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  1. Reid and the State Conceptual/Nonconceptual Apprehension Distinction: A Reply to Wolterstorff.F. Adam Sopuck - 2016 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (3):297-316.
    There is an interesting controversy in recent literature over the nature of Reid's theory of perception. Interpreters are divided over whether Reid's theory of perception is compatible with an acquaintance model of perception. This article discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff's objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I argue that these objections are inadequate insofar as they do not account for the possibility that Reid offers a ‘state conceptual’ – rather than a ‘state nonconceptual’ – acquaintance theory of perception. I provide textual (...)
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  • Even If It Might Not Be True, Evidence Cannot Be False.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.
    Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism faces serious difficulties and that its (...)
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  • Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  • Internalismo E Justificação Epistêmica Não Inferencial.Kátia Etcheverry - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):527-547.
    Este artigo tem como foco a dura tarefa epistemológica que cabe ao fundacionalismo internalista, no que diz respeito às condições internalistas para a justificação, quando os seus defensores tentam explicar de que maneira crenças básicas podem ser não inferencialmente justificadas com base na experiência. Michael Huemer recentemente ofereceu uma teoria, o Conservadorismo Fenomênico, que ele alega ser a teoria da justificação fundacional mais bem sucedida entre as teorias da justificação internalista. A partir da comparação e do contraste entre a posição (...)
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  • Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
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  • Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape.John M. DePoe - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.
    Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification cannot (...)
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  • The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is the introductory essay to the collection of essays: 'Acquaintance: New Essays' (eds. Knowles & Raleigh, forthcoming, OUP). In this essay I provide some historical background to the concept of acquaintance. I examine various Russellian theses about acquaintance that contemporary acquaintance theorists may wish to reject. I consider a number of questions that acquaintance theorists face. I provide a survey of current debates in philosophy where acquaintance has recently been invoked. And I also provide brief summaries of the other (...)
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  • Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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