We study closure properties of measurable ultrapowers with respect to Hamkin's notion of freshness and show that the extent of these properties highly depends on the combinatorial properties of the underlying model of set theory. In one direction, a result of Sakai shows that, by collapsing a strongly compact cardinal to become the double successor of a measurable cardinal, it is possible to obtain a model of set theory in which such ultrapowers possess the strongest possible closure properties. In the (...) other direction, we use various square principles to show that measurable ultrapowers of canonical inner models only possess the minimal amount of closure properties. In addition, the techniques developed in the proofs of these results also allow us to derive statements about the consistency strength of the existence of measurable ultrapowers with non-minimal closure properties. (shrink)

We present a characterization of weakly compact cardinals in terms of generalized stationarity. We apply this characterization to construct a model with no partial square sequences.

We show that many large cardinal notions up to measurability can be characterized through the existence of certain filters for small models of set theory. This correspondence will allow us to obtain a canonical way in which to assign ideals to many large cardinal notions. This assignment coincides with classical large cardinal ideals whenever such ideals had been defined before. Moreover, in many important cases, relations between these ideals reflect the ordering of the corresponding large cardinal properties both under direct (...) implication and consistency strength. (shrink)

We provide a model theoretical and tree property-like characterization of $\lambda $ - $\Pi ^1_1$ -subcompactness and supercompactness. We explore the behavior of these combinatorial principles at accessible cardinals.

We prove the following consistency results about indescribable cardinals which answer a question of A. Kanamori and M. Magidor .Theorem 1.1 . CON.Theorem 5.1 . Assuming the existence of σmn indescribable cardinals for all m < ω and n < ω and given a function : {: m 2, n } 1} → {0,1} there is a poset P L[] such that GCH holds in P and Theorem 1.1 extends the work begun in [2], and its proof uses an iterated (...) forcing construction together with master condition arguments. By combining these techniques with some observations about small forcing and indescribability, one obtains the Easton-style result 5.1. (shrink)

It is proved that in the absence of proper class inner models with Woodin cardinals, for each n ε {1,…,ω}, ∑3 + n1 absoluteness implies there are n strong cardinals in K (where this denotes a suitably defined global version of the core model for one Woodin cardinal as exposed by Steel. Combined with a forcing argument of Woodin, this establishes that the consistency strength of ∑3 + n1 absoluteness is exactly that of n strong cardinals so that in particular (...) projective absoluteness is equiconsistent with the existence of infinitely many strong cardinals. It is also argued how this theorem is to be construed as the first step in the long range program of showing that projective determinacy is equivalent to its analytical consequences for the projective sets which would settle positively a conjecture of Woodin and thereby solve the last Delfino problem. (shrink)

We show that form, n≧1 the existence of a∏ n m indescribable cardinal is equiconsistent with the failure of the combinatorial principle at a∏ n m indescribable cardinal κ together with the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis.

Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel's own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology.

Using the lottery preparation, we prove that any strongly unfoldable cardinal $\kappa$ can be made indestructible by all.

Assuming the existence of a proper class of supercompact cardinals, we force a generic extension in which, for every regular cardinal [Formula: see text], there are [Formula: see text]-Aronszajn trees, and all such trees are special.

If κ is any strongly unfoldable cardinal, then this is preserved in a forcing extension in which κ fails. This result continues the progression of the corresponding results for weakly compact cardinals, due to Woodin, and for indescribable cardinals, due to Hauser.

For n<ω, we say that theΠn1-reflection principle holds at κ and write Refln if and only if κ is a Πn1-indescribable cardinal and every Πn1-indescribable subset of κ has a Πn1-indescribable proper initial segment. The Πn1-reflection principle Refln generalizes a certain stationary reflection principle and implies that κ is Πn1-indescribable of order ω. We define a forcing which shows that the converse of this implication can be false in the case n=1; that is, we show that κ being Π11-indescribable of (...) order ω need not imply Refl1. Moreover, we prove that if κ is -weakly compact where α<κ+, then there is a forcing extension in which there is a weakly compact set W⊆κ having no weakly compact proper initial segment, the class of weakly compact cardinals is preserved and κ remains -weakly compact. We also formulate several open problems and highlight places in which standard arguments seem to break down. (shrink)