harm innocent persons, on one hand, and the (...) positive obligation that innocent persons be protected, on the other. The pacifist views the prohibition against harming others as more fundamental; the realist accepts the positive duty to protect others as more basic. Historically, the just war tradition has provided an alternative to these extremes. Recent events in the conduct of wars around the world have, however, called into question the relevancy of certain aspects of the just war tradition for modern wars. In this work I critically examine the notion of a just war in terms of both jus ad bellum, or the justifications for going to war, and jus in bello, or the just means of waging war, as it is reflected in international law. I begin with a discussion of various formulations of the realist's and pacifist's positions and argue that the just war tradition provides a reasonable alternative to either of these extremes. I then briefly trace the historical development of the just war tradition beginning with Roman Law. The purpose of this historical analysis is to identify those moral principles and arguments that inspired the development of various aspects of the just war tradition so that these same principles and arguments can be used as a basis for reevaluating existing rules in light of modern tactics and technology. Finally, I expose and discuss serious deficiencies with the way the just war tradition is reflected in current international law and offer proposals for how these problems might be addressed. My conclusion is that the just war tradition can provide effective guidelines for ameliorating the tragedy of war now and into the 21st Century if the issues I identify are adequately addressed. (shrink)