Este artículo explora las consideraciones éticas que rodean el uso de la Inteligencia Artificial (IA) en la academia. Se establecen principios éticos generales para la IA en este ámbito, como la transparencia, la equidad, la responsabilidad, la privacidad y la integridad académica. En cuanto a la educación asistida por IA, se enfatiza la importancia de la accesibilidad, la no discriminación y la evaluación crítica de los resultados. Se recomienda que la IA se use para complementar y no para reemplazar la (...) enseñanza tradicional. En cuanto al ámbito de la investigación, se hace énfasis en la necesidad de garantizar la calidad y la veracidad de los datos utilizados, así como la transparencia en los métodos y resultados. Se deben considerar los posibles sesgos y riesgos de la IA en la investigación. El artículo concluye que la adopción responsable de la IA en la academia requiere una reflexión crítica sobre sus implicaciones éticas. Se recomienda la creación de marcos éticos específicos para cada contexto y la participación de diversos actores en la toma de decisiones. (shrink)

As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, particularly generative AI (Gen AI), becomes increasingly prevalent in nursing education, it is paramount to address the ethical implications of their implementation. This article explores the realm of cyberethics (a field of applied ethics that focuses on the ethical, legal, and social implications of cybertechnology), highlighting the ethical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, and explicability as a roadmap for facilitating AI integration into nursing education. Research findings suggest that ethical dilemmas that (...) challenge these five principles can emerge within the context of nursing education; however, adherence to these very principles, which is essential to improving patient care, can offer solutions to these dilemmas. To ensure the ethical and responsible use of Gen AI in nursing education, these principles must be woven into the fabric of curricula, and appropriate guidelines must be developed. Nurse educators have a pivotal role in strategizing comprehensive approaches for ethical AI integration, establishing clear guidelines, and instilling critical thinking among students. Fostering lifelong learning and adaptability is key to ensuring that future nurses can successfully navigate the constantly evolving landscape of health care technology. Future research should investigate the long-term impacts of AI utilization on learning outcomes and ethical decision-making. (shrink)

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the “philosophical anthropology” presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus’ efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics (...) and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas. (shrink)

This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance. These are ontological and ethical questions, respectively. As the title indicates, I address both from a broadly neo-Aristotelian perspective, i.e. a teleological philosophy of life and virtue ethics. For brevity’s sake, I shall not argue for either philosophical position at length, but instead hope to demonstrate their legitimacy through their explanatory power. (...) I firstly argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms. I then suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterised by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life. (shrink)

One of the great dangers of our time is that the cumulative long-term action of smart socio-technical environments engineered to control thought and behavior results in an excessive loss of freedom. In response to this challenge, that we shall call humanity’s socio-technical dilemma, we outline here some fundamental ideas of a political program to control these environments, which is similar to the one proposed by Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger. It is similar insofar as we share their paternalistic and humanistic (...) approach. But it is different insofar as we claim, first, the duty to admit that it is a version of Sloterdijk’s controversial human zoo; second, the theoretical and practical convenience of identifying the human capabilities to be promoted by these environments with the capabilities necessary for the democratic electorate to comply with the competence principle; and third, the awareness of the probable long-term unsustainability of the program in a context of competition between countries and companies, in spite of which it must be implemented because of its moral superiority. (shrink)

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an ‘environmental ethic’ with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic (...) might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context. (shrink)

It is more difficult to feel emotions for future generations than for those who currently exist, and this seems to be one of the reasons why we struggle to care for the future. According to a number of authors, who have recently focused on the psychological flaws that prevent us from dealing with transgenerational issues, the main problem is “future discounting”. Challenging this common view, we argue that the main reason we struggle to care about future generations lies in two (...) features of our daily emotions: the «identified victim effect» and the decrease in empathy for people who are different from us. These traits give rise to two puzzles we call the problem of the indeterminateness of future persons and the problem of dissimilarity. After having analyzed these problems of our moral psychology, we show how they allow us to account for some differences in affectivity towards a number of entities that do not currently exist, such as future generations, past generations and fictional characters. Bearing in mind the real limits of our emotions when dealing with future people, we sketch an alternative proposal on how to develop emotions to provide citizens of liberal democracies with a motivation to act in favor of future generations. (shrink)