In this paper, I take up Herman Paul’s suggestion to analyze the process of writing history in terms of virtues. In contrast to Paul, however, I argue that the concept of virtue used here should not be based on virtue epistemology, but rather on virtue ethics. The reason is that virtue epistemology is discriminative towards non-coginitive virtues and incompatible with the Ankersmitian/Whitean view of historiography as a multivocal path from historical reality to historical representation. Virtue ethics on the other hand, (...) more specifically those forms of virtue ethics which emphasize the uncodifiability thesis, is very capable of providing such an account. In order to make this somewhat more concrete, I distinguish four important traits of virtue ethics, and I try to make clear how these can be interpreted with respect to the writing of history. (shrink)

Derek Parfit’s view of ‘personal identity’ raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. Part I of this paper argues that this assessment of personal identity undermines the distinction between suicide and homicide. However, rather than accept that an unknown metaphysical ‘further fact’ underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit’s view but offer a different account of (...) what it implies morally: that the social and legal bases for ascribing a persisting ‘personal identity’ maintain the distinction between homicide and suicide. (shrink)

Derek Parfit’s view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical ‘further fact’ underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit’s view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring (...) advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess the role responsibility argument that claims suicidal agents have obligations to specific people not to kill themselves due to their roles. Since the plausibility of the role responsibility argument is clearest in the parent–child relationship, I assess parental obligations. I defend a view that says that normative roles, such as those of a parent, are contractual and voluntary. I then suggest that the normative parameters for some roles preclude permissible suicide because the role-related contract includes (...) a promise to provide continuing care and emotional support. I propose that as we have established criteria for morally acceptable reasons for cancelling, voiding, or amending a contract, we can apply these to the role responsibility argument to establish grounds for releasing a parent from his role-related and contractual obligations. Failure to fulfil one’s contractual roles may not be blameworthy, depending upon the circumstances. I propose the factors determining culpability in failure to fulfil one’s role-related obligations are: intention, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, mental capacity, and foreseeability. (shrink)

Foucault's resistance to a universalist ethics, especially in his later writings, is well-known. Foucault thinks that ethical universalism presupposes a shared human essence, and that this presupposition makes it a straitjacket, an attempt to force people to conform to an externally imposed 'pattern'. Foucault's hostility may be warranted for one - perhaps the usual - conception of ethical universality. But there are other conceptions of ethical universality that are not vulnerable to Foucault's criticism, and that are ethically and culturally important. (...) I set out one such conception, and show why it matters. Paul Patton has argued that Foucault is best read as grounding his analyses of power in a 'conception of human being' traceable to Nietzsche. I explain why this does not amount to the ethical universalism that I sketch below. (shrink)

Social workers form part of many healthcare teams. This role can involve in-depth conversations with clients and home visits. These encounters can reveal sensitive information, not all of which may be accessible to other members of the healthcare team. Most modern healthcare systems employ shared care records, which are populated by, and accessible to, multiple members of the healthcare team. Shared care records are valued for their capacity to enhance inter-professional communication and improve patient care. But this very capacity may (...) increase an underlying tension between privacy and efficient, effective care. Ethical tensions can arise for health social workers between comprehensive documentation and protecting client privacy by limiting access to privileged information obtained in the context of a social work encounter. This qualitative empirical ethics study investigated health social workers' experiences of tensions between client privacy and maintaining complete records, and how they thought the tension should be resolved. Participant testimony informed a pragmatist approach to identify principles governing recording of sensitive information in shared care records. Three principles were identified: necessity, accuracy, and neutrality. Participants' reports of moral concerns about recording indicate that ethical tensions can occur. The identified principles offer a starting point for managing such tensions. (shrink)

Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in politics. Against this, several business ethicists and philosophers have recently argued that people can satisfy their obligations of civic reciprocity non-politically, by owning, managing, or working in for-profit businesses. In this article, I reject both the standard and the market accounts of reciprocal citizenship. Against the market view, I show that the ordinary work of profit maximization cannot take the place of traditional political activity. Yet contra (...) the standard political account, I show that a special class of the actions we perform in our work as employers and employees in for-profit companies can fulfill our obligations of reciprocity. Business ethicists must therefore develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between for-profit business endeavors and the debts we owe fellow citizens who undertake burdensome political work to our benefit. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Relationships between patients and psychiatrists are shaped by a complex array of factors. The clinical experience centers on diagnostic and treatment decisions occurring in the context of a structured relationship that is regulated by principles of professional ethics and personal boundaries. At the same, however, patients and psychiatrists are unique and autonomous agents with emotional responses to one another that may evoke a wish for a personal friendship or other sorts of personal relationships that are outside the bounds of the (...) usual professionally defined structures. Negotiating the tension between the need for professional regulation and the desire for developing a friendship with certain patients can present clinical and ethical challenges in psychiatric practice. Pragmatist reasoning can help the psychiatrist and patient to successfully negotiate the dilemma that may arise when either or both of them wishes to develop a personal friendship but still adhere to the ethical tenets of the patient/psychiatrist professional dyad. (shrink)

Political philosophical work on whistleblowing has thus far neglected the role of journalists. A curious oversight, given that the whistleblower’s objective - informing the public about government wrongdoing - can typically not be realized without the media. The present article, therefore, aims to start remedying this neglect by exploring some of the most pressing questions. Accordingly, the paper will be structured as follows: Section 1 will explain why the authorities have treated whistleblowers far more harshly than the journalists who publish (...) their disclosures. Still, the freedom of expression of media workers is less extensive than that of ordinary individuals. Section 2 will explain why by arguing that the freedom of expression of the press, contrary to that of individuals, is not an unconditional good; instead, it is good merely instrumentally. Section 3 considers and refutes an argument for a more expansive press freedom based on the marketplace of ideas model and, in doing so, also discusses some important differences between the ethics of the traditional and the new online media. Often journalists, like whistleblowers, will justify their publications based on leaked classified documents by appealing to the public interest. Yet, this is problematic for two reasons: the public interest is never clarified; and this argument overlooks the fact that the public interest can also be a reason for not publishing about leaked classified documents, even if the leaks are verified. Accordingly, Section 5 sets out to clarify the public interest. Section 4 then discusses two case studies – one concerning unverified leaks, and one concerning verified leaks – in order to demonstrate how we might employ the concept of the public interest in order to determine the permissibility of publishing about leaked classified information in practice. (shrink)

The present boosting interest for pragmatism and pragmatist approaches within the social sciences has developed somewhat confusedly in the absence of a shared conception of what a pragmatist outlook might imply for both theory and method. To overcome this failing, numerous analytical approaches have been devised over the course of the last two decades which either directly reclaim a pragmatist ascendancy or indirectly acknowledge a pragmatist influence, particularly at the methodological leve...

The ability of machines to make truly independent and autonomous decisions is a goal of many, not least of military leaders who wish to take the human out of the loop as much as possible, claiming that autonomous military weaponry—most notably drones—can make decisions more quickly and with greater accuracy. However, there is no clear understanding of how autonomous weapons should be conceptualized and of the implications that their “autonomous” nature has on them as ethical agents. It will be argued (...) that autonomous weapons are not full ethical agents due to the restrictions of their coding. However, the highly complex machine-learning nature gives the impression that they are making their own decisions and creates the illusion that their human operators are protected from the responsibility of the harm they cause. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between autonomous AI weapons and an AI with autonomy, a distinction that creates two different ethical problems for their use. For autonomous weapons, their limited agency combined with machine-learning means their human counterparts are still responsible for their actions while having no ability to control or intercede in the actual decisions made. If, on the other hand, an AI could reach the point of autonomy, the level of critical reflection would make its decisions unpredictable and dangerous in a weapon. (shrink)

Filial regard is the special consideration that children, even as adults, show their parents and filial morality the demonstration that such a regard is demanded of them. The three main accounts of filial morality, based upon ideas of gratitude, role obligations, and friendship, are shown to be unsatisfactory. The article explores the idea, found in traditional Chinese thinking, that filial regard is the ‘root’ of goodness, and suggests that the Chinese model has been viewed unsympathetically due to an understanding both (...) of the family's role in moral education and of the nature of modern morality. (shrink)

Since the 1980’s, surrogacy has become a popular reproductive alternative for individuals experiencing infertility. The ethical and legal analyses of surrogacy have been rich and varied. Some bioethicists have charged the commercial surrogacy industry with the exploitation of global southern women or with the impermissible commodification of children and women’s reproductive capacities. Others have praised the potential for economic empowerment and bodily autonomy that surrogacy may accord to women. However, throughout these explorations of the ethics of surrogacy, comparatively little attention (...) has been paid to the moral status of a crucial actor: the fertility doctor. Without doctors willing to provide prenatal and postnatal care to surrogates and make use of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), commercial surrogacy would not take place. Yet, doctors’ involvement in surrogacy is far from morally neutral. In my thesis, I aim to explore what duties doctors have in the context of commercial surrogacy. To do so, I take up the framework of fiduciary obligation. I argue that doctors have fiduciary obligations to surrogates, and that these obligations shape if and when doctors can ethically facilitate surrogacy. My thesis is divided into four chapters. The first defends the view that the doctor-patient relationship is fiduciary in nature. The second chapter extends this view to the realm of commercial surrogacy, arguing that doctors also owe the surrogates they treat fiduciary obligations. The third chapter addresses a challenge posed by my view, namely that surrogacy seems to place doctors in positions where they constantly face conflicts of interest, and are therefore unable to uphold their fiduciary duty of loyalty to surrogates. I address this concern by arguing that conflicts of interest are not inherent in surrogacy, but that surrogacy arrangements must be substantially rethought in order to safeguard the doctor-surrogate fiduciary relationship. The final chapter considers the obligations doctors have to the children they help create through surrogacy and through assisted reproduction more generally. (shrink)