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  1. “Cognition” and Dynamical Cognitive Science.Luis H. Favela & Jonathan Martin - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):331-355.
    Several philosophers have expressed concerns with some recent uses of the term ‘cognition’. Underlying a number of these concerns are claims that cognition is only located in the brain and that no compelling case has been made to use ‘cognition’ in any way other than as a cause of behavior that is representational in nature. These concerns center on two primary misapprehensions: First, that some adherents of dynamical cognitive science think DCS implies the thesis of extended cognition and the rejection (...)
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  • Philosophy of Psychology as Philosophy of Science.Gary Hatfield - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:19 - 23.
    This paper serves to introduce the papers from the symposium by the same title, by describing the sort of work done in philosophy of psychology conceived as a branch of the philosophy of science, distinguishing it from other discussions of psychology in philosophy, and criticizing the claims to set limits on scientific psychology in the largely psychologically uninformed literatures concerning "folk psychology' and "wide" and "narrow" content. Philosophy of psychology as philosophy of science takes seriously and analyzes the explanatory structures, (...)
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  • There is More to Memory Than Recollection and Familiarity.John F. Kihlstrom - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Theoretical models of memory retrieval have focused on processes of recollection and familiarity. Research suggests that there are still other processes involved in memory reconstruction, leading to experiences of knowing and inferring the past. Understanding these experiences, and the cognitive processes that give rise to them, seems likely to further expand our understanding of the neural substrates of memory.
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  • What the Science of Morality Doesn’T Say About Morality.Gabriel Abend - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):157-200.
    In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...)
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  • Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale.Sungsu Kim - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
    Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for (...)
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  • Brain–Computer Interfaces and Dualism: A Problem of Brain, Mind, and Body.Joseph Lee - 2016 - AI and Society 31 (1):29-40.
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  • Body Maps in the Infant Brain.Peter J. Marshall & Andrew N. Meltzoff - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (9):499-505.
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  • Brainhood, Anthropological Figure of Modernity.Fernando Vidal - 2009 - History of the Human Sciences 22 (1):5-36.
    If personhood is the quality or condition of being an individual person, brainhood could name the quality or condition of being a brain. This ontological quality would define the `cerebral subject' that has, at least in industrialized and highly medicalized societies, gained numerous social inscriptions since the mid-20th century. This article explores the historical development of brainhood. It suggests that the brain is necessarily the location of the `modern self', and that, consequently, the cerebral subject is the anthropological figure inherent (...)
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