In this article, I present what I believe to be the core of Jürgen Habermas’s views on the morality, ethics, and regulation of emerging genetic and reproductive technologies in his bookThe Future of Human Nature.

At its inception, geoethics was envisioned as a type of professional ethics concerned with the moral implications of geoscientific research, applications, and practices. More recently, however, some scholars have proposed versions of geoethics as public and global ethics. To better understand these developments, this article considers the relationship between geoethics and environmental ethics by exploring different aspects of the human-nature relation (i.e., the moral status and role of humans in relation to the non-human world). We start by noting that the (...) main strains of geoethical thought elaborated so far represent examples of environmental virtue ethics and defend moral weak anthropocentric positions (e.g., “ethical”, “responsible” or “enlightened” anthropocentrism). Some scholars propose that such weak anthropocentric geoethics can synthesize the different positions in environmental ethics and move beyond them toward a novel and distinct approach. We compare the meaning and the use of the term “anthropocentrism” in both environmental ethics and geoethics, stressing that although geoethics is inevitably epistemically anthropocentric (i.e., anthropogenic), it does not need to be morally anthropocentric. We consider the compatibility of non-anthropocentric stances with current geoethical theory and argue for the integration of normative non-anthropocentric accounts (e.g., ecocentric) into geoethical debates and geoscience education. (shrink)

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation (RI) focus (...) on how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI. (shrink)

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation focus on (...) how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI. (shrink)

It is more difficult to feel emotions for future generations than for those who currently exist, and this seems to be one of the reasons why we struggle to care for the future. According to a number of authors, who have recently focused on the psychological flaws that prevent us from dealing with transgenerational issues, the main problem is “future discounting”. Challenging this common view, we argue that the main reason we struggle to care about future generations lies in two (...) features of our daily emotions: the «identified victim effect» and the decrease in empathy for people who are different from us. These traits give rise to two puzzles we call the problem of the indeterminateness of future persons and the problem of dissimilarity. After having analyzed these problems of our moral psychology, we show how they allow us to account for some differences in affectivity towards a number of entities that do not currently exist, such as future generations, past generations and fictional characters. Bearing in mind the real limits of our emotions when dealing with future people, we sketch an alternative proposal on how to develop emotions to provide citizens of liberal democracies with a motivation to act in favor of future generations. (shrink)

Etymologically, autonomy is the ability to give oneself rules and follow them. It is an important principle of medical ethics, which can sometimes raise some tensions in the care relationship. We propose a new definition of ethics, the ethics of heteronomy: a self-normative, discursive and responsible autonomy. Autonomy cannot be considered without the responsibility each person must have towards others. In the care relationship, autonomy would be more the ability of each person to reach out to others than the ability (...) to decide alone. The care relationship must be seen as an accompaniment of equals where each person allows the other to be rephrased. Autonomy would then no longer be absolute but relative to each situation. Being autonomous would become an ability for adaptation of the patient-doctor pair. The accompaniment allows the birth of a relationship of trust, giving the patient and the doctor the ability to touch and let themselves be touched, thus making each one progress in this reciprocal dialectic. The care relationship becomes the possibility of considering autonomy as a collective and not as an individual notion only. Paradoxically, by promoting the autonomy of the patient-doctor pair, they both develop their own autonomy. (shrink)

After introducing some of the many issues raised by intergenerational justice, the paper will focus in particular on the motivational problem: Why should we be motivated to act in favor of others when sacrifices on our behalf are required? And more specifically, how can such sacrifices be justified when those we act for are neither born nor easily unidentifiable? While many accounts of moral motivation exist, most scholars will grant that emotional engagement is a strong motivational drive. Hence, the paper (...) will focus on such a drive. I will, first, argue that immediate emotions and empathy – understood uniquely as a form of emotional attunement – are insufficient to grant that the acts they motivate are morally acceptable. The case of future generations is a perfect example of such insufficiency. Second, I will discuss the possibility of regulated emotions and sympathy playing such a role. In fact, by regulating and educating emotions, a conscious or “rational” component is added, which could help avoid the biases and limitations immediate affective phenomena show. Such a “rational” component would also enable us to provide a criterion to distinguish cases in which emotions drive us in morally acceptable or unacceptable directions. In the second part of the paper, the sentimentalist tradition will be reconsidered, with particular attention to Adam Smith’s moral proposal – since the sympathetic engagement of an impartial spectator could be an excellent example of a regulated and educated emotional attunement of the kind required to deal with some of the many moral issues future generations raise and, in particular, with the motivational problem itself. (shrink)

The paper analyzes Max Weber’s concepts of rationality and rationalization as components of modernization processes in modern society. The author reconstructs Weber’s interpretation of “spiritual factors” of social development, which emerge in the ethos of Protestantism. The research demonstrates how Weber’s study of capitalism in terms of rationality corresponds with concepts of other classics of German sociology, such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel and others. The article emphasizes the relevance of Weber’s sociology for XX— XXI centuries and how (...) its basic concepts and methodological approaches have been further developed by scholars, including Ukrainian ones. Weber’s concept of rationality is applicable not only to the mental-epistemological sphere, it also acquires a social meaning. This approach has gained recognition in phenomenological sociology, theory of social systems, communicative theory and more. In addition to the formal rationality of the economy, modern social sciences use such concepts as social, aesthetic, ethical, environmental, and practical rationality. Weber’s “diagnosis of the age” is still a component of the “diagnosis” of modern society. The gap between values and interests remains an integral feature of the “risks and threats society” in the XXI century. This situation is especially evident in international relations, when “real politics” (Realpolitik), based on interests, becomes insensitive to “value postulates”. The author also discovers ways of value (moral and ethical) reclamation of modern society, particularly in the concepts of “ethical economy”, universalist ethics of discourse, global ethos and more. Keywords: purposive rationality, rationality (formal, material, communicative, systemic), value, ethos. (shrink)

Supererogation has gained attention as a means of explaining the voluntary behaviours of individuals and organizations that are done for the benefit of others and which go above what is required of legislation and what may be expected by society. Whilst the emerging literature has made some significant headway in exploring supererogation as an ethical lens for the study of business there remain several important issues that require attention. These comprise, the lack of primary evidence upon which such examinations have (...) been made, attention has been given to only singular pro-social acts of organizations, and the focus has been upon the actions of large organizations. Furthermore, Heyd’s (Supererogation, Cambridge University Press, 1982) original taxonomy of six supererogatory acts, comprising Moral Heroism, Beneficence, Volunteering, Favour, Forgiveness and Forbearance, has been considered to be complete and other forms of supererogatory acts have not yet been explored. In order to address these gaps this study poses the research questions: First, it studies how a single, contemporary SME performs multiple supererogatory acts in its attempts to address its social and environmental goals that go beyond CSR. Second, it seeks to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of Heyd’s (Supererogation, Cambridge University Press, 1982) taxonomy of six forms of supererogation through the capture of primary data. This research makes a three-year case study examination of a single SME that has been formally recognized for its work in addressing social and environmental issues at local, national and global levels. Primary data are acquired of the supererogatory acts that it performs through a three-year participant observation case study, utilizing 61 interviews and 3 focus groups with internal and external stakeholders. In doing so, it addresses the empirical limitations of the extant research, substantiates each of the forms that supererogatory acts may take, and makes a contribution to the theory of supererogation by identifying a further class of act that is ‘Sharing’. (shrink)

This paper investigates how the introduction of AI to decision making increases moral distance and recommends the ethics of care to augment the ethical examination of AI decision making. With AI decision making, face-to-face interactions are minimized, and decisions are part of a more opaque process that humans do not always understand. Within decision-making research, the concept of moral distance is used to explain why individuals behave unethically towards those who are not seen. Moral distance abstracts those who are impacted (...) by the decision and leads to less ethical decisions. The goal of this paper is to identify and analyze the moral distance created by AI through both proximity distance (in space, time, and culture) and bureaucratic distance (derived from hierarchy, complex processes, and principlism). We then propose the ethics of care as a moral framework to analyze the moral implications of AI. The ethics of care brings to the forefront circumstances and context, interdependence, and vulnerability in analyzing algorithmic decision making. (shrink)

The precautionary principle states, roughly, that it is better to take precautionary measures now than to deal with serious harms to the environment or human health later on. This paper builds on the work of Neil A. Manson in order to show that the precautionary principle, in all of its forms, is fraught with vagueness and ambiguity. We examine the version of the precautionary principle that was formulated at the Wingspread Conference sponsored by the Science and Environmental Health Network in (...) 1998. That version fails to indicate who must bear the cost of precaution; what constitutes a threat of harm; how much precaution is too much; and what should be done when environmental concerns and concern for human health pull in different directions. Whether this vagueness is a strength or weakness of the principle depends on what purpose(s) the precautionary principle is supposed to serve. (shrink)

The word “utopia” was coined by Thomas More and refers to the unreal and ideal state described in his Utopia, first published in 1516. Following the example of Plato’s Republic, More as well as other thinkers and writers of the 16th and 17th century reflect on the political relevance of utopia and provide unique accounts of ideal, just, and perfect “no places”, as paradigms and standards of social, political, and religious reformation of the coeval world. However, the political significance of (...) utopia relies on a basic anthropological feature, which incidentally is already underlined by More: the relationship between imagination and experience. This means that: 1) the human being’s “eidetic” freedom is characterised by the inseparable relationship between imagination, reflection, experience and action; 2) utopia is capable of disclosing the transformative and normative features related to the human being’s constitution; 3) utopia can be fruitfully used to motivate human will and mobilise support for human flourishing. In this article I endeavour to show that among contemporary philosophers it is Hans Jonas who most fully develops the anthropological significance of utopia by investigating the very relationship between imagination and experience, and by underlining how the eidetic and reflective constitution of the human being leads to ethics. As a further goal, I wish to highlight that the anthropological relevance of utopia can shed light on our imaginative and ambivalent nature, and provide a practical and educational basis for the achievement of an “ethics of images” for the current digital era. For this purpose I shall draw on the thinking of Marie-José Mondzain and Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, among other scholars. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the underlying tendencies and attitudes toward reproductive medicine borrowing the Nietzschean concepts of nihilism: “death of God” with secularization; “will to power” with reproductive liberty and technological power; and the race of “supermen” with transhumanism. Medical science has advanced in leaps and bounds. In some way, technical innovations have given us unprecedented power to manipulate the way we reproduce. The indiscriminant use of medical technology is backed by a warped notion of human freedom. With secularization in the (...) West, freedom has taken on greater significance in society, but with a heavy emphasis on individual choices and rights. As technology joins forces with sexual liberty, it is not difficult to understand why the public accepts the latest novelty from the reproductive industry. As a result, many find Catholic teaching behind the times and incomprehensible, if not downright anti-scientific. In fact, this coupling of reproductive liberty (will) with reproductive technology (power) echoes the famous dictum “will to power” Nietzsche predicted would characterize post-modern societies. When liberty becomes absolute and technology unchecked, transhumanism is the logical outcome. As a response to these nihilistic tendencies, the paper will end with a critique drawing from theological insights. (shrink)

In this essay, I ask what the precise relation is between Laudato si's theology and its claims about our individual and corporate responsibility for the environment and the plight of the poor. To do so, I first clarify the relationship between the theological claims and its account of moral norms, situating the text within the history of western ethical theory. I then turn to reconstruct the submerged theology of the encyclical, focusing on Pope Francis's accounts of the techno‐economic paradigm and (...) the possibility of an “integral ecology” paradigm. I end by assessing the text in terms of the coherence and plausibility of its argument as an ethical and theological statement. (shrink)

Theories of intergenerational justice are a very common and popular way to conceptualise the obligations currently living people may have to future generations. After briefly pointing out that these theories presuppose certain views about the existence, number and identity of future people, I argue that the presuppositions must themselves be ethically investigated, and that theories of intergenerational justice lack the theoretical resources to be able to do this. On that basis, I claim it is necessary to do the ‘ethics of (...) metaphysics’ in order to fully comprehend what, if anything, we may owe future generations. I defend these claims against some important objections. (shrink)

When we abandon the neoliberal fiction that one is independent on the grounds that it is a-historic and antisocial, we realize that everyone is dependent and interdependent. In a media-driven society the self-identity of the individual is formed within the framework of the culture-ideology of consumerism from early childhood. As a result, both the environmental and social destruction have intensified. In the global era, or in the era of the global environmental crisis, self-identity as a precondition for environmentally sustainable care (...) of the self should be based on the culture-ideology of human rights and responsibilities, and on conscious self-limitation which realizes that one’s prosperity and security cannot come at the expense of others. Care of the self is about ensuring the habitability of the global environment as the primary interest of each individual. (shrink)

Purpose of the study is explication of ethical and existential conditions of realization of human responsibility for the protection and recreation of the environment on a scale of the common world with all the other living beings. The crisis of the environment is the crisis of human morality. For responsible environmental management, it is necessary to form the ecological consciousness of society and reinterpret the anthropocentrism on the ethical foundations. The theoretical basis of the research is the analysis of ethical (...) and existential dimensions of understanding of the human environment ranging from the sphere of the home and the natural environment to the dimension of the common world of people and all the entities. The work clarifies the genesis of the concept of home from the ancient "oikos", household to the idea of home as a "hub", a base for mental and physical mobility in the contemporary technosphere. Correspondent to the transformation of the living world of mankind is the concept of communication and universal discourse of norms and values of human coexistence of J. Habermas, К.-О. Apel, D. Böhler, W. Kuhlmann, and others. The domain of the ecological consciousness and behaviour also requires motivation at the level of human feelings, beliefs, and convictions, which is represented by the philosophic and religious thought of H. Jonas, O. Leopold, K. M. Меуеr-Abich, A. Naess, the pope Francis, and others. As the result, the study proves the relevance of the concept of care about the common home based on the recognition of the value of the existence of all beings. Originality. The study explicates the genesis and meaning of the ethos of the common home with values of love, care, openness, solidarity, freedom, and responsibility which is proved to be the ethical and existential condition of the solution of the environmental crisis. The traditional anthropocentrism is reinterpreted towards the duty of people to be the centre of the responsibility for the existence of all beings that requires both reason and care. Conclusions. The ethics of care for our common home completes the moral duty of people as providers of the universal discourse who represent the interests of all beings. Concern for the preservation of the human environment and of all creation makes it possible for humanity to realize its universal responsibility in the world. The contemporaneous science and religious thought modify anthropocentrism to the holistic ethical understanding of human’s mission to be responsible for all beings. (shrink)

Захист природи і відновлення екологічного балансу людського довкілля неможливі без консолідації зусиль усього людства. Актуальною проблемою є формування етичної мотивації широкого загалу людей для зміни наявної неефективної політики і практики природокористування. У дослідженні розкрито застосування концепції покликання як філософсько-етичного феномена до вирішення екологічних проблем. Покликання визначено як смислове ціле, яке об’єднує особистісні бажання, здібності, діяльність для їх реалізації та оцінку досягнених результатів відповідно до розуміння людиною особистісного, суспільного або духовного блага, на яке вони спрямовані. Проаналізовано поклик як інтерналізовану соціальну спонуку (...) людини у сфері природоохоронної діяльності. Розкрито значення моральних почуттів і етичних принципів адвокації, солідарності, відповідальності, справедливості для виявлення і реалізації покликання до захисту природи. На основі аналізу філософських праць К.-О. Апеля, М. Гайдеґера, Т. В. Гардашук, А. М. Єрмоленка, Г. Йонаса, М. М. Кисельова, Х. Копніної, К. М. Маєр-Абіха та релігійної думки (папа Франциск, патріарх Варфоломій) проаналізовано проблему антропоцентризму в етиці і завдання консолідації антропології, етики і екології у пошуку шляхів вирішення кризи довкілля. Обґрунтовано принципи спільної відповідальності і надособистісного блага у покликанні людей на захист природи. (shrink)

In this paper, we observe an undergoing transformation in the qualification of the processes of emergence that we call ‘innovation’. First conceived in the industrial mode defined by Schumpeter within the consumer economy context, innovation has now acquired a more general meaning and has been transformed in the understanding of collective action. Against the backdrop of transformations in the industrial reality, the crisis of desire in consumer societies, and the impoverishment of the imaginary, ‘social innovation’ appears to be a new (...) form of imaginary institution of society in the definition that Cornelius Castoriadis gave to this expression. The semantic enrichment of the notion of innovation allows us to glimpse a new framework for the ethics of innovation, which needs to be interpreted from the perspective of the age of transitions. (shrink)

Business research and teaching institutions play an important role in shaping the way businesses perceive their relations to the broader society and its moral expectations. Hence, as ethical scandals recently arose in the business world, questions related to the civic responsibilities of business scholars and to the role business schools play in society have gained wider interest. In this article, I argue that these ethical shortcomings are at least partly resulting from the mainstream business model with its taken-for granted basic (...) assumptions such as specialization or the value-neutrality of business research. Redefining the roles and civic responsibilities of business scholars for business practice implies therefore a thorough analysis of these assumptions if not their redefinition. The takenforgrantedness of the mainstream business model is questioned by the transformation of the societal context in which business activities are embedded. Its value-neutrality in turn is challenged by self-fulfilling prophecy effects, which highlight the normative influence of business schools. In order to critically discuss some basic assumptions of mainstream business theory, I propose to draw parallels with the corporate citizenship concept and the stakeholder theory. Their integrated approach of the relation between business practice and the broader society provides interesting insights for the social reembedding of business research and teaching. (shrink)

Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution. Modelling cross-temporal relations on cross-spatial relations in this way obscures how earlier groups become the later ones. Procedural justice metaphors rely on metaphors of contract and thereby on impartial reasoning. Their dominance is already problematic in the case of contemporary relations, but is even more so in the case of relations across time, where the conditions for later parties are controlled and created by earlier ones. Future generations should not be thought of (...) as a distinct group living at a different temporal “location,” but as who we will become. Thus, the frame of “justice” is much less appropriate for our relations to them than the frame of “care”. (shrink)

This article uses the post-modern Nietzsche affirmation as a criterion for an analysis of the philosophical concept of the Constitution for the Earth (Šmajs, 2015) and other texts by Josef Šmajs, the principal author of the theory of evolutionary ontology. The author draws the attention of the group of authors of the Constitution for the Earth to the risk of the modernist and nihilist application of evolutionary ontology and proposes that the theory be extended to include new criteria and methods (...) to enable it to be applied in a more acceptable manner. The author places efforts aimed at the biophilic transformation of culture into the value-based and ethical framework of moderate anthropocentrism instead of the ecocentric approach preferred by the creators of evolutionary ontology. The author also underlines the risk of the application of an ecocentric approach through the application of recent analysis of media presentations of those who support and deny climate change in the work entitled Environmental Ethics and Behavioural Change (Franks, Hanscomb & Johnston, 2018). (shrink)

Karol Frenkel was one of Kazimierz Twardowski’s first disciples to undertake an attempt to develop their own concept of ethics. In his case, the process of developing his own ethical concept involved questioning the tradition in which he had been educated. Accordingly, he was able to formulate an original concept of independent ethics. In his doctoral dissertation, Frenkel analyzed two ethical systems, formulated by David Hume and Arthur Schopenhauer respectively which sought ethical determinants in the affective sphere. For Frenkel, these (...) proposals turned out to be unsatisfactory, and thus he proposed his own solution derived from the accepted concept of morality. From today’s perspective, it was the first reflection in Poland referring to scientific ethics, which – chronologically speaking – in many respects preceded the analogous solutions proposed later by British analytical philosophers. (shrink)

Modern technology presents new challenges and possibilities to the environment and life on earth. It is argued that ecology as the science of the earth as a whole cannot provide the means for making technical decisions pertaining to the environment. An alternative means is suggested in which modern technology provides the medium for communicating with nature, so that a dialogue, an intruding in and listening to nature, becomes the basis both for seeing modern technology in a new light and for (...) living with modern technology in a new way. Some theological ramifications are also explored. (shrink)

The possibility of in-breakings of God in science is discussed. A realist philosophy of science is used as a framework in which new paradigms are seen as providing ever better approximations to the true underlying structure of nature, which will be revealed in the eschaton. It is argued that ecology–the study of the earth as a whole–cannot be treated as a natural science because there can be no paradigms for understanding the earth as a whole. Instead technology is used as (...) a means for interacting with God through nature. (shrink)

Intellectual knowledge is omnipresent in human lives and decisions. We are constantly trying to make good and correct decisions. However, responsible decision-making is characterised by rather difficult epistemic conditions. It applies all the more during the pandemic when decisions require not only specialised knowledge in a number of disciplines, scientific consensus, and participants from different fields, but also responsibility and respect for moral principles in order to ensure that the human rights of all groups are observed. Pandemic measures are created (...) by politicians, healthcare policy-makers, and epidemiologists. However, what is the role of ethics as a moral philosophy and experts in ethics? Experts in ethics and philosophy are carefully scrutinising political decisions. Levy and Savulescu have claimed that Ethicists and philosophers are not epistemically arrogant if they question policy responses. They played an important role in the creation of a reliable consensus. This study analyses epistemic and moral responsibility, their similarities, analogies, and differences. Are they interconnected? What is their relationship and how can they be filled with actual content during the pandemic? (shrink)

Nanotechnology as an emerging field is strongly related to visionary prospects which are disposed to reappear as dystopian concerns. As long as nanotechnology does not provide reliable criteria for assessing these worries as rational or as irrational they remain a challenge for ethical reflection. Given this underdetermination, many nanovisions and their corresponding concerns should therefore be considered as “arational.” For that reason, a “constructivist” stance is endorsed which does not seek to take part in discussions as to how ethicists should (...) cope with controversial worries, but tries to observe how concerns are managed by different social actors. This perspective allows us to remodel some concerns such as “grey goo” not solely as a societal reaction, but also as challenging and irritating factors. As such they potentially initiate two different processes simultaneously: a differentiation in terms of demarcating science from non-science on the one hand, and a rationalization of concerns on the other. Analyzing these processes empirically allows to reconstruct how “arational” concerns are socially made rational or, on the contrary, irrational. (shrink)

Imagine your body is populated by billions of respirocytes capable of delivering 236 times more oxygen than your natural red blood cells. These mechanical, micron sized spheres are appropriately programmed by your physician to meet your personal requirements, be it the treatment of anemia or the enhancement of your physical abilities. Robert Freitas’ vision of such artificial blood cells comprised of nanometer-scale components was published in 1998 in a peer-reviewed medical journal, and was the first medical nanorobot design paper to (...) be published.The fact that this proposal for a future blood substitute was accepted as worthy of publication in a scientific journal, despite the inventor's explicit statement that such a device could not be built at the time, clouds the criteria upon which an informed opinion about the feasibility of such devices could be formed. In that respect, the idea of respirocytes formidably testifies to the current “blurring of fact and fiction” occurring in the field of nanotechnology. (shrink)

This article discusses Hans Jonas’ argument for teleology in living organisms, in light of recently raised concerns over enactivism’s “Jonasian turn.” Drawing on textual resources rarely discussed in contemporary enactivist literature on Jonas’ philosophy, we reconstruct five core ideas of his thinking: 1) That natural science’s rejection of teleology is methodological rather than ontological, and thus not a proof of its non-existence; 2) that denial of the reality of teleology amounts to a performative self-contradiction; 3) that the fact of evolution (...) makes it implausible that only humans actualize purpose; 4) that the concept of metabolism delimits and gestures towards beings performing purposive activity; and 5) that concrete encounters with living organisms are indispensable for the judgment that they are purposive. Lastly, we draw attention to how Jonas’ understanding of teleology and inwardness in nonhuman life in terms of degrees of identity with human life poses a problem for his view. In this way, we hope to clarify what Jonas, as an important source of inspiration for the enactivist project, is proposing. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

The aim of this essay is to consider how the dominant moral theories can be applied to the discourse of disaster situations. In specific times, specific values take priority. Therefore, this article will consider how moral theory deals with time. Kant’s moral philosophy has influenced ethics enormously, but rejects the idea of a temporal dimension in ethics; consequently, modern ethics has not devoted sufficient attention to the temporal dimension. Nonetheless, Kantian ethics established the basic principles of respect for human beings (...) as ends in themselves, and for autonomy of rational beings; thus it cannot be ignored. In political decision-making, simply having good intentions does not suffice; they must be accompanied by responsibility. Both the ethics of consequentialism and virtue ethics deal with responsibility for the future. Hans Jonas developed a concept of responsibility concerned particularly with the risks associated with new technologies and the ethical requirement to avoid disasters. “Uncertainty may be our permanent fate - which has moral consequences”. Public policy should be precautionary. The ethics of disaster preparation planning is distinct from the ethics of disaster response planning. (shrink)

New Breeding Techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 are revolutionizing plant breeding and food production. Experts believe that the social debate about these technologies could be similar to those on green genetic engineering: emotional and highly controversial. Future debate about Genome Editing could benefit from a better understanding of the GMO (genetically modified organism) controversy. Against this background, this paper (a) presents results of a content analysis of position papers criticizing green genetic engineering in Germany. In particular, (b) it focuses on the (...) controversy as a place where normative concepts of nature are debated and become visible. Hence, the study complements existing interpretations by showing that the emerging concepts are more diverse than the familiar reductionist breakdown of the debate into anthropocentric vs. non-anthropocentric conceptions suggests. (shrink)

What can the art of living after Foucault contribute to ethics in relation to the mediation of human existence by technology? To develop the relation between technical mediation and ethics, firstly the theme of technical mediation is elaborated in line with Foucault’s notion of ethical problematization. Every view of what technology does to us at the same time expresses an ethical concern about technology. The contemporary conception of technical mediation tends towards the acknowledgement of ongoing hybridization, not ultimately good or (...) bad but ambivalent, which means for us the challenge of taking care of ourselves as hybrid beings. Secondly, the work of Foucault provides elements for imagining this care for our hybrid selves, notably his notions of freedom as a practice and of the care of the self. A conclusions about technical mediation and ethics is that whereas the approaches of the delegation of morality to technology by Latour and mediated morality by Verbeek see technical mediation of behavior and moral outlook as an answer in ethics, this should rather be considered the problem that ethics is about. (shrink)

The article discusses the challenges, benefits, and risks that, from a bioethical perspective, arise because of the the development of eHealth projects. The conceptual framework of the research is based on H. Jonas’ principles of the ethics of responsibility and B.G. Yudin’s anthropological ideas on human beings as agents who constantly change their own boundaries in the “zone of phase transitions.” The article focuses on the events taking place in the zone of phase transitions between humans and machines in eHealth. (...) It is shown that for innovative practices related to digitalization and datafication in medicine, it is needed to rethink central bioethical concepts of personal autonomy and informed consent. In particular, the concept of broad or open informed consent is discussed, which allows the idea of moral responsibility in the field of biomedical technologies to be extended to events of uncertain future. The authors draw attention to the problems associated with the emergence of new autonomous subjects/agents (machines with artificial intelligence) in relationship between doctors and patients. The humanization of machines occurring in eHealth is accompanied by a counter trend – the formation of conceptions and practices of the quantified self. There emerges the practices of self-care and bio-power (M. Foucault) caused by the datafication and digitization of personality. The authors conclude that bioethics should proactively develop norms for the evolving interaction between doctor and patients. (shrink)

As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, particularly generative AI (Gen AI), becomes increasingly prevalent in nursing education, it is paramount to address the ethical implications of their implementation. This article explores the realm of cyberethics (a field of applied ethics that focuses on the ethical, legal, and social implications of cybertechnology), highlighting the ethical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, and explicability as a roadmap for facilitating AI integration into nursing education. Research findings suggest that ethical dilemmas that (...) challenge these five principles can emerge within the context of nursing education; however, adherence to these very principles, which is essential to improving patient care, can offer solutions to these dilemmas. To ensure the ethical and responsible use of Gen AI in nursing education, these principles must be woven into the fabric of curricula, and appropriate guidelines must be developed. Nurse educators have a pivotal role in strategizing comprehensive approaches for ethical AI integration, establishing clear guidelines, and instilling critical thinking among students. Fostering lifelong learning and adaptability is key to ensuring that future nurses can successfully navigate the constantly evolving landscape of health care technology. Future research should investigate the long-term impacts of AI utilization on learning outcomes and ethical decision-making. (shrink)

Although bioethics is a lively and expanding interdisciplinary field, there is not enough research about the patient‐doctor relationship, a central issue in philosophy of medicine. This article surveys the state of the field, paying attention to recent work by Alfred Tauber, and supplementing it with insights from Hans Jonas's philosophy of technology in order to propose a principle of responsible autonomy for health care. Based on a comparative look across different sub‐fields in bioethics, the resulting model claims that physician responsibility (...) is essential to professional integrity, providing an alternative to other active trends emphasizing patient autonomy, such as Robert Veatch's contractual model. (shrink)

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the “philosophical anthropology” presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus’ efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics (...) and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas. (shrink)

This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance. These are ontological and ethical questions, respectively. As the title indicates, I address both from a broadly neo-Aristotelian perspective, i.e. a teleological philosophy of life and virtue ethics. For brevity’s sake, I shall not argue for either philosophical position at length, but instead hope to demonstrate their legitimacy through their explanatory power. (...) I firstly argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms. I then suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterised by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life. (shrink)

Criticisms of patent laws for technological innovations in the United States reveal a multifaceted milieu of problems centered around the protection of short-term economic gain and individual property rights. In this article, we consider this a conflict between current patent laws and the innovation capabilities of organizations. We propose a solution that enables the company to assure its long-term survival in the face of these restrictions. This presumes that the firm will at least maintain its innovation capacities while preserving the (...) company's ethical values and those of its social environment. We offer a theoretical model that is designed to help managers and policymakers reorient their governance strategies for managing the innovation process, using the “ethics of responsibility,” which establishes the link to individual moral values at the beginning of a governance process as well as the consequences of a decision. Our integrated causal model of ethical innovation for patents is presented and implications for global organizations and possible solutions for patent law process failure are offered. (shrink)

One of the great dangers of our time is that the cumulative long-term action of smart socio-technical environments engineered to control thought and behavior results in an excessive loss of freedom. In response to this challenge, that we shall call humanity’s socio-technical dilemma, we outline here some fundamental ideas of a political program to control these environments, which is similar to the one proposed by Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger. It is similar insofar as we share their paternalistic and humanistic (...) approach. But it is different insofar as we claim, first, the duty to admit that it is a version of Sloterdijk’s controversial human zoo; second, the theoretical and practical convenience of identifying the human capabilities to be promoted by these environments with the capabilities necessary for the democratic electorate to comply with the competence principle; and third, the awareness of the probable long-term unsustainability of the program in a context of competition between countries and companies, in spite of which it must be implemented because of its moral superiority. (shrink)

There is a common belief that genuine awareness and acceptance of the existence of anthropogenic climate change (as opposed to either ignorance or denial) automatically leads one to develop political and moral positions which advocate for collective human action toward minimizing suffering for all and adapting human societies toward a fossil-free future. This is a mistake. Against the idea that scientific awareness of the facts of climate change is enough to motivate a common ethical project of humanity toward a unifying (...) good, I argue that climate change awareness can just as well equally motivate heightened divisions of humanity into anti-egalitarian, xenophobic, class-differentiated zones of competitive survival. I call this climate barbarism, and seek to explain its conceptual grounds. (shrink)

Karl Marx took technological development to be the heart of capitalism’s drive and, ultimately, its undoing. Machines are initially engineered to perform functions that otherwise would be performed by human workers. The economic logic pushed to its limits leads to the prospect of full automation: a world in which all labor required to meet human needs is superseded and performed by machines. To explore the future of automation, the paper considers a specific point of resemblance between human beings and machines: (...) intelligence. Examining the development of machine intelligence through the Marxist concepts of alienation and reification reveals a tension between certain technophilic post-labor visions and the reality of capitalistic development oriented towards intelligent technology. If the prospect of a post-labor world depends on technologies that closely resemble humans, the world can no longer be described as post-labor. The tension has implications for the potential moral status of machines and the possibility of full automation. The paper considers these implications by outlining four possible futures of automation. (shrink)

As a relational concept, responsible innovation can be made more tangible by asking innovation of what and responsibility of whom for what? Arranging the scattered field of responsible innovation comprehensively, starting from an anthropological point of view, into five fields of tension and five categories of spearheads, may be theoretically and practically helpful while offering suggestions for both research and management.